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Abstract
This thesis consists of three individual models on technology adoption, contracts and 
protection. 1'he first model is motivated by the inconsistency between empirical results 
and theoretical models regarding the firm size effects upon the timing of adoption. By 
proposing a two-stage, endogenous learning, Stackelberg model, we conclude that in a 
pure strategy equilibrium, the large firm may or may not tacitly delay its adoption to 
capture the information advantage, depending on cost and belief parameters. The welfare 
analysis provides a justification for government interventions in firms’ adoption 
decisions.
The second model is motivated by the fact that although more and more resources 
have been devoted to R&D activities, there is little theoretical discussion regarding R&D 
funding issues. Chapter 3 derives the optimal funding contract, which happens to be a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract in the literature. After considering the adverse selection 
problem, the optimal contract induces no efficiency loss under both discrete and 
continuous settings and the principal will be more conservative in funding. The optimal 
auction maintains both allocation and production efficiency, and bidding the principal’s 
reservation price will be a dominant strategy in a second price auction. Neither the 
revenue equivalence nor the separation property will hold. With symmetric beliefs, the 
optimal funding length is shorter than that of contractible effort. Under some 
assumptions, the lock-in effect persists and the principal will prefer short-term contracts 
to long-term contracts.
The third model decides the optimal protection forms, protection rates and protection 
lengths under various cost and revenue circumstances. Since the incentive scheme will be 
affected by the target firm’s future profits, we show that in the context of incomplete 
information, screening protection schemes can sometimes coincide with the efficient 
schemes. In R&D area, our result suggests that optimal patent length need not necessarily 
be increasing in firm’s investment efficiency.
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1. Introduction
l . I Motivation and Methodology 
l .2 Outline of the Thesis
1.1 Motivation and Methodology
Technological change has played an important role in economic growth. The most cited 
evidence is “Solow’s (1957) discovery that only a small fraction of per capita growth (10 
percent for the US non-farm sector over the period of 1909-49) was associated with an 
increase in the ratio of capital to labour”1. The significant role of technical progress has 
led economists to study firms’ incentives to create and adopt new technologies. 
Therefore, apart from competition in prices and quantities, firms’ research and 
development (R&D) activities have been an essential topic in Industrial Economics.
There are usually three stages in R&D activities2: The first stage is the invention 
process, encompassing the generation of new ideas. The basic research or fundamental 
technological breakthroughs are mainly carried out by universities and government 
agencies. For example, more than 58% of all Department of Defence basic research 
funding is spent on university research centres (Becker (1996)). The second stage is the 
innovation process, encompassing the development of new ideas into marketable 
products and processes. The third stage is the diffusion stage, in which the new products 
and processes spread across the potential markets. This thesis consists of three individual 
models addressing players’ behaviour for these three stages in reverse order. That is, we
' Tirole(l988, p. 389).
2 The classification of three stages follows Sloncman (1995).
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first talk about firms’ adoption decisions in Chapter 2, then the design of R&D funding 
contracts in Chapter 3, and finally the design of protection scheme in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2 analyses firms’ adoption decisions under an asymmetric market structure, 
and it aims to solve a missing point in the existing literature, which is shown as follows. 
The main theme of the adoption literature has been the “timing of adoption”, which is 
basically guided by the empirical observation that firms adopt a certain new technology 
at different times. More specifically, the path of the diffusion process is frequently 
depicted by an S-shaped (or sigmoid) curve. Following Stoneman (1986), we can classify 
the theoretical diffusion literature as “probit” and “game-theoretic” models, where the 
latter takes into account the interactions among firms. Of the various issues, the effect of 
current monopoly power upon firms’ adoption decisions is of primary interest. Empirical 
studies of technology adoption show inconsistent results regarding the firm size impact 
upon firms’ adoption time, but theoretical models seldom conclude that small firms can 
possibly lead in adoption. This inconsistency between empirical results and theoretical 
models is hence the motivation for the first model of this thesis.
To be more specific, although the majority of the empirical literature reports large 
firms’ leadership in adoption, there are some cases where small firms adopt earlier. For 
example, Mansfield (1967) examines 14 innovations and concludes that larger firms tend 
to adopt sooner than smaller firms. On the contrary, in his study of intra-firm diffusion of 
diesel locomotive usage, Mansfield shows that smaller railroad companies replaced their 
machines more rapidly than larger ones. Another example can be found in Nabseth and 
Ray (1974) who conclude from a study covering ten innovations in six European 
countries that no evidence supports large firms’ leadership in adoption. In the studies of
2
the basic oxygen furnace among steel companies, Adams and Birlam (1966), Oster 
(1982) and Sumrall (1982) all conclude that large firms tend to delay diffusion.
Unlike the empirical controversy, theoretically, the "probit" (or rank) models (where 
firms’ adoption strategy present the “simple reservation property”) all assert that large 
firms lead in adoption. Examples can be found in David (1969, 1975), Davies (1979) and 
Nooteboom (1993). After introducing imperfect information, Jesen (1982, 1988) and 
McCardle (1985) assume heterogeneity of firms’ beliefs about the innovation’s 
profitability and conclude a similar “critical belief’ in adoption decisions. Another 
branch of theoretical models - the game theoretic approach, seldom addresses the impact 
of current monopoly power on firms’ adoption decisions (e.g., Reinganum (1981, 1983), 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Hendricks (1992)). An exception can be found in Sadanand 
(1989), who analyses the firm size effect by assuming one large firm facing a nonatomic 
continuum of small firms. He concludes that the large firm will adopt first as a 
Stackelberg leader and all the small firms will adopt in the second stage as followers. 
Overall, the small firm’s possible leadership in adoption seems to be a missing point in 
the existing literature. Hence, the first model of this thesis is trying to build a model to 
explain this point. The main result supports two possible outcomes, that is, the large firm 
may or may not adopt earlier than the small firm, depending on the levels of the prior 
belief and current production cost.
Chapter 3 discusses the optimal contracts for funding R&D projects. Each year, 
there are more and more resources (including money and researchers) devoted to the 
creation of innovation. For example, “Japanese government spending on science and 
technology has increased about 5% annually over the last decade”3. Freemantle (1997)
1 From Fast Asian Fxecutivc Reports ( 1996).
reports that "between 1981 and 1992, the total funding of R&D in Germany climbed 
steadily from about $24 billion to over $48 billion a year”. Yet, there is little theoretical 
literature4 specifically addressing R&D funding issues. The aim of the second model is 
therefore to design the optimal funding contracts for long-term R&D projects confronted 
with opportunism problems.
R&D projects are different from others, such as construction projects, in that the 
performance of the contractor’s effort is difficult to observe or monitor. The monitoring 
or progress-checking devices that we usually find in other contracts are not really 
applicable to R&D projects, and hence the moral hazard problems in R&D projects are 
more severe than in other contracts. In addition, as the invention processing is time 
consuming, for example, the search for AIDS remedy, most R&D contracts take the form 
of long-term contracts. These two features of R&D contracts make them to be an 
interesting topic to study. Corresponding to two settings about the timing of innovation in 
the R&D literature: the deterministic and stochastic settings (see Reinganum (1989) for 
discussion of the literature), Chapter 3 discusses the optimal funding contracts for these 
two different settings of innovation time. But essentially, the discussion of optimal 
contracts belongs to the subject of information economics.
Information economics is a broad subject with many variations. There are mainly 
two types of problems: the first is the moral hazard (hidden action or opportunism) 
problem, where “one party to a transaction may undertake certain actions that affect the 
other party’s valuation of the transaction, but that the second party cannot 
monitor/enforce perfectly”5. The second is the adverse selection (hidden information)
* The only exception is Aghion and Tirolc (1994), which will be explained in chapter 3 to be dif ferent from
our setting.
'  The definitions of moral hazard and adverse selection follow Kreps (1990).
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problem, where “one party to a transaetion knows things pertaining to the transaction that 
are relevant to but unknown by the second party”.
Most discussion of moral hazard and adverse selection problems uses the principal 
and agent framework. Our derivation of optimal funding contracts in Chapter 3 adopts 
this framework, and assumes that there is a self-interested principal who wishes to assign 
an agent to undertake a time-consuming R&D project. The assumption of a “self- 
interested” principal is in contrast to the assumption of a “benevolent” principal, who 
makes her decision to maximise the sum of all players’ expected utilities. The latter 
setting will be applied in Chapter 4, where a government agency wishes to design a 
protection scheme for the protected firm to undertake a welfare improving investment. 
Apart from this, there is another structure difference between Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
concerning the agent’s valuation from the mechanisms. That is, in Chapter 3, it is 
assumed that the project value is irrelevant to the agent, for example, one can think of the 
case of employed researchers whose research outcomes belong to their employers. 
However, in Chapter 4, the agent’s (protected firms) future profits will be affected by 
whether protection succeeds in motivating the investment. The different assumptions 
about the agent’s valuation will affect the determination of compensation scheme, as we 
will discuss in details later.
Chapter 3 starts with a deterministic setting for the timing of innovation, and 
discusses firstly the case with only a moral hazard problem as a benchmark of 
comparison. Later, by assuming the agent has private information about the innovation 
time, we discuss both the moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the contexts of 
discrete and continuous settings. The terms “discrete” and “continuous” refer to the 
principal’s anticipation about how the information that is better known by the agent is
5
distributed. The discussion of the optimal contract with an adverse selection problem 
mainly relies on applying the revelation principle (Ciibbard (1973), Green and Laffont 
(1977), Dasgupta et al. (1979) and Myerson (1979)).
When there is incomplete information, the contract (mechanism) design is typically 
studied as a three-step game. “In step 1, the principal designs a mechanism, or contract, 
or incentive scheme. A mechanism is a game in which the agents send costless messages, 
and an allocation that depends on the realised messages.... In step 2, the agents 
simultaneously accept or reject the mechanism.... In step 3, the agents who accept the 
mechanism play the game specified by the mechanism”6. The revelation principle says 
that “to obtain her highest expected payoff, the principal can restrict attention to 
mechanisms that are accepted by all agents at step 2 and in which at step 3 all agents 
simultaneously and truthfully reveal their types”. Since this principle plays a major role 
in the discussion of the optimal funding contract in Chapter 3 and the optimal protection 
scheme in Chapter 4, we present the formal statement7 of the revelation principle as 
follows.
The revelation principle says that any efficient outcome of any Bayesian game can 
be represented by a truth-telling direct mechanism. The following will describe the forms 
of a general mechanism, equilibrium and a truth-telling direct mechanism, then explain 
the principle. Suppose there is a principal and i agents (/=/,.../) with types 
A = ( A1, . . . , A ' )  from set D. The object of the mechanism is to determine an 
allocation c = {x , r }, where the vector x e X  c  1)1 " is the decision of the principal 
and r = ( r 1.......r ' )  is a vector of money transfers from the principal to each agent. A
6 Definitions of mechanism design and the revelation principle are quoted from Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991).
7 I hc formal statement of the principle is again adopted from Fudenberg and Tirole, however, in order to 
use notations consistent with the remaining chapters, the notation has been changed.
6
mechanism m defines a message space U  ' for each agent a game form to announce
the messages, and p = (p  1.... p ')  to be the vector of all messages sent by the
agents in the game form. The allocation depends on the agents’ messages: 
c m : p -» C = X  x ill ' . Assume that there is a pure strategy equilibrium p ' * ( A ') . 
Now consider a new message space D' (type space) for each i, so that each agent 
announces a type A ‘ . Denote A = ( A1, . . . , A ' )  and the new location rule as c :D —>C 
by c“( A ) = c m( p  * ( A ) ) ,  where p * (A) is the vector of the equilibrium strategies.
Theorem (the revelation principle)8
Suppose that a mechanism with message spaces U‘ and allocation function cm has a 
Bayesian equilibrium p * ( ) = { p ' * ( A ' ) (  i . Then there exists a direct-
revelation mechanism ( c ) such that the message spaces are the type spaces 
( U ' = D ' ), and such that there exists a Bayesian equilibrium in which all agents 
accept the mechanism and announce their true types.
Another interesting issue in Chapter 3 is the design of the optimal auctioning 
contract, since in most cases an agent will be selected from several other competitors. 
There are some interesting results in auction theory, including the revenue equivalence 
theorem (Vickrey (1961)) and the separation property (Laffont and Tirole (1993)). By 
comparing the results from the optimal auction and a second-price auction, we can see 
how the opportunism problem in R&D contracts changes these commonly agreed 
conclusions. The last section of Chapter 3 talks about the stochastic setting of innovation 
time (see Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1982), Harris and Vickers (1987)). With 
both incomplete and imperfect information, the design of the optimal contract becomes
“ When applying this theorem, chapter 3 and chapter 4 concentrate on a truth telling direct mechanism and 
refer to the allocation function in this theorem as the “contract" itself, and the decision x as the “allocation 
rule". The notational changes, although a bit confusing, are to cope specifically with the topic of contract
design and the discussion of auction.
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more interesting. The choice between long term and short term contracts is also discussed 
here.
Finally, the third model is motivated by the observation that government 
interventions (protection) of various forms are still used by many developed and 
developing countries, and the empirical results do not always support the positive effect 
o f protection. Chapter 4 builds up a general protection model, where “protection” is a 
general term for government interventions and could take the form of, for example, an 
export or import tax or subsidy, a voluntary export restraint, or a patent. When the public 
good property of innovation causes some difficulty in the appropriability of R&D 
activities. Patents are the most commonly used instruments to adjust this market failure. 
However, there are other government interventions with the names of regulation and 
protection; for example, the protection or subsidies granted due to the infant industry 
argument in developing countries (e.g., Krugman and Smith (1994)), or due to the injured 
industry argument in developed countries (e.g., Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995)), and the 
preparation allowance periods before the launch of severe environmental laws. A 
common feature of the various interventions is: protection is granted on the grounds that 
the protected firms can undertake a welfare-improving investment in order to adopt new 
equipment for international competition, to update machinery, to install anti-pollution 
equipment, or to invest in creating a new product or production process. The difference is 
that the preparation allowance period and the infant or injured industry protection put 
emphasis on protection during the investment, but patents are granted after the success of 
the investment. This observation of these two different forms of protection gives the 
motivation for the discussion of optimal protection schemes in Chapter 4.
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We derive the optimal protection scheme through mechanism design. As noted 
earlier, in this chapter, the principal will maximise the social surplus, and the investment 
outcome will also affect the agent’s future profits. Taking into account the agent’s future 
profits makes the discussion more complicated, as different future profits indicate 
different incentive compensations. The main result shows that only a few cases justify 
protection, and the optimal protection form could involve no protection, one-part or two- 
part protection. One-part protection refers to the use of only during- or post- investment 
protection, and two-part protection means using both protection forms. There are many 
empirical studies testing the protection effects, some of which agree with the positive 
effects (e.g., Baldwin and Krugman (1988)) and some disagree (e.g., Krueger and Tuncer 
(1982), Luzio and Greenstein (1995)). Chapter 4 says that not all cases fit into the same 
protection form, and the protection scheme will be in vain if a wrong form has been used. 
The second part of Chapter 4 discuss the setting of protection scheme in the context of 
incomplete information, and we gain some implications regarding the patent policy.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
Since the existing literature cannot explain small firms’ leadership in adoption. Chapter 2 
builds a two stage, endogenous learning, Stackelberg model in order to explain this 
missing point. After considering each firm’s reaction, it is not easy to discuss the market 
structure effect. Therefore, we follow the reasoning by Varian (1987) and use a 
Stackelberg setting to depict the market structure with different firm sizes. We have 
noted that the leader and follower structure alone cannot solve our problem. Furthermore, 
when raising funds, due to higher profits the dominant firms have relatively more internal
9
funding resources. Even with external funding, the dominant firms are seen as more 
reliable by banks and generally can raise funds at lower interest costs. The positive 
relation between discount rate and interest rate suggests that the dominant firms will put 
higher weights on their future profits than small firms. Considering the two effects from 
internal and external funding, we assume in this two stage game that the follower is more 
myopic than the leader, and to make this extreme, that the follower lives only for one 
stage*. To exclude other heterogeneous factors, we assume that both the leading and 
following firms have identical initial beliefs about the cost uncertainty and the same 
current production cost. This cost uncertainty can be resolved through learning from the 
experience of earlier adoption.
The main issue of this model is: Which firm will adopt first: the LR1" firm or the SR 
firm ? Our result supports two possibilities, that is, the large firm may or may not adopt 
earlier than the small firm, depending on the levels of the prior belief and the current 
production cost (both o f which are common to the two firms). The intuition is as follows: 
with the assumptions o f different life spans and uncertain profitability, the leading firm 
may delay its adoption in order to grasp the information benefit of learning from earlier 
adopters, but the short-lived firm can only react myopically. In making adoption 
decisions, both players will adopt cut-off strategies, and there will be a gap between two 
players’ cut-off points. This gap explains the possibility that the small firm might adopt 
earlier than the large firm. Section 2.2 also provides the comparative statics about the 
equilibrium. Section 2.3 discusses the welfare effect by assuming a benevolent central 
planner. The result justifies the situation when government intervention is needed to
As will be shown later, an asymmetric setting with the same life span will not explain the missing aspect. 
I.R refers to the large firm which lives for two stage; SR refers to the small firm which lives for one
stage. Refer to Chapter 2 for details.
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encourage firms to adopt a new technology. 1'his central planner adopts a cut-off strategy 
similar to those of the firms, and the gap between the leading firm’s critical point and the 
central planner’s cut-off point provides the justification for government intervention.
The second model is motivated by the fact that although more and more resources 
(personnel and money) have been devoted to R&D activities, there is little theoretical 
discussion regarding R&D funding issues. Chapter 3 provides a guideline to a rich class 
of funding contracts, especially for time-consuming projects confronted with moral 
hazard problems. To emphasise the opportunism problem and to set a benchmark of 
efficiency, the basic model in Chapter 3 firstly supposes that the total time needed to 
complete a project is deterministic and known by both the principal and the agent. With a 
further assumption of no initial wealth for the agent (so penalty is impossible and there is 
a moral hazard problem), Section 3.2 derives the optimal contract form from a general 
compensation scheme, which implements the agent’s full effort in the context of 
complete information. The optimal contract describes a funding period and an end-of- 
contract reward, which happens to be a multi-stage version of the “Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee” 
(CPFF) contract in the literature.
Next, we consider the case where the agent has better information about the time 
needed for completion (due to experience or expertise). Following the literature, we 
denote the value that is better known by the agent as a “type”. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 hence 
determine the optimal contracts with both moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
for cases when the principal thinks the agent’s type is discretely distributed and when it is 
continuously distributed. The discussion of both discrete and continuous settings serves 
two aims: (1) to see if the optimal contract will vary with the setting of type; (2) to 
provide a basic structure for the discussion of optimal auction design. The solution says
II
that when there are only two types (a simplified discrete type setting), the optimal 
contract will not induce efficiency loss to either type, but instead pays an extra 
information rent to the efficient type. The intuition is: any shortage in funding will result 
in the failure of R&D, hence the principal would rather pay more rent than lose the whole 
project value. When the type is continuously distributed, the principal will adopt a cut-off 
strategy in funding, that is, to stop funding for types greater than some critical value. It is 
concluded that the agent's production efficiency remains for efficient types (types smaller 
than the cut-off point), and the principal will take a more conservative attitude in funding, 
since the inefficient types will definitely take the contract and shirk.
Section 3.5 derives the optimal auctioning contract in a discrete type setting, as it 
provides a clearer idea about how an auction works in our model. In the optimal auction, 
both allocation and production efficiency persist, that is, the project will be assigned to 
the bidder with the lowest cost and the winner(s) always finishes the project efficiently. 
The principal can benefit from the agents’ competition in two ways. First, the project is 
more likely to be completed by an efficient type under an auction. Second, competition 
reduces the incentive rent for the efficient type as he is less likely to mimic the inefficient 
type who might have less chance to win. However, this rent reduction varies with the 
difference between the two types, that is, when the inefficient type is not sufficiently 
greater than the efficient type, the former might be better off shirking under the efficient 
type’s contract (which gives him a higher winning probability). Hence, to motivate the 
inefficient type (and therefore the efficient type) to choose his own contract, the principal 
has to reward more than when there is a big difference between the two types.
Finally, we relax the assumption of private information in Section 3.6, and assume 
that both parties have identical beliefs about the time needed for completion. This setting
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corresponds to the stochastic nature in the R&D literature. Section 3.6 firstly discusses 
how opportunism affects the agent’s shirking decisions under symmetric beliefs. The 
optimal contract is derived and we show that the principal’s optimal funding length with 
an opportunism problem is no longer than the contract without an opportunism problem. 
Later, we introduce the possibility of contract renewal and show that under some 
constraints, the lock-in effect persists and the principal will prefer a sequence of short­
term contracts to a long-term contract. The intuition is because the former provides both 
parties opportunities to update their beliefs in this symmetric setting.
The third model is motivated by the observation that various government 
interventions (protection) are still used by many developed and developing countries, but 
the empirical results do not always support the positive effect of protection. The purpose 
of Chapter 4 is to provide a positive guideline to various government interventions, and 
especially to address two important but usually ignored dimensions: the protection form 
and the protection length. The basic model of Chapter 4 firstly analyses the case with 
complete information but confronted with a moral hazard problem. Since the investment 
outcome will also affect the target firm’s future profits, the incentive scheme has to 
consider different cost and revenue environments in order to give the target firm right 
motivation. Various cases are classified according to the target firm’s investment ability 
and investment willingness. The investment ability refers to whether the target firm can 
afford the investment cost under its current profit, and the investment willingness refers 
to the target firm’s future profits after the completion of the investment. Hence depending 
on parameters, the optimal protection could involve no protection, one-part protection or 
two-part protection. One-part protection refers to using only during- or post-investment 
protection, and two-part protection involves both during- and post-investment protection.
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This result gives a significant policy implication, that is, as empirical evidences show 
different conclusions about protection effects: some are positive (e.g., Baldwin and 
Krugman (1988)) and some are negative (e.g.. Krueger and Tuncer (1982), Luzio and 
Greenstein (1995)), our result suggests that using a correct protection form will be critical 
for the success of investment and not all cases fit in the same protection form.
Furthermore, we conclude that whether the during-investment protection rate is 
increasing, decreasing or constant will not affect the investment efficiency, which is in 
contrast to the prevalent argument that decreasing protection rates can mitigate the 
protected firms’ pain when adjusting towards liberalisation. Finally, after considering the 
target firm’s private information about the time needed to complete the investment, our 
results show that: (1) The screening protection scheme could possibly coincide with the 
efficient scheme when only the inefficient type is lacking in investment willingness, or 
when there are only liquidity problems; (2) The screening scheme is strictly better than 
the pooled scheme of the efficient type; however, whether it is better than the pooled 
scheme of the inefficient type is dependent on parameter values; (3) Whenever there is a 
liquidity problem, the efficient type’s post-investment protection will be longer than that 
of the inefficient type; otherwise, the reverse result applies. In terms of patents, this 
means that a more efficient firm does not necessarily need a longer patent life span to 
keep incentive compatibility. The intuition is: when the target firm’s future profits are 
also connected to the success of the investment, the incentive rent (patent life) will vary 
with the cost and revenue environments.
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2.1 Introduction
We all believe that in reality market structure is seldom symmetric. For example, “A 
commonly observed pattern of behaviour is for smaller firms in the computer industry to 
wait for IBM’s announcement of new products, and then adjust their own product 
decisions accordingly” (Varian (1987), p. 458). For this kind o f asymmetric 
circumstance, the literature uses the Stackelberg model to describe industries in which 
there is a dominant firm or a natural leader. Hence, although assuming symmetry among 
firms can provide very useful (sometimes easier to manage) benchmarks for analysis, it 
cannot cover every aspect in reality. We present a “missing aspect” from the existing 
technology adoption models, and propose an asymmetric model in the hope that it can 
provide more comprehensive interpretation for this case.
The “missing aspect” is about the relation between firm size and the timing of 
technology adoption. This issue has been examined by extensive empirical studies, but 
their results do not always support the same answer. That is, large firms may or may not 
adopt earlier than small firms. For example12, Mansfield (1967) examines 14 innovations
12 Examples arc mainly cited from Baldwin and Scott (1987, Ch 4). Also see Reinganum (1989) and 
Stoneman (1995) for further surveys of technology diffusion studies.
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and concludes that larger firms tend to adopt sooner than smaller firms, but the result 
from his logistic model does not entirely support this conclusion. On the contrary, in the 
study of intra-firm diffusion o f diesel locomotive usage, Mansfield shows that smaller 
railroad companies replaced their machine more rapidly than the larger ones. In Nabseth 
(1973)’s study on the adoption of six process innovations in Sweden, only two cases have 
significant size effects. Nabseth and Ray (1974) conclude from a study covering ten 
innovations in six European countries that no evidence supports large firms’ leadership in 
adoption. In the studies of the basic oxygen furnace among steel companies, Adams and 
Dirlam (1966), Oster (1982) and Sumrall (1982) all conclude that large firms tend to 
delay diffusion. More recent work, for example Daugherty, Germain and Dorge (1995), 
show by their logistic regression results that firm size has positive impact on the adoption 
of electronic data interchange (EDI).
Two characteristics are common in the evidence: first, using the term from the 
adoption literature, “diffusion” occurs, meaning that firms adopt a certain technology at 
different times. Second, it is ambiguous whether firm size has a positive or negative 
effect on the timing of adoption. There have been substantial theoretical models13 
examining this evidence. The pioneering work is David (1969, 1975), who uses a “probit 
approach”14 where each firm with a size bigger than the critical firm size will adopt the 
innovation, and this critical value is determined by the equality of adoption benefit from 
labour saving and adoption cost. However, as noted by Davies (1979), this critical firm 
size will disappear if both return and cost functions are proportional to firm size. Davies 
proposes a model where both the expected and critical payoff periods are functions of 
firm size, and he concludes that a firm will adopt a new technology if its expected payoff
13 Refer to Nooteboom (1993) for early adoption theories.
14 Stoncman (1983) refers the "critical firm size” models as probit approach.
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period is less than the critical one. Nooteboom (1993) assumes the expected return to be 
proportional to firm size and the risk of failed implantation to be independent of firm 
size. He concludes that large firms adopt earlier than small firms. Although this “critical 
firm size approach” supports large firms’ leadership in adoption, it fails to explain the 
other possibility, that is, small firms may adopt earlier as well. Moreover, the interaction 
among firms has not been considered in the above literature.
Another strand of diffusion models assumes imperfect information about the new 
technology. The intuition is to assume that there is uncertainty regarding the profitability 
(revenue or cost) of an innovation. We can further distinguish the literature according to 
whether the uncertainty is to be resolved through time (e.g., Reinganum (1981,1989), 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Hendricks (1992), Sadanand (1989)), or to be gained by 
external searching (e.g., Jesen (1982, 1988), McCardle (1985), Toivanen et al. (1995)), or 
by learning from experience (e.g., Kapur (1992)). Except for Jesen and McCardle, all the 
other examples fit into another classification: the game-theoretic approach, in which the 
interaction among firms has been considered.
In Jensen’s (1982) model, the uncertainty decreases as the external information 
about profitability accumulates. Each firm’s adoption decision is therefore characterised 
by an optimal stopping rule. By assuming heterogeneous prior beliefs across firms, his 
model depicts the traditional S-shaped diffusion curve. Jesen (1988) extends this model 
by considering firms’ information capacity and shows an ambiguous result, that is, 
greater information capacity will increase learning and hence shorten the expected delay 
before adoption, but on the other hand, it will also induce a more stringent adoption 
criterion and thus lengthen the expected delay. McCardle (1985) presents a more general 
case by considering the information cost. All these models assume the information to be
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external, for example front “industry trade journals" (Jesen (1982)). Following the same 
line and adding the interaction among firms, Toivanen et al. (1995) examine firms’ 
adoption decisions when they can defer adoption and invest in a search for external 
information. They first derive the conditions for which a monopolist will adopt 
immediately, search or not adopt at all. Then, in a two-stage symmetric duopoly, they 
derive the conditions for a diffusion equilibrium where one firm adopts the innovation 
and the other searches for external information. This kind of diffusion equilibrium is 
firstly shown by Reinganum (1981 ) by using what is called the game-theoretic approach.
Assuming the adoption cost to be decreasing through time, Reinganum (1981) 
shows that neither imperfect information about profitability nor heterogeneity across 
firms is necessary for the diffusion outcome. By letting firms commit to their adoption 
dates, Reinganum shows that the interaction between firms alone can cause them to adopt 
at different times. However, as pointed out by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), 
’’precommitment strategies are equivalent to infinite information lags”, that is, these 
strategies ignore any subsequent information regarding the rival’s decision. Alternatively, 
they assume that firms can respond immediately and show in a duopoly case that the 
threat of pre-emption makes equalised the rents from adoption, but if the pre-emption 
gain is sufficiently small, both firms delay and simultaneously adopt the innovation. 
Hendricks (1992) cites this model and further assumes that there is private information 
about the rival firm’s innovation capacity. He shows that the reputation effect will delay 
the early adoption and hence rent dissipation will not occur. In another paper, Reinganum 
(1983) uses a static model incorporating both imperfect profitability and the rival’s 
reaction, and shows that “if initial costs are sufficiently dissimilar, then it is the high cost 
firm which adopts the new technology, while the low cost firm eschews the adoption”.
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Sadanand (1989) also derives the conditions for diffusion to occur, by using a two-stage 
symmetric duopoly model and assuming the uncertainty to be resolved at the end of the 
first stage. More relevant to the present model, he also analyses the firm size effect by 
assuming one large firm facing a nonatomic continuum of small firms. He concludes that 
the large firm will adopt first as a Stackelberg leader and all the small firms adopt in the 
second stage as followers. As mentioned earlier, these results support only one of the 
observed outcomes.
Finally, Kapur (1992) models an endogenous learning process in which firms can 
only learn from the experience of other adopting firms. Learning is through observing the 
signals sent by previous adopters. Those non-adopting firms can observe these signals 
and update their priors according to some subjective beliefs on these signals. He 
concludes that diffusion is the result of a sequential waiting game and the path of a mixed 
strategy equilibrium depicts the S-shaped diffusion curve.
The present model characterises the asymmetry among firms by assuming an ex- 
ante15 Stackelberg framework. To cope with the firm size issue, we adopt the reasoning 
mentioned by Varian, that is, the Stackelberg model is often used to describe industries in 
which there is a dominant firm or a natural leader, and further assume that the large firm 
is the leading firm and the small firm is the following firm. An interesting question to ask 
is whether this leader-follower setting alone can explain the missing aspect of the 
adoption literature. To check, for example, in Reinganum, Fudenberg and Tirole type 
models where both firms have infinite life spans, if we replace the symmetric assumption 
by a Stackelberg setting, it can be seen that since the leader has the priority in decision 
making, there will be a pure strategy equilibrium where the leader pre-empts the
15 That is, before the adoption of the new technology.
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adoption. Likewise, in Kapur's model, there will be no pure strategy equilibrium that 
supports diffusion. In other words, the leader-follower structure or endogenous learning 
alone can not explain the puzzle mentioned earlier.
The present paper proposes a two-stage, endogenous learning, Stackelberg model to 
analyse firms’ adoption decisions for an uncertain profitability innovation. We have 
noted that the leader and follower structure alone cannot solve our problem. Furthermore, 
when raising funds, due to higher profits the dominant firms have relatively more internal 
funding resources. Even with external funding, the dominant firms are seen as more 
reliable by banks and generally can raise funds at lower interest costs. The positive 
relation between discount rate and interest rate suggests that the dominant firms will put 
higher weights on their future profits than small firms. Considering the two effects from 
internal and external funding, we assume in this two stage game that the follower is more 
myopic than the leader, and to make this extreme, that the follower lives only for one 
stage. To exclude other heterogeneous factors, we assume that both the leading and 
following firms have an identical initial belief about the cost uncertainty and the same 
current production cost. This cost uncertainty can be resolved through learning from the 
experience of earlier adoption. The main issue of this model is: Which firm will adopt 
first: the LR firm or the SR firm '6? Our result supports two possible outcomes, that is, the 
large firm may or may not adopt earlier than the small firm, depending on the levels of 
the prior belief and the current production cost (both of which are common to the two 
firms). The intuition is as follows: with the assumptions of different life spans and 
uncertain profitability, the leading firm may delay its adoption in order to grasp the 
intertemporal benefit of learning from earlier adopters, but the short-lived firm can only
16 In the following, LR denotes the large firm who lives for two stages and SR denotes the small firm who 
lives for only one stage.
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react myopically. In making adoption decisions, both players will adopt cut-off strategies, 
and there will be a gap between the two players’ cut-off points. This gap explains the 
possibility that small firm might adopt earlier than large firm.
In the comparative statics of the equilibrium, we show that the realised market 
concentration for LR adopting earlier is very likely to fall below the pre-adoption level. 
This is in contrast to some other studies, for example Hannan and McDowell (1990). One 
reason for the disadvantage from early adoption is because of the perfect learning 
assumption, which indicates the high spillover or imitation effect. Later in the welfare 
analysis, a central planner is assumed to decide which firm should adopt earlier from the 
welfare point of view. Similar to firms’ decisions, this central planner also adopts a cut­
off strategy, and the gap between the leading firm’s critical point and the central 
planner’s cut-off point provides the justification for government intervention (e.g., Green 
et al. (1996)).
In the rest of this chapter, section 2.2 presents the model, the main result and the 
comparative statics. Section 2.3 is the welfare analysis. Section 2.4 concludes this model 
and discusses further research. All proofs are put in Appendices 2.1 and 2.2.
2.2 The Model17
Consider an industry where both the leader and follower are producing a homogeneous 
good. The production lasts for two stages. Due to the effects from internal and external 
funding, it is assumed that the leader has a discount rate of 1 and the follower’s discount 
rate is 0. That is, the leader (denoted by LR) lives for two stages, and shares the market
17 We consider “inter-firm” rather than "intra-firm” adoption.
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with different short run followers (denoted by SR) in each stage. The market demand is 
described by a linear inverse demand function with a constant term A and slope 1. 
Linearity is assumed to get unambiguous implications and more general demand 
functions would not change the nature of the analysis. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
both LR and SR are using the same production technology before adopting the 
innovation and have the same current production cost c , where A > c .
Suppose that both firms simultaneously confront a non-drastic process18 innovation. 
It is assumed that there is no adoption cost and the adoption decision is irreversibleIM, 
however, the adoption effect is uncertain: it is publicly known211 that both LR and SR 
have the initial assessment /?e[0,l] that this innovation will decrease the production 
cost to c, and (1 -  p) that the production cost will increase to c2, where c,<c<c2 and 
A > c2. If any firm adopts earlier, the rival firm can observe the performance21 of the 
adopting firm and update its prior. To avoid complication, perfect learning is assumed, 
that is, when each firm observes a successful adoption from the other firm, it will update 
its prior to p = 1; similarly, if failure is observed, the prior will be adjusted to 0. An
There is usually a classification between product and process innovations. The former refers to new 
goods or new services, and the latter means better ways of producing the existing products. However, the 
line between these two types is vague in reality, as a product innovation might become the input for 
another product. Following most of the adoption literature, we discusses firms’ decisions towards a process 
innovation.
The alternative assumption of irreversibility is to assume an adoption cost.
20 We did not assume common knowledge in belief in order to allow the central planner having an variant 
belief in the analysis of welfare effect.
21 The term ’performance' refers to the realised cost change from the adoption. It is assumed that the 
observation of the performance is through an informal information approach, for example, word of mouth 
from the manager or labours of the adopting firm, rather than from observing output or price. This reason 
is because the output of an early adopter is actually set ex-ante before the realisation of market price (see 
the output decisions below), and hence reveals no information about the uncertainty. However, during the 
production process, the involved individuals can somehow tell whether the innovation is really saving cost. 
Lquivalently, it is assumed that separating equilibrium of the signalling game exists, and there is no 
concealing. Hence, before the realisation of the market price, the rival firm can obtain information about 
the adoption.
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interpretation for this perfect learning setting is the presence of a highly spillover or 
imitation effect.
Since the leader-follower setting is basically a sequential game, the whole model 
consists of four stages. The timing of the firms’ adoption and production decisions is 
described as follows.
l = 1 t = 2
---------- 1---------- ------------ 1
4 4 4 4
(A) (B) (C) (D)
(A) At I = 1, LR makes the decision whether to adopt now or to wait for SR to adopt 
first, and then sets its optimal output according to its adoption decision. (B) Two cases 
are considered according to LR’s adoption decision at t = 1: (i) if LR has decided to 
adopt first, SR can observe the performance from LR's adoption, update its belief (to 1 if 
the adoption is successful and to 0 otherwise), and make its adoption decision 
accordingly; (ii) if LR has decided to wait at t = 1, SR now has to decide whether to 
adopt under uncertainty and sets its optimal output accordingly. (C) At t = 2 , there are 
three cases: (i) if LR has decided to adopt at / = 1, it now has to set the optimal output 
according to the result from its own adoption at t = 1, since the adoption is irreversible; 
(ii) if LR has decided to wait for SR and SR actually adopts at I = 1, it now has to 
observe the performance from SR's adoption, update its belief and set the optimal output 
accordingly; (iii) if LR has decided to wait for SR but SR does not adopt at / = 1, then 
again it has to decide whether to adopt the innovation and sets its output accordingly. (D) 
The decision for SR at t = 2 is the same as SR at t = 1.
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The whole process is solved backwards through time. We firstly describe SR’s
output and adoption decisions, then LR’s decisions.
2.2.1 S R ’s decision
Since both SR firms at t = I and t = 2 react static optimally to LR’s action, the following 
decision rule will apply to both SR firms. Denote qSR and q IJt as SR and LR’s outputs. 
Each SR makes its output decision by taking LR’s output as given. For a given belief p 
(could be prior or posterior), SR’s expected profit for deciding to adopt the technology is:
Jt“„ = max{/>(( A -  qIJt -  qSR )qSR ~ c,qSR) + (l -  />)(( A -  qIJt -  qSR )qSR -  c2qSR)}. (2.1)
</.v*r
The superscript “a” denotes “adopting”. To generalise SRs’ decisions in both stages, we 
keep the notation of the prior p22, and note that SRs’ expected profit is the maximisation 
over the weighted values, instead of a weighted sum of maximised values. The reason is: 
since SR’s output decision is made given the prior belief” , SR needs to set an optimal 
output to minimise the possible loss from this uncertainty. The same situation will apply 
to LR’s adoption if it decides to adopt the innovation under uncertainty. Denote SR’s 
optimal output and profit by q“SR(q tJ<, p) and Tt,’RR(q IM, p ) , where denotes the optimal 
value.
<tsKUl,j"P) = ! ( *  “  <lu, ~ (P<-\ + (' -  />>c2»
and
22 If LR adopts curlier, p could be I or 0 depending on the observation.
21 Note that the innovation is a process innovation. Before it is actually put into the production process, the 
adopting firm has to invest in other production capacity or order components, etc. Hence the output 
decision has to he made before the adopting firm knows whether the adoption is successful.
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The superscript “/in” means “not adopting”, in which case, its production cost remains 
the current production cost c. Denote the optimal output and profit as: q™R{qlJt) and
rc™ (</«). wherc
llsR ^  « ) —A ~ Vui ~ C
and
« * ( « « )  =
' ‘I  I K ~  C
Notice that SRs’ optimal variables are functions of LR’s output. To see SRs’
adoption rules, we need to compare the expected utility from adopting with not adopting.
That is, SR will adopt the technology if n j*(<?,*,£) Srcj* (</,;,) • In other words, SR will
_ __ £ —  ^
adopt if p> p](c ,,c ,c2) , and not adopt if p< p 2 (c/,c ,c2), where p ‘2(c, ,c,c2) = —^2——
C2 Cl
is the critical belief that the SR firm is indifferent between adopting and not adopting.
Two points are worth noticing: firstly, SR’s belief will affect both its adoption and 
production decisions. The intuition is: since we assume a process innovation, if SR 
decides to adopt the innovation, the output decision has to be made before knowing the 
true state of the innovation and hence the belief will affect the output. Secondly, SR’s
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adoption decision is irrelevant to LR’s output. Its decision follows a rule of thumb: if the 
proportion of the possible cost increase over the dispersion of total cost change is higher, 
SR will be more cautious towards adoption. An explanation of the irrelevance comes 
from the assumption of linear demand: SR's profits are negatively related to LR’s output 
with or without adoption. Since the extent that LR’s output affects SR’s profits is 
dependent on SR's adoption decision, SR needs only takes into account the cost effect 
from adoption. Although a non-linear demand function will cause the profits comparison 
to depend on LR’s output, it is suspected that in equilibrium we can have more useful 
insights24.
For further use, we summarise SR’s adoption and output decisions as follows:
For pe (0,1), SR will adopt if p > p'2; otherwise it will not adopt.
The optimal respective outputs for adopting and not adopting are: 
fsMu<d>)=\(A-<lu' - ( /« ’, + ( l-p )c 2)) if p > p 2(c„ c ,c2),
<?sk(<7/.#) = ~ ‘Ilk ~ c) if  P < P\ (f, ,c ,c2). (2.2)
2.2.2 LR’s decision
LR’s adoption decision occurs in three cases: (i) at t = 1, it has to decide either to lead the 
adoption or to wait; (ii) if it decides to wait and SR decides to adopt at t = 1, then at 
t = 2 LR has to make its adoption decision according to its posterior belief; (iii) if it 
decides to wait but SR does not adopt at t = I , LR faces a static adoption decision with 
its belief remaining the prior. As noted earlier, SR’s decisions are affected by the cost
2,1 For example, we might need more assumptions to present the difference of LR and SR firms’ adoption 
decisions in this paper.
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uncertainly, and hence in LR’s expected profit functions, both the anticipated cost and 
demand are related to this uncertainty.
At / = I if LR decides to adopt, its intertemporal expected profit is :
71 ;j? = niax{/J(( A — q u, — qSK(q iJt ,1))<7 ¡jt ~ t'iq ijt) + (I — p)((A — if,K — qSR (c] IJt ))cf IJt —•a*
+ p max {(A — (¡¡A — ■I))'/;.* — L\q  ut }
<Ilk
+ (1 ~ p) max{( A —tfu f— i j j  (<1 ijt ))q ijt ~ c2ci ijt} • (2.3)
Again, the superscript “a” denotes “adopting”. The first maximising term is LR’s 
expected profit for the first stage and the second and third terms denote its second stage 
expected profits for possible adoption success ( c ,) or failure (c2) with probability p and 
(l -  p) respectively. Note that LR’s optimal outputs in these terms are different. The first 
term is the maximisation over the weighted profits, instead of a weighted sum of 
maximised profits. The argument is similar to SR’s decision: since the output is set 
before it knows the true state of the innovation, LR needs to set an output to minimise the 
possible loss from this uncertainty. The difference now is: LR has to take into account 
SR’s reaction function in the anticipated demand. Recall the definitions of q“SK(q u f 1) anc* 
q Z (qLR) from equation (2.2). (A -q ,j ,  - q '^iq ,j,, 1)) means that if LR’s adoption is 
successful (cost decreases to c, ), SR will observe the success and update its belief to 
p = 1. From SR’s adoption decision rule, we know that SR will adopt and set an optimal 
output q‘iK(q,.„,!). Similarly, ( A - q - q ' ^ q „ ) )  means that if LR’s adoption is 
unsuccessful (cost increases to c2), SR will update its belief to p = 0 and set an optimal 
output q?„(q,j,).
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The meaning of the second and third terms are similar. If LR's adoption at / = 1 is 
successful, it’s production cost decreases to c , . The SR firm at 1 = 2 also observes LR’s 
success and hence updates its belief to p = 1, adopts the innovation and produces 
,1). Therefore, LR’s anticipated demand for a successful adoption is 
( A —q IJt -q ^ iq ,*  ,1)) ■ Likewise with probability (1 — p ) , LR’s adoption is expected to 
be unsuccessful, and its cost and anticipated demand will be c, and ( A - q ,R -q™R(qtR)) 
respectively. LR’s expected profit in the second stage is the weighted sum of two 
maximising terms, because the uncertainty has been resolved through its own adoption at 
/ = I , and hence LR knows its product cost for sure and sets its output optimally.
If the LR firm decides to wait, its expected profit function will depend on whether 
SR adopts at r = l .  Therefore, two cases will be discussed : p< p2(cn c,c2) and 
p> p 2(c ,,c ,c2).
I. p< p'2(c ,,c ,c2)
LR’s intertemporal expected profit from waiting will be:
The superscript “w” in jt^„(l) denotes “waiting” and “ 1" in the argument denotes the 
first case: p < p 2(c ,,c ,c2) . In this case, SR will not adopt and hence LR’s expected 
profits will be the same for both stages. To sec this, since in the first stage LR decides to 
wait, its production cost will be c and the anticipated demand will be 
(/f - q IR -q™ (q ,R)) . In the second stage, as learning is endogenous and neither SR nor
(2.4)
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LR adopts in the lirst stage, the belief remains the prior as in the first stage. Again, LR 
faces the choice between adopting and not adopting, but now the decision is static. We 
need to compare LR’s single stage expected profits from both of its choices. If LR adopts 
now, its anticipated demand will be p(A — q,K — q'Z(qut^))
+ (1 -  p ) ( A - q IJ( -</."«(</,.*)). or in short, + (PC i + 0  -  P)c)) ■ This value is
less than the anticipated demand for not adopting which is ( A - q IJt — <7 (<?«)) > or 'n 
short, y( A — q ,H +c) (since pc, + (1 — p)c < c). Moreover, LR’s expected cost from 
adopting is pc, + ( 1 - / j)c2, which is higher than the expected cost for not adopting c
(since p < p\ = C2 ~ C ). Further, for a given q,k , the marginal profit for not adopting is
C 2 i-1
higher than from adopting, indicating that LR’s optimal output for adopting will be less 
than not adopting as well. Therefore, we can conclude that LR will have a higher 
expected profit from not adopting the innovation in this case. The intuition for the 
disadvantage from adoption is: since LR’s intertemporal benefit from successful adoption 
disappears in the static decision, if it is not worthwhile for LR to adopt the innovation in 
the first stage, it is not worthwhile to adopt in the second stage either. Hence its expected 
profit for the two stages are the same.
II. />> p \(c ,,c ,c2)
LR’s intertemporal expected profit from waiting for this case is:
7t* (2) = max{(A — q tA - q as„(.Qu,^P))^ui - ° ? m }‘//A 1 3
+ />max{(<4 -q,j, - q“SK(Qu,.0)9ut ~c\<?,*}‘//A 1
+(l —/*) roaxf(A — qijf — lr (2*5)
a. u *■
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The superscript in 7t “K (2) denotes “waiting” and "2” in the argument denotes the 
second case: p > ). In this case, the SR firm will adopt. The first term denotes
the expected profit from waiting for SR to take the risk from early adoption. Anticipating 
that SR will produce an optimal output q ^ lq ^ .p )  • LR has an anticipated demand
(A — q IJt — <i“sR(<iut<p)) and the current cost c. This is different from equation (2.3), 
where LR instead of SR bears the risk of early adoption. The second and third 
maximising terms have similar meanings to those in equation (2.3). The difference is: in 
this case, the information comes from SR instead of LR, hence in the third term LR is 
able to avoid the cost increase by observing SR’s performance and not adopting the 
technology. In our notation, rather than producing with cost c2 in k “k , LR will produce 
with cost c .
LR’s decision rule is to lead the adoption in the first stage if 7t’,^ > 7t ’,^( 1)
( k '¡‘j, > K (2)) in the case of /> < p j ( p > p \ ), and to wait in the first stage otherwise. 
Lemma 2.1 firstly shows the existence of a unique critical belief p*ly(ct,c ,c2, A) e [0,1]25 
such that Jt (/) = 7t '/j,, i = l ,  2, and some properties of p*n(c,,c,c2. A) when 
characterised in (p,c) space.
Lemma 2.1
(1) Define d, = 71^(1)-n " j, and d2 = 7 t^ (2 )-7 t“s to be the differences of LR’s 
expected profits from wait inf; and adopting in the cases of p < p'2(c ,,c ,c 2) and 
p> p \(c /,c ,c 2) respectively. There exists a unique p\{' \ c x,c,c2. A) e  [0,1] such that 
i/, =0. Similarly, there exists a unique pi'2\ c t,c,c2,A ) e  [0,1] such that d2 =0.
25 Since cli and d> (defined in Lemma 2.1) are polynomials of more than one degree, it is necessary to know 
whether there are solutions lying in the interval of [0,11.
(2) When presented in (p,c) space with c e [ c ; ,c2], i f  market demand is sufficiently high
2c2 . -  , -
(i.e., A > —— ----t- c, ), p , ’(c,,c,c2,A) > p2(c ,,c ,c2) for all c e (c , ,c 2] and with
3t-2 -c ,
equality at c = c ,.
The proof is in Appendix 2.1. This lemma says that LR adopts a cut-off strategy in 
its adoption decision, and the cut-off value is proved to be higher than SR’s cut-off point 
except when c = c , . Notice that /ji‘" i(c, ,c,c2,A) > p 2(c,,c,c2) actually means that when 
SR does not want to adopt, it is also optimal for LR not to adopt. The more interesting 
case is when p ‘l(2\ c l,c,c2,A )2f' also lies to the right of p'2(c,,c ,c2) . Hence in the 
following, we concentrate on this case. To illustrate this theoretical result, a numerical 
case (c,,c2,A) = (1,10,50) is presented as Fig. 1.
As shown in Lemma 2.1 that except for c = c , , p\{2) > p\ for every c , we can 
divide the rectangle [0 J]x [c ,,c2] into three areas: A, B and C. The main result of this 
model is summarised as Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1
A pure strategy equilibrium says that when the prior and current production cost pair 
(p,c) is located in area A, LR will adopt first; when it is in B, SR will adopt first; and 
when it is in C, no adoption will happen. In other words, depending on parameters, the 
LR firm may or may not adopt earlier than the SR firm, or both firms will not adopt at 
all. 26
26 The explicit function form of p[ is,
p\ = {-2c, A + 5Ac 2 +c ,C j  + c ,c  + 4 r2c -  iAc -  5cj -  c 1 - | 4 c J  -  20Ac] + 9 A 2c 3 - 4 / 4 ? ’  + c f c 2
44c,c, 4- c 2c, + 4 ? ’ c, 4-I2c ,3? ! -  !6c,c ’ - 2 ( M ! c ,c ,  + { 2 A 2c , c  -  A A c f i ,  -  44c,2? 4-1 (Me, c , - 2 2 4 c , ? 2
- 3 0 4 2c , ?  4- 16/4c,?2 4- 2c , c 2?  -  24c,c ,?  4 Kc,c ,?2 4 2K 4c,c ,?  4  4/42c 2 4 25/42cf 4 4 c 411/2}
/(c, - ? ) ( 2 c ,  4 ? -  3 c , ).
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The existence of area B is the most interesting result of this model. The possibility of 
waiting gives LR an information advantage from delaying adoption, meaning that if SR 
ever adopts at t= l, LR can benefit by making production decisions under certainty. 
Hence compared to SR, the LR firm tends to be more conservative towards adoption, 
which can be seen from p ‘<2) > p \ . Areas A and C coincide with Rcinganum (1983) in 
the sense that if the current costs are sufficiently high (low), both (neither) of the firms 
will adopt. Moreover, we know from Lemma 2.1 that when both firms adopt in the first 
stage, LR will adopt first. Area B indicates the case when current cost is at an 
intermediate level. As LR’s cost benefit form early adoption is less that the information 
advantage, so LR forgoes its priority in adoption.
The comparative statics about the equilibrium is presented in Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2
(!) />,*<2) (t'| ,c,c2, A) is increasing with c ,,c 2.and A, hut decreasing with c.
(2) p ‘2{c ¡,c,c2) is increasing with ct ,c2, hut decreasing with c.
32
The proof is in Appendix 2.1. Moreover, we can derive some implications regarding the 
possibility of each result in Corollaries 1-3.
Corollary 1. The possibility that LR adopts earlier increases with the current cost.
The possibility that LR will adopt earlier is described by 1 - p\i7) (cx,c,c2,A ) , which 
is area A in Fig 1. Combining the fact that p\ is decreasing with c , we know that this 
possibility is increasing with the current cost. A higher current cost means that LR has 
higher cost benefit from adoption than in a lower cost case.
Corollary 2. The possibility that neither firm adopts decreases with the current cost.
The possibility that neither firm will adopt is described by />j(c,,c,c2) , which is 
area C. Again this is simply shown by the effect that p ’2 is decreasing in c. A further 
implication is about the market concentration after adoption:
Corollary 3 For a given current production cost and prior, if  LR adopts a successful 
innovation earlier, the second stage market concentration21 will remain at the pre­
adoption level and the first stage market concentration will decrease.
The second stage’s market concentration following LR’s successful adoption will 
remain at the pre-adoption level28: ^ . The intuition is because: if the cost decreases after 
adoption, the SR firms will follow suit immediately. As both LR and SR will produce
27 Market concentration is defined as the ratio of LR’s realised profit to SR’s profit. Since the assumption of 
oligopoly, the alternative definition in terms of firm number does not suit our model.
1 LR's second stage profit for successful adoption is:
. (A-c, )2------------; SR s profit is: -------------16 . Hence the
concentration rate is 23 '
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with a lower cost, the market concentration will remain the same. However, for the first 
stage, since LR’s ex-ante output'* will be lower than the optimal output for c, , together 
with the fact that SR will produce the optimal output with cost c, (hence having a higher 
profit), we know that the concentration ratio will be lower than the current level. An 
interpretation for this disadvantage from adoption is the existence of high spillover effect 
(perfect learning). Hence, despite some empirical studies concluding that large firms 
adopting earlier will increase the market concentration (e.g., Hannan and McDowell 
(1990)'°), our result says that the reverse will happen if the spillover or imitation effect is 
very strong.
The impact of increasing c, and c2 is equivalent to decreasing the proportion of the 
cost reduction from a successful adoption over the cost increase from a unsuccessful
adoption (i.e., -— ^4). Hence, the impact from increasing c, and c2 is the opposite of
c2 — c
the effect of increasing c . Finally, increasing the market demand raises the cut-off value 
p i(c ,,c ,c ,,A ), and hence also decreases the possibility that LR adopts earlier. We can 
see the intuition for LR’s conservative attitude from its expected profit functions: 
comparing n “IR and 7t (2) shows that the comparative advantage from adopting rather 
than waiting mainly comes front the cost benefit in the first stage. When market demand 
increases, the relative importance of the cost benefit decreases and hence LR is more 
likely to wait. *1
29 LR’s exuntc output for adopting in the first stage is: — pc{ -2(1 -  />)c2 +(l -  p)c) ; LR’s
optimal output for cost C, is r/,^  = \ ( A  — c*,).
111 Hannan and McDowell (1990) give this conclusion from investigating bank adoptions of automated teller 
machines.
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2.3 Welfare Analysis
In this section, the welfare effect is analysed by supposing a central planner, who wishes
This planner is also uncertain about the profitability of the innovation. To avoid 
confusion, let p t be the planner’s belief that the innovation will decrease the production
cost to c, . Each firm’s belief and cost parameters are known by the planner. To see 
which firm should adopt first from the welfare point of view, we need to calculate the 
welfare effect for each decision. Let W/’k denote the realised welfare for each stage 
i = 1,2, each of LR’s decision j= a, w (a for adopting and w for waiting), and each 
possible result of the adoption k= g, b (g for success and b for failure). Define 
W{J t =CSl' t + , which is the sum of consumer surplus CSf k and the firms’
realised profits With linear demand, we can easily calculate consumer’s surplus
(= |(fo /« / output)1), and LR and SR’s realised profits can be derived similarly to the 
analysis of each firm’s adoption decision. The definition of W," * is explained in detail 
here and we leave the others for Appendix 2.2. W,“'* is stage l ’s welfare level when LR 
decides to adopt first («) and the planner thinks the adoption is going to be successful (g), 
which is:
11 The welfare effect is restricted to a single industry and the assumption that the income effect is zero, that 
is, we are not using a general equilibrium approach.
to decide which firm should adopt first if it is to be better for the whole economy ' 1.
>1 = Ut.SR
W’“" —"2 [</”.*+<7.v#(i/jt>1)] + {(^ <//j( ciQut}
(2.6)
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—(/‘¡jt is LR's first stage optimal output if it decides to adopt first (see footnote 26 for the 
explicit form of ), and <7s»(9«,l) is SR’s reaction function for p = 1. Remember that 
in this case, the central planner thinks the adoption will be successful, so after LR’s 
adoption the planner will expect SR to update its prior to p = 1, adopt the technology and
set its output as qaSR(qaLK, 1). Hence the consumer surplus will be j[ q a,j, + <7™ (<7^,1)] , 
which is half of the squared total output in the industry. The second term 
{( A -  q“iJt -  qsK(q1J,A))q‘!j, -  } is LR’s realised profit for this case, where the central
planner anticipates LR’s production cost to be c,q“,j , . The definition for SR’s realised 
profit { ( A - q ^ - q l R(qlKA))qsR(qautA ) - c xqaSK(q“lJ,A )\ can be explained in the same way. 
For this central planner, LR adopting earlier will be better for the whole economy if:
P„(w r  + W"*) + (1 -  p , )(w ;h + W2“h)> P '(W f*  + ) + (1 - P ')(Wf* + W2wh) (2.7)
By setting pK = p , we can calculate the planner’s cut-off belief p*, when there is no
welfare difference for LR to adopt or to wait in the first stage. Unfortunately, due to the 
complication of function form52, it is not easy to derive any general implication from this 
cut-off belief. However, with the same numerical example (c,,c2, A) =(1,10,50) as Fig 1, 
we have Fig 2.
12 The explicit form of /<’ is:
/>,* = (- lO c./t + ISAcj -  5Ac -  I3c,c2 + I Icjc + 3(ic2c + 6 c2 -  I9c| - 2 1 c 2 - | I 9 6 cJ - 4 2 (M c J  
+25/tJc 4 -  12()4c ' + GOIc'jC2 -  156c2c? -  364cjc, - 7 1 c Jc 2 +I32cc,5 -  504c5c, + 4 2 0 c jc 2 -  l(X)8c3r 5 
-3(KI/t!< l C; + l(X)/t2c ,c  -  l60/tc?c2 +320A c ,2c  + 7704c ,c | -  1 10 4 c ,c2 -  I5 0 4 2c ,c  + 404C jC  
4420/tCjC2 -  574« ¡t f c  -8K O cj2c ,c + I764c2c , c ! -  6 20 4 c ,c2c + l(X )42cp -  I204cj’  + 22542c|
+36c,4 + 4 ( is r111' 21 / |-26<, c2 -  14c, c + 36c2c + 20c,2 -  5c2 -  1 I c 2).
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When a (p,c) pair is located above p*, the central planner will think it optimal for 
LR to adopt first, and for SR to react to LR’s adoption result afterwards; when a (p,c) 
pair is below p* , the central planner will think it optimal for LR to wait, and respond 
optimally after observing SR’s adoption at stage one. Notice that in Fig 2, p’g lies
between p ’ and p ’ , indicating a gap between the planner’s desired equilibrium and the 
actual equilibrium. When (p,c) is in area A or C, the actual equilibrium coincides with 
the planner’s desired equilibrium.
Interesting implications come from areas B, and B2. Area B2 is the case when both 
the actual and desired equilibria are characterised by LR waiting and SR adopting in the 
first stage. In other words, there is no conflict between LR’s decision and welfare. Area 
B, is the situation when the actual equilibrium describes LR to wait and SR to adopt in 
the first stage, but the desired equilibrium says LR should adopt earlier. In other words, 
area B, denotes a situation when LR’s optimal decision will cause welfare inefficiency. 
The intuition for the relatively optimistic attitude of the central planner is because the
expected cost increase from an unsuccessful adoption for the whole society is less than 
that for the LR firm alone. Hence, the area /¿, illustrates a need for policy intervention in 
firms’ adoption decisions about this cost uncertain innovation. An example of 
government interventions in technology adoption is in the water industry, where water 
price reforms are increasingly used to encourage improvements in irrigation efficiency 
(Green et al. (1996)).
2.4. Conclusion and Further Research
Although most of the evidence shows large firms’ leadership in adopting new 
technologies, there are some cases when small firms do adopt earlier. The existing 
literature can only explain one possible outcome which asserts that large firms always 
adopt earlier. To interpret the missing aspect, the present paper proposes a two-stage, 
endogenous learning, Stackelberg model to analyse firms’ adoption decisions towards an 
innovation with uncertain profitability. By assuming identical prior and cost for each 
firm, our model derives a pure strategy equilibrium in which the LR firm may adopt first, 
the SR firm may adopt first, or neither of them may adopt. More specifically, it is 
concluded that when current cost or the belief is sufficiently high, the LR firm is more 
likely to adopt first. The SR firm will adopt first for intermediate levels of initial cost and 
belief, and no adoption will happen if initial cost or belief is sufficiently low. This result 
explains the missing aspect in the adoption literature. The comparative statics shows that 
the possibility of LR adopting earlier is negatively related to market demand and 
positively related to the ratio of possible cost reduction over possible cost increase. It also 
says that the realised market concentration for LR adopting early is very likely to fall
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below the pre-adoption level. The welfare analysis provides a justification for policy
intervention with firms' adoption decisions. An interesting extension of the model is to 
assume that there are more than one following firms. By forming an adoption coalition, 
there could he an equilibrium where one small firm takes the lead in adoption under co­
ordination. Moreover, since adoption is basically an irreversible investment, the model 
can be applied to various investment cases, such as the launch of McDonald into the 
Chinese market. The uncertainly associated with the investment may come from 
consumers' preferences, and natural or bureaucratic environments. We leave the detail 
for future discussion.
Appendix 2.1
Proof fo r  Lemma 2.1: (1) Recall the definitions of , 71^(1) and n wIJt(2) from 
equation (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5). Calculate the optimal outputs and substitute into the 
respective profit functions. In order to tell the sign of the derivative, the envelope 
theorem is applied to the first term of equations (2.3) and (2.5):
- c . - c )  + {(2c2 — c —c,)(2a -2 c , - c  + 2c2)]< 0 .
= (A — Cj)(Cj - c )  > 0 , 
d \p =i = i (<•' -  t'i)(c2 -  2A + c) < 0.
and
- i ^ - i ( A - c - 2 c 2)2] < 0 ,
i/2|/Cn = j ( t 2 -  c)( 10A -  7c2 -  3c) > 0 , 
d 21P-1 = -j U'i -c )(A  - c )  < 0 .
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= 4(/4 -p c ,  -2(1 -  p)c2 + (I -  />)c) is the optimal output for the first maximising 
term of 7t'„,, and </J“ (2) = + pc, + (1 -  p)c2 -  2c) is the optimal output for the first
maximising term of it',v„(2). Since both functions are negatively related to p and the 
function values at p = 0 and p = 1 have different signs, we can conclude that there exists 
a unique p ‘,0)(c,,c,c2, A) e  [0,1] such that c/ l=0 and a unique p ’li2\ c l,c ,c2. A) e [0,1] 
such that </2 = 0 .
(2) The proof of the second part of the proposition is less intuitive, because the explicit 
forms of />,'•" and p ‘,2) are complicated. However, several properties can be examined to 
obtain general implications regarding p '° ’ and p2 in (p,c) space. Firstly, when c = c, , 
both p f ’and ¡>\a) will be one. When c = c2, these values are not defined, because the 
denominators of p[u) are 0. However, by applying L’Hospital’s rule, it can still be 
checked that both p^ 'an d  p\a) approach 0 when c approaches c2. Secondly, it can be 
calculated that both p,"*and p*<2) intersect with p2 only once at the corner
d //121and * < 0 , where
dc
dpi0’ _ r)</, / dc U - j d  + i c ) - i ( i - p ) q j JI+ i O - p ) ( i A  + j c - c 2)} 
dc/, / dp
< 0 ,
dc dc/, / dp 
and
dp',t2) _ del, / dc 
dc dcl2 / dp
U - q Z - H l -  P M A - t c ) ) - W ~  PXW u, + A + c - 2 c2))
dcl2 / dp
Moreover at the point (p.c) = (l.c ,) , the slopes of p',°' and p,'<2) are bigger than p\ for
sufficiently high market demand, i.e.,
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and
Hence, we can conclude that if market demand is sufficiently high, then
Proof for Proposition 2.2: (1) Lemma 2.1 shows that p\a) decreases with respect to c . 
The rest is proved by applying the implicit function theorem and the envelope theorem:
q J" (2) and q)aM are defined in the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Appendix 2.2
The following optimal outputs are from LR and SR’s maximisation problems, and will be 
applied to the calculation of W/'k = CS/’k + y.7t /.'* .
qa,j, = 9 «  = \ ( A - p c ,  -  2(1 — p)c2 +(1 - p ) c ) ,  
</,*(2) = </,* (2) = *(A + pc, +(1 - p ) c 2 - 2 c ) .  
</u,( l) = 4(A-c,),
9ut(0) = i ( A - c 2),
q“s»(.<iij<<p) = H A - ‘ii* -(P ci +( \ - p ) c2)), 
<7.w(9/.*) = 4 (A -  q, R -  c ) .
p* '\c ,,c ,c2,A) > p2(c,,c,c2) for all ce ( c , , c 2] and with equality at c = c , . Q.E.D.
dp',k2) dd2 / dc,
dc, dd2 / dp
9/?*<2> _ del2 / dc2 
dc2 dil 2 I dp
and
dd2 I dp
It (1 -P )< ? ;I (2 ) - [ (P -1 )9 ^ + 1 (P -1 )(A  + c - 2 c2)]1 
dd2 / dp
> 0 ,
dp',{2) dd2 / dA
d A dd 2 / dp
(2) It can be checked from the definition. Q.E.D.
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( 2.6)
^ 1  —  2 [*/ IR  9.V* ( 9  IJt • O  ]  +  { (  ^  ll l R  *i Sr Í Q  IR  «O )* /  (J? C i * h j t }
■*■{( ^  — y  IR ~  (I.SR (ll IR <l))(lsR (y IR *1) ~ C\ y  SR (y IR >1)}
=  ^  [v /jt "*■ is« (^ /J»  )] ■*■ { ( ^  — Q u t  ~  Q s r Î Q i r  LR ~  C l <! u t  }
+ {( ''l — <llR ~  UsR ( y  IR ( y  IR ) -  °?»  ( y  IR )} (2.6-1)
^ 1  * =  2" \{ l  IR  *  Q  SR ( y  IR  '  p ) \  +  { (  ^  ~  y  IR  ~  t / s R ^ I R  ’ IR  ~  C(i  IR  }
+{M -</,"* -  ‘ísrÍVÍr , p W sr((/7r . P) -  c,(isRUhR. P)} (2.6-2)
W, = 'i \‘l ir Qsr (<//.«> /O] {(A — q ir — qSR(q ,r , p))q ir — t(j ¡r ^
■*"{( 4 — y ir  ~ 9 » (9  ut * P))9»(9 u» » P) — Cjt/sR^ lr > P)} (2.6-3)
w2“-x = wç •« =i[<//J,(D + ^ (< ? iJ,0 ).i)]2 + { (A -9iJ,(i)-<5rS,(<?ü,( i ) . i ) ) 9 „ 0 ) - c l9iJ,(i)}
+{( ^  -  <ÎLR ( ■) -  9.W (</,* ( D .D )í¿ (<7;jî (0.1) -  (<7¿j, (0.1)} (2.6-4)
W2U* = 4[</(J((0) + 9™(^uî(0))]2 + {(¿ -  </,*(0) -  < i ? R ( c j i R m ) < i , R ( 0 )  - < ^ „ ( 0 ) }
+{( A ~ V , r (O) -« 5 (< /«  (0)))</£ (9« (0 )) -  ce ,- (qu , (0))} (2.6-5)
K *  = *[</£ + 9 2 (9 5 )]*  + {m - î ï  - « S t o Z ï t o Z
+ { M " 9 S  - 9 Ï ( 9 S ) ) 9 5 ( « S ) - ^ S ( 9 S ) }  (2.6-6)
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3.1 Introduction
Most R&D funding contracts take the form of “long-term contracts”. The reason is not 
only because a long-term contract is an optimal way to implement efficient investments 
(if possible), but also, most importantly, because R&D activities are actually time 
consuming and the results of R&D are either successful or not (binary). One can think of 
the research for AIDS medicine for example: although AIDS was first identified in 1981, 
there is still no effective remedy today. Due to the fact that researchers usually possess 
better knowledge about the research object and their effort is not easy to verify, the 
monitoring or progress-checking devices that we usually find in, say, construction 
contracts are not really applicable to R&D projects. The purpose of this paper is therefore 
to design an optimal funding contract for activities that are time consuming and 
confronted with opportunism’1 problems.
Despite the fact that R&D expenditures have been increasing year by year, for 
example, “Japanese government spending on science and technology has increased about 
5% annually over the last decade”* 14, there is little theoretical literature specifically
"  Throughout this chapter, the terms “opportunism” and “moral hazard" will be interchangeably used.
14 From Hast Asian Executive Reports (1996).
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addressing die issues of R&D funding'*’. One exception is Aghion and Tiróle ( 1994), who 
mention the funding issue in their discussion of property right allocation and innovation 
efficiency. Funding is interpreted as a specific investment from the financier. Their basic 
argument is similar to Grossman and Hart (1986), that is, the choice of property right 
should best protect two parties’ (the research unit and the financier) specific investments 
in the relationship. Since the agent’s effort and the financier’s investment are 
substitutable for the success of the innovation, it is possible that the financier alone can 
undertake R&D if she owns the right for the innovation. In the present model, we 
suppose that both the agent’s effort and principal’s financing are indispensable in the 
relationship. More specifically, we assume that the completion of R&D depends only on 
the agent’s effort, but the agent has no initial wealth and hence is unable to put in effort 
without the principal’s funding. Our setting is closer to reality for both the employee- 
inventors and independent research units cases. In addition, our discussion of the long­
term compensation scheme, the adverse selection problem, auctions, and the choice of 
long-term and short-term contracts is not addressed in their paper.
There has been an extensive literature on optimal contract design with moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. Hart and Holmstrom (1987) provide a comprehensive 
review of contract theory. Most of the literature addresses implications on financial36, 
labour37 and procurement™ issues, but the topic of funding a long-term activity is seldom 
mentioned. Hence, the present model can provide a guideline to a broad context of 
funding contracts, especially for time consuming projects. Moreover, the present model
”  There arc several discussions on agents' pre-auclion R&IJ investments, for example, Piccione and Tan 
(1996). However, this is not the issue addressed in tile present paper.
For example, Chemmanur and John (1996), and Singh (1997).
"  For example, Baily (1974), Gorden (1974), Addison and Chilton (1997).
’* For example. Cox el al. (1996), Piccione and Tan (1996).
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contributes to the determination of contract length (duration), optimal auctioning 
contract, and the choice between long-term and short-term contracts.
Firstly, there is only a small literature examining the determination of contract 
length. Under the assumption that new information is resolved over time. Dye (1985) 
emphasises the incompleteness of contracting under uncertainty and shows that it is 
efficient to recontract in response to the arrival of new information. In a labour market 
model, Cantor (1987) also argues that a contract needs to be expired to revise wages to 
adjust to the new information. Cantor stresses the deterministic rather than the stochastic 
(Dye) property of the expiry date. By assuming costly observation of the information, 
Harris and Holmstrom (1987) determine the contract length as the period between costly 
observations. Bodman and Devereux (1993) argue that the optimal contract duration 
depends on a trade-off between the benefit of wage rigidity and the cost of lacking 
flexibility. In the present model, the optimal contract length stands for the funding 
periods during which the agent puts in full effort in a time consuming project.
Secondly, when there is more than one candidate for a project, an auction is usually 
held to select the agent to undertake the project. Section 3.5 derives the optimal auction 
form via mechanism design. This approach is pioneered by the work of Harris and Raviv 
(1982), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), 
Matthews (1983), and Maskin and Riley (1984). Moreover, Milgrom (1987) and McAfee 
and McMillan (1987) provide excellent reviews of early auction literature. Laffont and 
Tirole (1987) bridge the connection between auctions and incentive contracts. In the first 
part of this section, we follow Laffont and Tirole’s approach and solve the optimal 
auctioning contract. Later, the result from the optimal auction is compared to another 
auction form: the second-price auction (SPA). An interesting result arises from the 
comparison: when agents are bidding for the project’s total expenditure, neither the
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revenue equivalence theorem nor the separation property will hold when there is a moral 
hazard problem in the long term contract. We also derive some notes on “built-in cost- 
overruns”, mentioned by Scherer (1964) in research on US weapon procurements. The 
connection between selection bias and cost overrun has been mentioned by Quirk and 
Terasawa (1984), and Gaspar and Leite (1989/1990) in common value and single stage 
models. Since their selection rule is to assign the project to the lowest cost bidder, neither 
an actual auction form nor the opportunism problem is discussed in their papers.
Finally, in the context of symmetric beliefs19 where both parties have identical 
beliefs about the time needed for completion, our model draws implications on the choice 
of long-term and short-term contracts. There have been many debates on this topic, for 
example, Barcena-Ruiz and Espinosa (1996) stress the strategic role of the intertemporal 
dimension of contracts in a duopoly market, and since in the linear case there is strategic 
substitution in the product market, the incentive variables (contract lengths) are also 
strategic substitutes. Hence a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentive, while 
a short-term contract makes it a follower. Under Bertrand competition, the equilibrium 
has one firm sign a long-term contract and the other firm sign a short-term incentive 
contract; however, under Cournot competition, both firms’ dominant strategies are to sign 
a long-term incentive contract. Another important issue in the literature is whether long­
term efficiency can be implemented by a series of short-term contracts. For instance, 
Chiappori et al. (1994) show that two conditions are necessary for the optimal long-term 
contract to be implemented by spot contracts: (1) the long-term optimum should be 
renegotiation-proof; (2) spot contracts should provide efficient consumption smoothing. 
As pointed out by Rey and Salanie (1996), this approach ignores the discussion about
w This is corresponding to (lie stochastic setting in the RAI) literature (e.g., Lee and Wilde (19X0), 
keinganum (1982), Harris and Vickers (1987)).
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both moral hazard and adverse selection problems at the contracting date. They instead 
analyse a multi-period agency model with adverse selection, and conclude that 
renegotiable short-term contracts can be as efficient as long-term renegotiation-proof 
contracts. However, some limited commitments are both necessary and sufficient to 
achieve the long-term efficiency. The present model shows that when contract renewal is 
not anticipated by the involved parties, a sequence of short-term contracts is better than 
one single long-term contract from the principal’s point of view. Intuitively, since short­
term contracts provide the involved parties opportunities to update their beliefs, the 
principal can pay less incentive rent to induce the same amount of effort in the presence 
of a moral hazard problem.
To emphasise the opportunism problem and to set a benchmark of efficiency, the 
basic model in Chapter 3 first supposes that the total time (expense) needed to complete 
the project is deterministic and known by both the principal and the agent. With a further 
assumption of no initial wealth for the agent (so a penalty is impossible and there is a 
moral hazard problem), Section 3.2 derives the optimal contract form from a general 
compensation scheme, which implements the agent’s full effort in the context of 
complete information. The optimal contract describes a funding period and an end-of- 
contract reward, which happens to be a multi-stage version of the “Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee” 
(CPFF) contract in the literature.
Next, we consider the case where the agent has better information about the time 
needed for completion (due to experience or expertise). Following the literature, we 
denote the value that is better known by the agent as a “type40”. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
hence determine the optimal contracts with both moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems for cases when the principal thinks the agent’s type is discretely distributed and
40
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when it is continuously distributed. The discussion of both discrete and continuous 
settings serves two aims: (1) to see if the optimal contract will vary with the setting of 
type; (2) to provide a basic structure for the discussion of optimal auction design. The 
solution says that when there are only two types (a simplified discrete type setting), the 
optimal contract will not induce efficiency loss to either type, but instead pays an extra 
information rent to the efficient type'11. The intuition is: any shortage in funding will 
result in the failure of R&D, hence the principal would rather pay more rent than lose the 
whole project value. When the type is continuously distributed, the principal will adopt a 
cut-off strategy in funding, that is, to stop funding for types greater than some critical 
value. It is concluded that the agent’s production efficiency remains for efficient types 
(types smaller than the cut-off point), and the principal will take a more conservative 
attitude in funding, since the inefficient types will definitely take the contract and shirk.
Section 3.5 derives the optimal auctioning41 2 contract in a discrete type setting, as it 
provides a clearer idea about how an auction works in our model. In the optimal auction, 
both allocation and production efficiency persist, that is, the project will be assigned to 
the bidder with the lowest cost and the winner(s) always finishes the project. The 
principal can benefit from the agents’ competition in two ways. First, the project is more 
likely to be completed by an efficient type under an auction. Second, competition reduces 
the incentive rent for the efficient type as he is less likely to mimic the inefficient type 
who might have less chance to win. However, this rent reduction varies with the 
difference between the two types, that is, when the inefficient type is not sufficiently 
greater than the efficient type, the former might be better off shirking under the efficient 
type’s contract (which gives him a higher winning probability). Hence, to motivate the
41 The observation of types comes from the direct mechanism (to be discussed later).
42 The agents’ beliefs are assumed independent to avoid the complication from correlated beliefs.
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inefficient type (and the efficient type) to choose his own contract, the principal has to 
reward more than when there is a big difference between the two types.
Finally, we relax the assumption of private information in Section 3.6, and assume 
that both parties have identical beliefs about the time needed for completion. This setting 
corresponds to the stochastic4’ nature in the R&D literature. Section 3.6 firstly discusses 
how opportunism affects the agent’s shirking decisions under symmetric beliefs. The 
optimal contract is derived and we show that the principal’s optimal funding length with 
an opportunism problem is no longer than the contract without an opportunism problem. 
Later, we introduce the possibility of contract renewal and show that under some 
constraints, the lock-in effect persists and the principal will prefer a sequence of short­
term contracts to a long-term contract. The intuition is because the former provides both 
parties opportunities to update their beliefs in this symmetric setting.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. With unverifiable effort, Section 3.2 
derives the optimal contract form from a general compensation scheme, which consists of 
a funding deadline and an end-of-contract reward. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss both 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems in discrete and continuous type settings. 
Section 3.5 derives the optimal auctioning contract, the result of which is later compared 
to another auction form: SPA. Section 3.6 relaxes the assumption of private information 
and considers the case with symmetric beliefs about the time needed for completion. 
Section 3.7 contains conclusions and suggestions for further research.
3.2 The Model 41
41 Most R&D models adopt the exponential distribution function (e.g. Lee and Wilde (1980)),which will be
imposed in the following sections.
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-This section describes the basic structure of our model, including the involved parties, 
information structure, actions, payoff functions and the equilibrium. Our purpose is to 
find the optimal contract for a self-interested principal to assign an agent to undertake a 
time-consuming project. As we can see, most R&D projects are time-consuming, for 
example, the research for AIDS medicine. Although AIDS was first identified in 1981, 
there is still no effective remedy today. The assumption of a “self-interested” principal is 
in contrast to the assumption of a “benevolent” principal, which could be a government 
agency who wishes to find a regulation scheme for the benefit of the whole society. The 
case of multiple principals is not considered in this model; but the case where the 
principal selects among several candidates will be discussed in Section 3.5. It is assumed 
that the agent has limited liability and no initial wealth, and moreover he cannot maintain 
the residual profit, which implies that self-funding and financial penalty are impossible. It 
is further assumed that no non-pecuniary penalty is feasible. As this assumption could be 
too restrictive for most construction contracts, we probably need to concentrate on R&D 
contracts, where the “no penalty” assumption applies to most cases.
To emphasise the opportunism problem and to set a benchmark of efficiency, we 
first assume the innovation to be deterministic. More specifically, it is assumed that the 
project takes the agent A periods of effort under full capacity (i.e., no shirking). In each 
period, £1 will be needed to cover the agent’s effort and rental costs, such as the labour 
wage, the rental cost for machine or lab equipment and the cost of inputs. A could be 
associated with the agent’s cost structure or production technology. In this section, A is 
assumed to be known by the principal so that wc can concentrate on the effect of
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*opportunism problem. The cases with incomplete information will be discussed in the 
following sections. Finally, it is assumed that there is no discounting across time* 44.
The design starts with the principal offering the agent a contract, including the 
funding of £1 each period till the deadline and a reward scheme. The agent responds by 
taking the offer or rejecting it45. If the agent rejects the offer, the project will not be 
undertaken and both parties have the reservation profits (normalised to zero); if the agent 
accepts the offer, he needs to make a sequence of working and shirking decisions which 
are unobservable or too expensive for the principal to observe or monitor. In other words, 
there is a moral hazard problem in the design of the optimal contract. This is again a fair 
assumption for R&D projects. However, whether there is ultimately an innovation or not 
will be publicly known. Concealing the innovation is excluded in our model. As this 
game features a leader (principal) and follower (agent) structure, we need to know the 
follower’s best response to derive the optimal contract. The following first discusses the 
agent’s response to an arbitrary contract and then derives the optimal contract form.
Consider an arbitrary contract which specifies a funding length of T periods, and a 
contingent reward scheme for the agent’s effort. The funding is to give the agent £1 at the 
beginning of each period so that the agent is able to put in effort. Since the principal does 
not observe the agent’s effort, the reward scheme can only depend on the observable 
variable; the completion date. For a committed completion date x , denote r,(x) as the 
reward paid at the end of each period i from the moment that the contract is accepted. The 
whole reward scheme hence has the form /?(x):= {r,(x),r2 (x),...rt (x), rt<.,(x),...}. A
44 The no discounting assumption is to simplify the analysis, as the profit value is irrelevant to the agent. In 
Chapter 4. the discount factor is introduced to discuss the protection scheme when the success of 
investment will affect the agent's future profits.
44 This excludes the possibility that the final contract is settled by a sequence of bargains.
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contract c  is defined as c {r,{W(T)) | J<’. This general contract form considers
the reward scheme for every possible finishing date t e  .
Given a contract c, the agent has to make a sequence of effort decisions at each time 
I. Since the funding stops after the deadline, an index /, is introduced to distinguish 
funding periods from non-funding periods, i.e..
With funding, if the agent puts in effort, £1 will be used up as effort and rental costs; if 
the agent decides to shirk, he can only divert an exogenous fraction a  , 0 < a  < I , of £1 
into his pocket. The sunk cost (1 -  a ) comes from the rental or input cost which can not 
be avoided even if the agent shirks. Without funding (for t > T ), the agent still spends 
£147 if he puts in effort, and since no funding is available, there will be no shirking 
benefit. Let e, =1 if the agent’s choice at time t is to put in effort, and e, =0 if the agent 
chooses to shirk. Define n, as the accumulated effort level up to time / - l ,  i.e.
n,: = y  e, . We can write the agent’s value function at time I as W,‘ (n, ) , where the
i=i
superscript denotes the contract c and the subscript is the time index starting from the 
moment that the offer is accepted by the agent.
J" The renegotiation of the contract is excluded for the moment to simplify the discussion. However, later in 
Section 3.3, there will be some implications about the renegotiation issue.
41 Since the agent can not fund himself, his choice must be shirking. However, we need to take into account 
this case to describe the decision function.
/, =£1 for t< T
= 0 for t > T .
(3.1)
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it is clear that uj] > f t — 1 . The terms in the brackets denote the values from shirking and
putting in effort respectively. Equation (3.1) says that shirking gives the agent a higher 
current profit q/ ,,  a reward r,(x) and a next period value with accumulated effort level 
n, ; however, putting in effort gives him a lower current profit /, — 1, the same reward 
rt (x) but higher accumulated effort n, + 1 next period.
Given the agent’s decision in equation (3.1), we next show that a single end-of- 
contract reward can implement the same effort vector as the reward scheme R(x ). The 
argument proceeds in several steps. Firstly, since no effort will be needed after the 
completion of the project, there is no loss to squeeze the compensations after time t  to a 
sum of rewards which is paid at the end of period x, that is, the compensation scheme 
becomes:
Secondly, the optimal rewards for time before the completion of the project should 
be independent of the completion date, that is, for x * x ' , r,(x) = ri(x') for 
i < min{x,x'}. To see the reason, suppose r, (x) < r{(x') for an arbitrary i < min{x,x'} 
and the others remain unchanged. We know from equation (3.1) that the agent’s effort 
decisions with both rf(X) and r,(x') are the same. That is, if
a/, + r , ( x ) + > / , - l  + r,(x)+W,‘tl(«, +1), then we still have 
of] + r,(x ')+  W;+l(/i,) > f, -  1 + r,(x')+ VV,'+I(«, +1), where by supposition r,(x) < r,(x ') .
However, by replacing r (t ') with r ( x ), the principal will be better off as the reward is 
costly to the principal. Therefore, we can rewrite the compensation scheme as:
(3.2)
where rT(x) := ^  t;(x) from the general form. The intuition is: the principal will not
compensate the agent in such a way that the agent would rather choose the contract with 
x' (instead of x) for higher pre-completion rewards.
Finally, the following lemma shows that any effort vector implemented by the 
reward scheme in equation (3.2) can also be implemented by a single end-of-contract 
reward. An effort vector e describes the agent’s decision at each time t, i.e. 
e = (e, ,e1...e, ...) ,e e. E , where £  is a set of infinite binary sequences.
Lemma 3.1
Any effort vector e which is implemented by the compensation scheme 
/?(x) = {rl ,r2,...rt (x),0,0,...} can be implemented by a single end-of-contract reward
scheme, i.e., R \x )  = {0,0,...rt (x),0,0....}.
Proof: Firstly, suppose /?(x) = {rl,r2,...rt (x),0,0,...} implements a given effort vector e . 
At any time t, since r: is given whenever the agent shirks or works, we know that if
> f, -  \ + W'fx(n, + \ ) , where we replace R(t ) with £'(x). Similarly, if e, =1, i.e.,
£ /, -  1 + W,'t\ (;t, + 1), if we replace R(X) with R'(x) ■ Q.E.D.
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Thus, abusing the notation to some extent, 1 denote K (t )  as a single end-of-contract
reward for the finishing date t .
Up to now, the finishing date T has not been defined properly as a function of the 
agent’s effort. The following will define this function and discuss a standard issue in 
moral hazard problems, that is, to look for the cheapest way to motivate the agent to 
complete the project at an arbitrary date. Firstly, the finishing date is defined as the 
earliest date that the accumulated effort level exceeds A , i.e..
X(e) is a function of effort and it is possible that two different effort vectors e'and e" 
( e ' * e " )  finish the project at the same date, i.e., T(e') = T(e"). The multiplicity is 
because, under the assumption of no discounting, the agent has no preference over the 
order of efforts. For distinction, I denote the cases where e' and e" induce different 
finishing dates as x'(e') and i" (e"). Fortunately, the project value (to be defined later) 
will be realised as long as the project is completed, so we can concentrate on the set of 
the effort vectors that finish the project at an arbitrary date s. Define E ‘ as this set:
E ' : = {«? e £|x(ii) = s and e{ - 0V< > ,vj.
Since funding is indispensable for the innovation, unlike the standard moral hazard 
problem, the setting of the cheapest rent will also be related to the contract length, 
beyond which there will be no funding to the agent. Considering this limitation, for a 
given T, we can separate the discussion about the cheapest reward into two cases:
where x(e) could be °°.
55
T(t') > T and He) < T . Recall that the “cheapest” way means the smallest end-of-projeet 
reward, as the whole compensation scheme can be replaced by an end-of-project reward.
Firstly, for any committed finishing date T(e) > T (or any effort vector e e  Es for 
S > T ), the cheapest compensation is to pay nothing, i.e.,
R(l(e)) = 0,  for x(e)>T.  (3.3)
Given /?(T(t')) = () for X(e )>T , we have the following lemma regarding the agent’s 
effort decisions:
Lemma 3.2
For either A > T  or A < T  hut with a committed completion date x(e) > T , shirking 
right through the funding period is the dominant strategy.
We can see the reason from the agent’s decision (3.1) and equation (3.3). Since for both 
A > T or A < T but with a committed completion date x(e) > T , the project will not be 
finished on T. Equation (3.3) implies that the agent would be better off shirking 
throughout the funding period in his effort decisions (3.1).
Secondly, to derive the cheapest reward for x(e)<T,  we need to have more 
information about the agent’s choice over different contracts. For this end, we firstly 
describe the involved parties’ utility functions. For a given contract c, the agent’s utility 
for completing the project414 is
a(x(e)-A)+R(x(e))4v. *41
4K The principal prefers the agent finishing the project to shirking all throughout, for which case the agent 
will have the shirking benefit (to he discussed later).
41 The principal and agent's intertemporal commitments do not have the “false dynamics" problem 
mentioned by Laffont and Tirolc (1993, p. 103). As the innovation process is time consuming and the
5ft
The meaning of this function is: as the outcome is ex-post observable, there is no need to 
provide funding after 1(c)- Hence for x (e )< T , the agent can get £1 funding for Tfe) 
periods. Since he only needs A to finish the project, he will shirk for (x(e) —A) periods 
and divert shirking benefit a(x(e) — A) from the funding. Once the project is finished, the 
principal will give him an end-of-contract reward: R(x(e)).
The principal’s utility is:
V(T(c)) -  «(Tie)) - T  + ( T -  x(e)).
V is a constant project value, implying that any delay in the completion date does not 
directly affect the project value, provided there is no discounting. However, the agent’s 
effort does matter with the value in the sense that it will never be realised if the project is 
not completed. Therefore, in this basic model with only the moral hazard problem, we 
can rewrite the value as V(T(e))50, where
V(x(e)) = V if T(<?)<7\
= 0 if x(e) > T .
In order to get the project value, the principal has to spend £1 funding for at least x(e) 
periods, plus an end-of-contract reward R(x(e)). As the contract assigns a funding for T 
periods, if the agent finishes the project earlier, the principal can save funding for 
(T-X{e))  periods.
agent's effort is unobservable, the principal can not actually learn from the performance of the agent's 
efforts in previous perirxls.
,n X(e) will be omitted in later sections after we solve this basic opportunism model.
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Now, we are back to the search for the cheapest compensation to implement a 
completion date x(i') < T . For a given funding period T, the reward must be designed in 
such a way that, firstly the agent has at least the reservation utility as from not taking the 
contract (Individual Rationality constraint, 1R). Secondly, finishing the project at x(e) 
will give the agent at least the same utility as finishing at some other time x'(e’) 
(Incentive Compatibility constraint, IC), or shirking right through the funding periods 
(Moral Hazard constraint, MH). In notation, IR is:
a(T(e) -  A) + /f(T(e)) > 0 . (IR)
Since the agent has no initial wealth and hence self-funding is impossible, the agent will 
have the reservation of zero if he does not participate. Note that the assumption of weak 
inequality is “to assume that ties are broken in a fashion that favours the first mover” in 
order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium (Kreps (1990), p. 604). IC requires that for 
X(e), x'(e') < T and x(e) * x ' (e') ,
a(x(e) -  A) + R(x(e)) > a(x V )  -  A) + R(x \e ’)) , e’ e Es and S < T . (IC)
IC constraints say that if X(e) < x'(e’), R(X(e)) > R{x\e’) ) . In other words, the end-of- 
contract reward must be decreasing in the finishing date to satisfy the IC constraint. 
Finally, due to the unobservable effort assumption, the agent is able to shirk all 
throughout T (as penalty is infeasible) and has the shirking benefit: a T . The reward must 
ensure that finishing the project at time x(e) will bring him at least the same benefit, i.e.,
a(x(e) -  A) + R(x(e)) > a T . (MH)
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Since Mil implies IK, the 1R constraint can he ignored in what follows.
Put in terms of equilibrium, we are looking for an equilibrium where the agent 
completes the project in an efficient way and the principal maximises her utility. To solve 
the optimal contract, we need to maximise the principal’s utility subject to capacity, IC 
and MH constraints (denoted as P). The capacity constraint is because: if T<  A, the 
project will never be finished before or at the deadline. As the principal would prefer the 
agent finishing the project, the funding period has to be at least A . In the following, we 
first solve the cheapest reward for implementing an arbitrary finishing date x(e) and later 
show that it is optimal to implement X(e) = T .
To determine the cheapest reward, firstly, since the reward is costly to the principal 
and 1C says that the end-of-contract reward has to be decreasing in the completion date, 
let us firstly guess that only MH is binding, i.e.,
R(x(e)) ~ cl(T + A) — otx(if). (3.4)
This setting says that the reward is decreasing in x(e) and hence IC is binding. 
Substituting R(x(e)) by the definition in equation (3.4), we can rewrite the principal’s 
problem51 (P) as:
max{V(T(e)) - a(T  + A) + ax(e) -  T  + (T -Tic))},
r.t(c-)
St. T — A > 0.
Since T has a negative coefficient, meaning funding is costly to the principal, the 
deadline should be set as short as possible. However, the capacity constraint says that any 
shortage in funding will fail to complete the project, therefore we set the deadline at its
' 1 The solution proceeds without setting up multipliers, because the utility is linear in each variable.
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lowest possible value: 7' = A. Finally from the objective function we know that except 
for V(T(i')), 1(e) also has a negative coefficient, implying that although finishing the 
project earlier or later does not affect the project value, longer funding periods will cost 
the principal more. There is no explicit restriction to x(c) as the capacity constraint to T, 
but we know that the project value will become zero at time T if 1 (e) > T . The smallest 
possible value that satisfies all these requirements is hence 1 (e) = T -  A . By equation 
(3.4), the agent has the optimal reward R(T) = clA . The principal’s optimal utility is 
therefore V —(l + oc)A.
The derivation of 1 (e) indicates that when there is only a moral hazard problem, the 
principal can concentrate on a contract which induces a completion date exactly on the 
funding deadline T  and rewards the agent for R(T). In other words, the optimal contract 
form is a multi-stage version of Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contracts in the literature. 
The following proposition summarises the optimal contract for implementing a 
successful project.
Proposition 3.1
Consider a time-consuming investment that lasts for  A periods under the agent's full 
capacity. The optimal contract for complete information with an opportunism problem is 
to assign a funding period A and an end-of-contract reward proportional to the contract 
length.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the optimal contract with the one without a moral 
hazard problem. In the latter, the principal solves the following problem:
max{V(T(e)) — T}
St. T - A > 0 .
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Since the ellort is observable and hence contractible, there is no need to pay an extra 
reward. The agent will have the reservation utility (0), and the optimal contract
implements an effort vector e e  E& (i.e., the full capacity effort vector )
with funding periods T = A. The presence of the moral hazard problem costs the 
principal an extra incentive rent ctA to extract the same effort vector r e  £ 4.
This section is closed by the comparative analysis of the equilibrium. Firstly, since 
the project will only be undertaken if V > ( l+ a )A , a higher project value will increase 
the possibility that the project is taken. V may represent the profitability of a R&D 
project, or the return for a long-term loan for developing countries. Since the principal in 
this model is assumed to be self-interested, V is very likely to be under-evaluated by 
private investors. Policies such as patents are often used by the welfare-maximising 
government to improve this kind of under-evaluation. The bias could be worse if there is 
a serious moral hazard problem, measured by the size of a  . A bigger a  means that the 
agent has to give up more in order to put in full effort, and hence as a  increases, the 
principal needs to give a higher incentive rent to keep incentive compatibility. Moreover, 
a  may vary across industries. In industries where the force of work morale prevails, the 
compensation can be lower. But as pointed out by Frey (1993) who summarises the 
literature about the impact the other way around, “regulations may crowd out the agents’ 
work morale, and negatively affect their behaviour”. This effect will be ignored in the 
present model. Finally the longer the project actually takes (bigger A ), the more 
compensation the principal has to pay to implement the efficient effort.
3.3. A Uncertain to the Principal (Discrete Type)
This section extends the basic model by considering the case when the agent has private 
information about the lime for completion: A . The superiority of information comes 
from the agent’s expertise or past experience. Following the literature, we denote the 
value that is better known by the agent as a “type52”. In this section, we discuss the case 
when the principal thinks that the agent’s type is discretely distributed. The purpose for 
discussing this case is: from the last section we know that even when A is known by the 
principal, there is a moral hazard problem in the contract design. By assuming incomplete 
information about A , there will be both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
This is of course a standard discussion in mechanism design, and it helps us to 
understand the way that asymmetric information together with the agent’s opportunism 
affect the design of long-term contracts. By assuming that there are only two types, we 
can gain some interesting implications for production efficiency, which will be shown to 
sustain for continuous types. The derivation of the optimal contract relies on applying the 
revelation principle, proposed by Gibbard (1973), Green and Laffont (1977), Dasgupta et 
al. (1979) and Myerson (1979), which says that any efficient outcome of any Bayesian 
game can be represented by a truth-telling incentive compatible direct mechanism. In this 
incomplete information setting, it is even difficult to characterise the set of feasible 
contracts, which may involve very complicated forms. The significance of the revelation 
principle is that we can restrict our attention to a direct mechanism which requests the 
privately informed agent to report its type to the uninformed principal. The allocation of 
resources then depends on what is reported. Of course, the agent could mis-report in its
The underlying assumption is consistent beliefs, in the sense that they can be regarded as conditional 
probability distributions derived from a certain “basic probability distribution" over the parameters 
unknown to the various players (Harsanyi (1967)).
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own interest. An inecntive compatible direct mechanism requires that the allocation 
among resources is designed in such a way that the informed agent’s best response will 
be to report truthfully. Denote the optimal screening" contract as the “incentive 
contract”. We then compare this incentive contract to the pooled contract of the efficient 
type and the pooled contract of the inefficient type to find out a better contract from the 
principal’s point of view. A remark regarding efficiency and renegotiation concludes this 
section.
Keeping the assumption of a single self-interested principal and a single agent, we 
now assume that the agent has better information about the time for completion. 
Specifically, it is assumed that the agent knows A for sure, but the principal thinks that 
A could take two possible values: A, with probability t> and A2 with ( 1 - u ) ,  where 
A, <A2. Refer to A, as the efficient type and A2 as the inefficient type. Given that the 
agent accepts the offer of contract, he has to decide on a sequence of effort level, which 
are not observable by the principal. As shown in the basic model, the principal can use an 
end-of-contract reward to provide enough incentive for the agent to finish the project. 
With asymmetric information, the revelation principle says that the principal can provide 
a menu of contracts (including the funding length and rewards), and let the agent self- 
identify (i.e., to report his type A>). The menu of contracts needs to be designed in such a 
way that in equilibrium A, = A, and the project will be completed. Let 
C2:=  {{7j, R(7j)},{T2,R(T2)}} denote the menu of contracts offered to the agent54. Since 
we arc looking for a truth-telling equilibrium, by taking the contract that is meant for him
"  The optimal screening (separating) contract assigns different contracts to different types in equilibrium. 
"  The following is meant to find out the screening contract, however, it is not excluded that 
(7], K( 1])} could be the same as [T2, N(T, )} .
(i.e., {7j, R(T,)}), type A: will have utility a(7j -  A ,) + R(Tt ) for completing the project. 
The principal’s expected utility is then:
u{V -  R(Tt) -  Tx}+ (1 -  u){V -  R(T2) -  7, }.
For the following discussion to make sense, we restrict to the case where the 
principal will find it worthwhile to finance the project for both types, i.e..
Assumption 3.1: V > max{(l + a )A 2,(Ti + /?(7])),=l 2}.
Assumption 3.1 says that, the project’s value will be at least as great as the sum of 
funding and reward in both the complete55 and incomplete information case.
The optimal incentive contract is the solution to the principal’s maximisation 
problem subject to the constraints that each type will take the contract and finish the 
project, and each type will not be better off mis-reporting his value and taking the 
contract for the other type. That is, we have (P2):
max u{V -  R(T,) -  7]}+ (1 -  t)){V -  R(T2) -  T2 },
St. 7]-A , > 0 , 
r 2 - A 2 > 0 ,
a(7j -  A,) + 7?(7;) £ a7 ;, 
a(7'2 - A 2) + /?(7’2) > a r 2, 
a(7; -A ,)  + /?(7; ) > a ( J 2 -  A ,) + R(T2), 
a(T2 - A 2) + 7?(r2) > a ( r , - A 2)+R(Tt ) ,
(P2)
(capacity constraint)
(MH1)
(MH2)
(IC1)
if T, > A ,. (IC2)
''Complete information ease means the case with only a moral hazard problem. We need to assume the 
availability for the complete information case as well in order to compare the result with the pooled
efficient contracts.
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Assumption 3.1 says that V will he realised under each contract. The principal's expected 
utility is the weighted sum of utilities from offering {7],/i(7])} to each type i. The 
capacity constraints come from Lemma 3.2 which says that if 7^  < A ,, the agent’s 
dominant strategy is shirking right through T: . Hence, in order to have the project 
completed, the funding periods for each type should at least cover the true value. The MH 
constraints say that, by taking {7^ , /f(7j)}, type A, would prefer finishing the project to 
shirking all through . Since aT{ > 0 , the MH constraints also imply the requirements 
that each type will be better off finishing the project than not taking the contract at all (IR 
constraint). Moreover, for truth telling, 1C1 says that type A, will not be better off 
finishing the project under type A2’s contract {7'2,/?(7'2)}. IC2 describes a similar 
requirement for type A2 but is only true for 7j > A2. For Tt < A2, Lemma 3.2 has shown 
that if taking {7j, /f(7j)}, type A2 will shirk all through 7] and have the shirking benefit 
tx7j. But MH2 will have considered this case if 7j < T2, which is obvious since the 
capacity constraints together with 7j < A2 imply T2 > A2 > 7]. Therefore, IC2 will only 
apply for T, > A2.
In addition to the shirking possibilities restricted by MH1 and MH2, each type can 
also take the other type’s contract, and shirk throughout the funding periods rather than 
finish the project. Firstly, type A, may take the contract {7'2,7f(7'2)} and shirk through 
7 \, which gives shirking benefit a.T2. But we know from IC1 and MH2 that
oc(7] -A, )+R(T,  )> a (7 2 -A ,)+/f(7-2)
> a (T2 - A 2) + li(T2) >o.T2.
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That is, these two constraints have already restricted that type A, would rather complete 
the project under contract |7j,/f(7j)} than take type A ,’s contract and shirk. Secondly, 
type A2 may take {7j,/i(7j)} and shirk through 7j, which gives shirking benefit a7 j. 
MH2 should have included this case if Tt < T2. To proceed, suppose that 7] < T2, which 
will be justified by the solution later.
To find the solution, the first task is to look for the cheapest reward to motivate type 
i to finish the project at 7]. Replacing A, by A, in MH2 shows that if the principal gives 
each type the efficient contract in Proposition 3.1, type A, will be better off mimicking 
type A2. Next, ICI alone requires R(T2)< R(Tt ) if Tt ^ T 2. Since rewards are costly to 
the principal, R(T2) should be set at the minimal value, that is, MH2 has to be satisfied 
with equality:
To derive /?(7j), we need to check the 1C constraints. For Tt < A2, only 1C1 applies. 
Substituting the definition of R(T2) from equation (3.5) into IC1 gives:
As the same way of deriving R(T2), K(7j) should be set at the minimal value, that is, 
equation (3.6) is binding, which gives
R(T2 ) = -a(T2 - A 2) + ccT2 = clA 2 . (3.5)
R(Tt)> a(T2 -  7j) + aA2. (3.6)
7f(7j ) = a(7"2 -  7] ) + (xA 2 . (3.6)’
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Next, for 7j >A 2, IC2 will also apply. After substituting 7f(73) by aA ,, IC2 
requires:
R(T,)<a(T2- T , )  + a A 2. (3.7)
To simultaneously satisfy IC1 and IC2, both equations (3.6) and (3.7) will bind, that is, 
we have R(T,) = cl(T2 -7 j )  + aA ,. Hence 7?(7j) has the same setting for both T, < A, 
and T, > A2. Notice that this setting also implies MH1. where R(Tt ) > aA ,.
Substitute the settings of /?(7j) and R(T2) into the principal’s objective function. 
The principal’s maximisation problem becomes:
m ax u { V -(l-a )7 j - a T 2 - a A ^ + f l - u J I V - T ,  -a A ,} ,
T\ T2
St 7j > A ,,
T2 > A 2.
For a  < 1, both 7] and T2 are costly to the principal. Therefore, to maximise the 
principal’s expected utility and satisfy the capacity constraints, both capacity constraints 
should bind, i.e., T, =A, and T2 = A 2. In other words, in this mechanism, the agent 
reports his type truthfully (as required by MH and IC constraints) and the principal will 
provide the funding for as long as the actual time needed. Since A, < A2, the assumption 
that T^<T2 is justified. Furthermore, substituting T, = A, and T2 = A2 into equations 
(3.5) and (3.6)’ gives the optimal compensations: /?(7j) = a(2A2 -  A ,) and 
R(T2) = a A , . The principal’s expected utility is:
V -  \){2aA, -  aA, + A, } - ( l  -  u){aA2 + A2}. (3.8)
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The result says that apart from the incentive rent for the unobservable effort, the 
principal has to pay an information rent of ot(A, -  A, ) to the efficient type to induce 
truth-telling. Keeping other constraints constant, a bigger difference between the two 
types means a higher extra rent in the screening contract. The intuition for this rent is: by 
taking the inefficient type’s contract, type A, has (A, -  A,) more funding periods than 
taking his own contract. Hence, to motivate type A, to report truthfully, the screening 
contract has to compensate the efficient type for mimicking benefit in addition to the 
opportunism reward.
Finally, we can conclude a different view regarding the agent’s production 
efficiency. That is, due to the time consuming assumption (the capacity constraint needs 
to be satisfied), the equilibrium contract has both the efficient and inefficient types finish 
the project without delay. There is no distortion in type A ,’s production efficiency, 
which is in contrast to most contract literature in addressing the trade off between 
efficiency and rent extraction, in addition to "no distortion at the top (by IR constraint)” 
(e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993)). The intuition is: as a result of assuming unobservable 
effort and binary outcome (success or failure), the principal’s fear that the whole project 
value will disappear in case of any shortage in funding has led the principal not to distort 
the production efficiency in the optimal contract. Furthermore, the principal’s belief 
affects only her expected utility, and has no influence on the production efficiency of the 
project. The main result of this section is summarised as Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2
For a long-term project with both moral hazard and adverse selection problems, the 
incentive contract has both types complete the project, induces no ejjiciency loss to either 
type and pays an extra information rent to the efficient type.
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In the following, we first present the principal’s expected utilities from the incentive 
and pooled contracts, and then discuss the principal’s choice among these contracts. First 
of all, the benchmark case is when there is only a moral hazard problem, that is, each type 
is offered the efficient contract described in Proposition 3.1. Denote the principal’s 
expected utility for this case as A :
A = V -\)(l+ a)A , - ( l - u ) ( l + a ) A 2.
The principal’s expected utility from the incentive contract is (equation (3.8)):
V -  u{a(A2 -  A ,) + rxA2 + A, } - ( l  -u ){aA 2 + A, }
= A-2om (A2 -A ,) .
The term 2au(A2 -  A,) is the incentive cost to prevent the efficient type from mimicking 
the inefficient type. For a positive belief of the efficient type, the incentive contract 
always costs more than if the principal knows the agent’s type for sure.
Secondly, offering the pooled contract {A,,aA,} to both types will cause the 
inefficient type to shirk all through Tt . Flence the principal’s expected utility with this 
contract is:
u { V - ( l + a ) A , } + ( l - u ) { - A , }
= A - ( l - u ) { V - ( l  +a)Aj  + A, ).
The last term (1 -  u)|V -  (1+cx)A2 +A,) is the probability of the inefficient type times 
the sum of expected cost saving (l+ot)A 2 and expected revenue loss V -A ,. Under 
Assumption 3.1, this pooled contract is worse than the first best by definition. For u
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close to zero, the incentive contract is better than this pooled contract, however, for u 
close to one, we have the opposite result. In other words, if the principal is fairly 
confident that the agent is an efficient type (for v> > p *, where
V -(1 + gc)A2 + A. ,7
U* = ---------------------------------  ), the expected cost saving makes the pooled contract
V -( l-o t)(A 2 -  A ,) - cxA,
of the efficient type better than the incentive contract.
Further, the pooled contract of the inefficient type {A2,aA ,} gives the principal:
V - o ( l  +a)A 2 — (1 — v>)(1 + a)A 2 
= A -  o(l + a)(A2 -  A,).
Given this contract, the efficient type will mimic the inefficient type, finish the project at 
time A ,, and get an extra benefit a(A 2 -  A,) from shirking. Comparing this contract 
with the incentive contract shows that for a  < 1 the principal is better off with the 
incentive contract, since the principal can avoid the rental cost for equipment (1 -  a )  per 
period for the extra funding periods (A2 —A,). When this cost is close to zero, the 
pooled contract for the inefficient type will be identical to the incentive contract.
Finally, since this equilibrium always keeps the production efficiency, a different 
conclusion can be drawn in contrast to Laffont and Tirole (1993). They show that a direct 
mechanism is not renegotiation proof, as the solution of the direct mechanism in their 
model is suboptimal ( the inefficient type will produce inefficiently), and hence “it would 
be optimal to renegotiate to ensure production at the efficient level (given the reported 
type), and share the gains from trade” (Laffont and Tirole (1993), Ch. 1). However, in the 
present model, the solution will be renegotiation proof for the reason that the production
' 7 It can be checked that u* < I . since A , > A , ■
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is always ctticienl and any decrease in payment from the principal will decrease the 
agent’s utility (and hence will not be accepted).
3.4 A Uncertain to the Principal (Continuous Type)
This section studies the case when the agent knows the value of A for sure and the 
principal thinks that types are continuously distributed. There are two reasons for 
discussing continuous types: First, it will be interesting to ask if the result from the 
discrete type setting will hold in the continuous case. Second, since it is assumed that A 
ranges from 0 to °° and the project value is constant, intuitively we can guess that the 
principal will stop funding for A greater than some critical point. The issues concerning 
this point are: Is this point unique? In other words, will the principal adopt a cut-off 
strategy? What determines this point? How will the unobservable effort affect the 
determination of this critical point? When there are both moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, the effort and information rents paid by the principal will vary with 
the choice of this critical point. Most important of all, the principal cannot prevent those 
inefficient types™ from taking the contract and shirking throughout (which will be their 
dominant strategy). The determination of this critical point proceeds in several steps: 
firstly, by supposing an arbitrary critical point, we discuss the principal and the agent’s 
behaviour before and after this point. It can be seen that before this point the principal’s 
utility flow is decreasing in A and after this point the utility flow is a constant which is 
dependent on the size of this point. This hence justifies the existence of such point. 
Secondly, since the choice of such a critical point will also affect the compensations for
Inefficient types refer to those with A > A , and efficient types for otherwise. Among efficient types, 
those with smaller values of A will be denoted as more efficient types, and less efficient types refer to 
smaller value of A .
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efficient types, the optimal critical point is determined at a value where the principal’s 
expected utility is maximised.
We keep the assumption of a single principal and a single agent. The agent knows 
the value of A for sure, but the principal thinks that A is drawn from (0,°°) according to 
a distribution function /•'(A), with density function /(A ). Suppose an arbitrary paint 
A e (0, °o) beyond which the principal stops funding the project. For those efficient types 
we know from Section 3.2 that the contract has to include an end-of-contract reward to 
provide enough incentive for the agent to complete the project. In addition, to consider 
asymmetric information, we need to apply the revelation principle, and restrict our 
attention to a truth-telling direct mechanism. Let A be the reported value from type A . In 
this equilibrium, A=A and the project will be finished. Let C3:= {7(A), /i(7(A))}A, or in 
short, C3: = {7(A), A)}a be the menu of contracts offered to the agent. Before solving 
the optimal contract, we need to change the notation slightly to express the connection 
between the agent’s effort and the completion date in the continuous version. First of all, 
in the same way of dealing with the continuous version of a multi-stage game, denote the
history of sequential effort decisions up to time t by an index h, = \e¡dj , which is
actually the accumulated effort level at time t. Note that, as in the discrete types case, 
there can be more than one path of sequential decisions that result in the same 
accumulated effort level. Since the principal can only observe the completion date, we 
can focus on the set of paths that accumulates the same level of effort It,. Denote l£h as 
such a set and r e £ ‘ to be an element of this set. The finishing date is defined as 
T(e) = min{fl/i, > A} for A e  (0,«»).
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For this truncated part ( A < A ), each type’s utility for completing the project under
Cj is:
(/(A, A) = a(7'(A) — A) + W(A), fo rA e((),A |. (3.9)
The first argument in (/(.,.) is the reported value and the second argument stands for the 
true value. The principal’s truncated expected utility is:
J,f{V -  /?(A) — r(A))/(A)</A .
A e (A,<*>) is not included, since for the moment we are not sure about whether there 
exists such a “single” critical point which then depends on both parties’ behaviour (to be 
discussed below). For truth-telling, the contract must be designed in such a way that for 
every A e (0, A |, putting in effort and completing the project are preferable to shirking 
throughout the funding period. As in the previous section, denote these requirements as 
the Moral Hazard (MH) constraints. Furthermore, we need to consider that under the 
optimal contract more efficient types will not take the contracts meant for less efficient 
types, and vice versa. These requirements are the Incentive Compatibility (IC) 
constraints.
But first of all, the capacity constraints are necessary for each type to complete the 
project, i.e., T(A) > A . Next, the MH constraints require that:
a(T(A) -  A) + (?(A) £ clT(A) , fo rA e(0 ,A |. (MH)
That is, each type would rather finish the project than take the contract but shirk all the 
time. As ’/’(A) > 0 (capacity constraint), MH implies that the agent’s utility will be
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higher than when not taking the eontraet. The ineentive compatibility constraints are: for 
any A, A' e (0, A | and suppose A < A ',
ct(7(A) -  A) + R(A) > <x(T(A') -  A) + R(A' ) , (IC1)
a(7(A ') -  A') + R(A') > a (7 (A )- A') + R(A) , if 7(A) > A '. (IC2)
As in the discrete case, due to the capacity constraints, the second line is only valid for 
7(A) > A '. For 7(A) < A ', type A' physically can not Finish the project. Lemma 3.2 
tells us that the agent will shirk all through 7(A) and have a utility «7(A ). The capacity 
constraint together with the supposition of 7(A) < A' imply that 7(A') > A' > 7( A ) . The 
MH constraint for type A ' has already included this case. Therefore, 1C2 is only valid 
when 7(A) > A '.
Note that these constraints also exclude other shirking possibilities that are not 
written explicitly. Firstly, the more efficient types might take the contracts for the less 
efficient types and shirk throughout the funding periods. For A < A' we know from MH 
and 1C1 that
a(7(A) -  A) + R(A) > a(7(A ') -  A) + R(A')
> a(7(A ') -  A') + R(A') > a7 (A ').
Hence, IC1 together with MH have already included this case. Next, it is also possible 
that the less efficient types would like to take the contracts for the more efficient types 
and shirk through the funding period. This case would have been included in the MH 
constraints, if 7(A) is increasing in A . To proceed, we need to temporarily assume that
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'/'(A) is increasing and differentiable'1* in A and the solution will justify this assumption 
later.
The principal maximises the truncated expected utility function subject to the 
capacity, MH and 1C constraints, i.e.,
max J,f{V -  R(A) -  T(A))f(A)clA , (P3)
K (& ).T I  A>  1
St. r(A )> A , VA e (0,A] and A < A ',
a ( n A ) - A ) + R ( A ) > a T ( A ) ,  (MH)
a(7(A) -  A) + R(A) > a(T(A') -  A) + R{ A ' ) , (IC1)
a(T( A') -  A') + R(A') > a(T( A) -  A') + R( A), if T(A) > A '. (IC2)
Notice that these constraints actually represent infinite numbers of constraints. Following 
the existing literature, we can replace the infinite numbers of IC constraints by the first 
order condition*’". Recall the definition of the agent’s utility function from equation (3.9), 
and for illustration, A is kept to distinguish the reported value from the true value.
U(A,A) = a(T (A) -A)+R(A) ,  Ae(0,A ] (3.9)’
It must be T(A) > A to satisfy the capacity constraints: if 7\A) = A , only IC 1 applies and 
it says that a(T(A' ) -T(A))  < R(A) —R(A'). Since we temporarily assume that T(.) is 
increasing and differentiable, R(.) has to be decreasing and differentiable to satisfy the 
1C1 constraint. Therefore, IC1 together with equation (3.9)’ imply that U2 (A ,A )< -a  
(abbreviated as ( / ( A )< -a ) ;  If 7 '(A)>A, both IC1 and IC2 will apply. IC2 says that
"*The differentiability is necessary to derive the agent's marginal utility.
1,11 Since in our model, the completion date is a linear function of effort, we can adopt this approach without 
further constraint (see Kreps (1990), Ch 16 for the constraints of using this approach).
a ( T ( A ' ) ~ 7(A)) > K(A)~K(A') , which is contrary to 1C I. Therefore, to simultaneously 
satisfy ICI and IC2, we need:
a(7(A ')~  7(A)) = K( A) -  R( A ' ) . (3.10)
Again, R(.) will be decreasing and differentiable if 7(.) is increasing and differentiable. 
From equations (3.9)’ and (3.10), we have U2'( A,A) = -oc (abbreviated as I f  (A) = —a  ).
We can combine the capacity and IC constraints, and rewrite the maximisation 
problem as (P3)'
max f V  -  (1 -  a)T(A)  -  aA -  U(A))f(A)dA , (.P3Y
St. 7(A )> A A 6 (0 ,A],
I f  (A) < - a  and (7(A) -  A)(lf  (A) + a ) = 0, (IC)
U(A) > a7 (A ). (MH)
Note that R(.) has been replaced with the definition of U(.) in equation (3.9), because 
K(A) +7(A) = (1-a )7 (A ) + aA + (/(A ). Since the agent’s utility is decreasing in A 
( I f  (A) < 0 ) and under the assumption that T(.) is increasing in A , MH will only apply to 
the most inefficient type, i.e., U(A) > a7 (A ). Since giving the agent any rent is costly 
(the coefficient of U(.) is -1), MH for type A should bind, that is, U(A) = a T (A ) . Note 
that if I f  (A) = - a  , the integration of the utility function gives:
U( A)= fotr/A +aT(A)J A
= a (A -A ) + aT(A). (3.11)
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Using equation (3.1 I ), we can rewrite the problem as (P3)":
max f lv  — ( I -a )7 (A )-a A -í/(A )lí/F (A ), (P3)"
i/<it.r<A> Jo
St. 7(A )>A , A e |0 ,A ),
(/(A) > a(A -  A) + a7(A) and
(7(A) -  A)(i/(A) -  a(A -  A) -  a7(A)) = 0.
To derive the optimal rent61, firstly, if we set 7(A) = A , the above constraints 
require that U(A) > ot( A -  A) + a7(A ). Since U(A) ’s coefficient is negative, it should be 
set at the lowest possible level, that is, a(A — A) + a7 (A ). However, if we set 7(A) > A, 
it must be i/(A) = a(A -  A) + a7(A) to satisfy all the constraints. Substitute the setting 
of U(A) into the objective function and after manipulation we can see that the coefficient 
of 7(A) and 7(A) are - ( 1 - a )  and -I respectively. In this case, there will be no 
equilibrium values of 7(A) and 7(A) to maximise the utility function, because for any 
7(A) > A , we can find a smaller 7'(A) that is greater than A , still satisfies all the 
constraints and is less costly to the principal. To conclude, setting 7(A) at the efficient 
level A will be the only equilibrium solution, which hence justifies the supposition that 
the funding period is increasing and differentiable in A. For every Ae((),Al, the 
equilibrium utility is (7(A) = a(A -  A) + a7 (A ). Finally, the principal’s utility flow for 
this truncated case A s (0,A| is:
V - ( l - a ) A - a A - a 7 ( A ) .  (3.12)
w The solution proceeds without setting up multipliers, because the utility (low is linear in each variable.
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Before we go on to determine the optimal critical point A , two remarks should he 
noticed: First, like the discrete type case, the optimal contract for the continuous type 
setting induces no efficiency loss to any type before A (because the funding period is set 
at the efficient level A ) and extra rewards will be given to the more efficient types as 
information rents. Second, the existence of a single critical point can be seen from the 
fact that T'( A) = I and R'(A) = - a  , implying the principal’s profit flow to be decreasing 
in A . As the project value is constant, the existence of such a critical point can hence be 
justified. However, we need to consider the remaining part A > A to decide the optimal 
location of such critical point.
For a given A , the principal will stop funding those types with A > A . However, 
since effort is un-contractible, the principal can not prevent those inefficient types from 
mimicking and taking the contracts for types A SA . If the contracts for type A S A  all 
have 7( A) = A , it is infeasible for types A > A to finish the project and it will be better 
off for them to shirk throughout the funding period. To get the highest shirking benefit, 
they will choose the contract with 7(A) and have a utility cx7(A). In other words, the 
principal has to waste 7(A) for types A > A , as it is a dominant strategy for them to 
claim A . If the contracts for type ASA have 7(A) > A , then some types A' e [A, 7(A)] 
will find it feasible to finish the project. The problem with this case is that the principal 
will find it difficult to know exactly which type that A' is going to mimic, meaning that 
she can not tell when type A' is going to finish the project. Since the principal can not 
motivate any A 'e  [A,7(A)] to tell the truth (that is, to finish the project at A' if 
A' < 7(A )), it is assumed that types A' will all choose the contract with 7(A) and finish
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the project at 7(A)'’~. Therefore, instead of wasting 7(A) as in the ease of 7(A) = A . the 
principal’s utility How for this case is V -7 (A )-/? (A ) for A' e |  A, 7(A)] and -7(A) 
for A > 7(A). To cope with this situation, a complementary variable q is defined 
together with the capacity constraint, that is,
q = 0  if 7(A) = A , VA e [0,A],
= 1 if 7(A) > A and let |A| = 7 (A )-A .
The principal’s total expected utility function is:
max {i,f[T-(I -oc)T(A)-otA- (/(AJli/TXA)
+ J | ♦ «w [ V -  (1 -  a  )7( A) -  aA -  U(A)]dF(A) + £ ;|i| [-T(A)]i/F(A)}, ( « ) ’”
St. 7(A) > A for A e (0, A),
U(A) > a(A — A) + a7(A) and
(7(A) -  A)(i/(A) -  ot(A -  A) -  a7(A)) = 0.
In the objective function, the first term is the truncated utility for A e (0,A) as defined in 
(/',?)’. The second term denotes the expected utility if 7(A) > A , where some inefficient 
types could take the contract with 7(A) and finish the project. Notice that R(A) + 7(A) 
has been replaced by (1 -a )7 (A ) + aA + U(A) and this term exists only when 7(A) > A ; 
The last term is the principal’s utility for types A > A + q|A| who will find it infeasible to
finish the project and hence will take the contract for type A and shirk throughout.
The introduction of q does not really complicate the problem, since if 7(A) = A,
we have q = 0 and U (A) > a(A -  A) +a7(A ) = 2aA - a A . As giving rent is costly to
“  It is assumed (hat when the agent is indifferent between finishing and shirking, it will finish the project.
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the principal, she will set the utility at the lowest possible value, that is, 
U( A) = 2 a A —oA; If 7 '(A )>A , we have q > 0 and U(A)  = a(A  -  A) +a7'(A ), 
V A e|0 ,A |. Substitute U(A) into the first and second terms of the objective function, 
and collect terms. We can see that T( A) has a coefficient of —( I — ot) and T( A) has -1 in 
both the first and the second terms, and T(A) has a coefficient of -1 in the last term. As 
argued earlier, there will be no equilibrium setting of T(.). Hence, the only equilibrium 
contract length is set at the efficient level: T(A) = A , VAe[0,A]. The agent’s rent is 
U(A) = 2aA -  aA and the principal’s expected utility for a given A is:
[ V — (1 — a)A -  aA -  2aA + aA]</F( A) -  j£Ar/F( A)
= tv  -  (1 - a )A  -  2a A]</F(A) -  J£AJF(A). (3.13)
Integrating the first term by parts gives:
[V - ( l-a )A -2 a A ]F (A ) |i  + |o(l-a)F(A )c/A > (3.14)
Substitute (3.14) into equation (3.13) and integrate the last term. The principal’s total 
expected utility for a given A becomes:
[V — aA]F(A) -  A + |^ l  -a)F(A)c/A . (3.15)
Equation (3.15) has a neat explanation, that is, since mimicking is not punishable, the 
screening contract has to give the efficient types extra information rents which are 
decreasing in A and bounded below by type A ’s utility. The first and second terms of
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equation (3.15) summarise the principal’s project value less the sum of type A 's funding 
and effort rent, and the mimicking loss from the inefficient types A(1 -  F(A )). The last 
term is the sum of saving in funding and extra information rent for the efficient types. 
This utility is smaller than without the moral hazard problem where the principal’s value
is:
J(V — A)dF(A).
Integrating by parts gives:
[ V -  A]F(A) + jV(A)dA. (3.16)
Moreover, differentiating equations (3.15) and (3.16) with respect to A gives the 
principal’s marginal utility. We can hence check that the optimal A in equation (3.15) is 
less than in equation (3.16)62. In other words, due to the possibility that the agent can take 
the contract and shirk throughout, the principal turns to a conservative attitude in funding 
the long term project. Proposition 3.3 concludes the finding in this section:
Proposition 3.3
For a long term project with a moral hazard problem: (I) If A 6 [0, °°), the principal will 
adopt a cut-off strategy: she funds the project fo r  type A < A * and stops funding if 
A > A * ; (2) The agent’s production efficiency remains for the efficient type A < A *; (3) 
Compared to the contractible effort case, the principal will take a more conservative 
attitude in funding.
*’2 The second order conditions are satisfied if F(.) is concave.
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3.5. Auction
When there is more than one candidate for a project, an auction is usually held to select 
the agent to undertake the project. The most often cited examples are EU leasing R&D 
projects through tender process. Motivated hy its prevalence, we firstly discuss the design 
of the optimal auctioning contract, following the framework of Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
The outcome of this optimal auction is then compared to that of another auction form: the 
second-price auction. We obtain some interesting results concerning the revenue 
equivalence theorem and the separation property6\  Later, using this second-price 
auction, we discuss the existence of a built-in cost overrun which is caused by the mixed 
effects of bidding competition and the setting of a cost ceiling in case of overrun. The 
relevant literature is discussed at the end of this section.
3.5.1 Optimal Auction64
The derivation of the optimal auctioning contract is presented in a discrete type setting, as 
it provides a clearer idea about how an auction works in our model. To simplify the 
analysis, we keep the single principal assumption and further assume that there are two 
agents, whose types are independently drawn from the set {A,, A2) : with probability u to 63
63 Both of them are important results in auction theory. The revenue equivalence theorem (Vickrey, 1961) 
says that, under some assumptions (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.253 for detailed discussion ot these 
assumptions), all of the traditional auctions give the principal the same expected revenue. However, as 
demonstrated in Fudenberg and Tirole, this theorem does not hold in a two-type framework. The separation 
property says that the winner’s effort is the same as if the winner faced no bidding competition. (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993, p.328).
M Since the agent’s private information is due to a better understanding of its own cost structure, the auction 
we study here belongs to the class of “independent value model". The alternative settings are: the “common 
value model’’, where none of the bidders knows the cost (which is common to each agent) of the project 
although each agent may receive different information concerning this cost; the affiliated value model, 
where each bidder signals contain an idiosyncratic and private information (i.e., the observation of the 
common value) (see Milgrom (1987)).
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type A, and with probability (1 — u) to type A ,. Each agent knows his own type but not 
the rival's type, and the principal knows only each agent’s distribution. The assumptions 
of risk neutrality, no discounting, and a deterministic production technology still hold in 
this section. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is no collusion between two bidders. 
Denote the agents’ true values as A1 and A2 respectively (note the difference between 
superscript and subscript). The auction starts with each agent submitting its bid A'. The 
bid stands for the total duration equivalent to the total cost needed to complete the 
project, as we assume the cost per period to be £ 1. The bidding set is restricted to the type 
space (A,, A21, since the principal knows both agents’ distributions. The allocation of the
project, funding periods and rewards are hence dependent on the bidding vector (A1,A2). 
By the revelation principle, we can concentrate on a truth-telling direct mechanism. Let 
A = (A1, A2) and jc‘(A) be the probability that the project is assigned to agent /. Based on 
A, an auctioning contract specifies a probability jc'(A), a funding period 7j(A) and an 
end-of-contract reward R,(A) to each agent i. The truth-telling Bayesian implementation 
requires that the mechanism is designed in such a way that each agent bids its true value 
A' = A' and the project will be finished.
First of all, there are some constraints on the project allocation:
(A) S I.'*
x‘ (A) > 0 , for ( = 1,2.
M ^  i 1 (À) < I stands for the case where none of the agents wins the project. In other words, it is allowed to 
have allocation inefficiency.
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To sci a benchmark of allocation efficiency, wc need to check the allocation rules under 
complete information (i.e., when A is known):
a'(A,,A i) + jc2(Ai,A ,)=  1, 
a'(A2,A2) + x2(A2,A2)= 1 , 
a'(A,,A2) = a2(A2,A ,)=1.
When each agent’s type is known by the principal, the project will surely be assigned to 
the low cost agent. Notice that the sum of x'(.) is one, meaning that there is no 
efficiency loss in allocation. Recall that it is always efficient for the project to proceed. 
By submitting A1, agent 1 ’s expected utility for completing the project is:
V (A1, A2 )t/(A1, A2) = Ea! {x' (A1, A2 )[a(Tx (A1, A2) -  A1) + R, (A1, A2)] |
= {t)Al(A',A,)[a(7;(Al,A ,) -A ')+ /il(Al,A1)]
+ ( l - u ) x l(A',A2)[a(7j(A',A2)-A ')+ tf,(A l,A2)]).
As the principal would prefer the agent to complete the project efficiently, she has to 
ensure that this utility is at least the same as if the agent commits to shirk throughout or 
finish the project inefficiently. Note that the agent’s utility term goes after the winning 
probabilities * '( .) , rather than being an isolated term, which setting is often found in the 
mechanism design literature. In order to generalise the analysis, the previous literature 
allows the principal to compensate the loser(s) of an auction if necessary. However, as 
argued in Section 3.2, any reward before the completion of the project has no effect in 
encouraging effort, hence it is optimal for the principal to use the end-of-contract reward. 
Since the agent can not get the reward unless he wins and finishes the project, wc should 
put the compensation terms after the winning probabilities.
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I'or truth-telling to form a Bayesian Implementation, several constraints need to be 
satisfied. Firstly, if given the project1''’, each type of agent I will prefer completing the
project to shirking throughout (Moral Hazard constraint: MM), that is.
a(7j( A,, A2) — A,) + /f, (A,, A2) > a7](A,, A2) for A2 = A ,,A 2, (3.17)
and
ot(7j(A,,A2) -  A2)+ /?,(A2, A2) > a7j(A2,A2) for A2 = A ,,A 2. (3.18)
These two equations are not in expectations, as shirking can only matter after the project
(3.17)’ and (3.18)’ say that even in expectations, committing to finish the project will 
give each type of agent 1 at least the expected value from shirking throughout.
Secondly, to have truth-telling, the principal needs to ensure that each type of agent 
1 would prefer bidding the true value and committing to finish the project to bidding the 
other value and committing to finish or shirk throughout. In notation, the incentive 
compatibility constraint for type A, is:
We discuss agent I's constraints here, and agent 2’s constraints can he derived in the same way. 
‘,7 Note that since other constraints are in expectation terms, it is not a type dominant strategy 
implementation.
is assigned to the agent67. For future reference, taking the expectation across A2 on both
sides of equations (3.17) and (3.18), we have:
and
* '(A,, A2 )[oc(7; (A,, A2) -  A,) + K, (A ,, A2)]
> E &,x '  (A2, A2 )[a(7j (A2,A2) -  A , ) + /?,(A2, A2)].
(3.19)
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Bidding A, gives type A, a different probability of winning the auction. Note that (3.19) 
also implies that A, will not be belter off bidding A, and shirking throughout, which can 
be seen from (3.18)' and (3.19):
E j x \ A,, A2 )|ot(7j (A,, A2) -  A ,) + (A,, A2)] (3.20)
> V (A,, A2 )[(X(7^  (A2, A2) — A,) +/?, (A2, A2)]
> £ 4i-*l(A2,A2)[a(7](A2,A2) —A2)+ /f,(A2,A2)] > £ A,jc '(A 2,A2)a7'l (A2,A2).
The incentive compatibility constraint for type A2 is less straightforward, as whether 
type A, can finish the project is physically restricted by the capacity constraint. If 
7j(A,,A2) > A,, it is possible that A2 can finish the project by taking type A, 's contract 
and receive the rent from completing the project; if 7](A,, A2) < A ,, type A2's dominant 
strategy is to shirk throughout, as finishing the project is infeasible. For this case, type 
A, has the shirking benefit a7j(A,,A2). Since bidding will also affect type A2’s 
probability of winning the auction, MH2 will not cover this case as it does in the single 
agent case. Denote (his part as the Incentive Moral Hazard constraint for type A2 
(IMH2). Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint for type A, is:
V (A2, A2 )|cx(7j (A2, A2) — A2) + R{ (A2, A2)]
> £ A, jc'(A,,A2)• inax{[cx(7j(A, ,A2) -  A2) + /^(A ,, A2)],ix7j(A,, A2)}. (3.21)
The constraints for agent 2 can be derived in the same manner. The principal 
maximises her expected utility, which is the expected project value less the expected 
funding and reward cost, with respect to jc‘(A), 7^ (A) and Kt(A). That is.
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t  {*'(A', A2 )| V -  K, (A1, A2) -  7j(A', A2)]
+*2(A', A2 )| V -  «-.(A1, A2) -  r2( A', A2)]}, (3.22)
subject to the capacity, moral hazard and incentive compatibility constraints.
To solve the problem, we first need to find out the cheapest rent to implement an effort
level that finishes the project at time Tt . The analysis is similar to Section 3.2 but more
complicated as we need to take into account each agent’s winning probabilities*’8. So far,
for the efficient type, we have the moral hazard constraint (MH1(3.17)) and the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC1 (3.19)). Unlike the single agent case, the moral hazard
constraint for type A2 (MH2 (3.18)’) will not imply MH1, as different bidding values
will also affect the winning probability x‘(A). For the inefficient type, we have moral
hazard constraint (MH2 (3.18)’) and incentive compatibility constraint (1C2 (3.21)).
Again unlike the single agent case, 1MH2 will not be implied by MH2 constraint. The
following discussion helps to cut down the number of constraints. Firstly, MH1 cannot
bind, since if it is binding, IMH2 will be violated. That is, suppose MH1 is binding.
Therefore, for the cheapest rent for type A ,, IC1 will be binding. Secondly, if T, < A2, 
1C2 can be pinned down to only IMH2. To proceed, we guess that only IMH2 is valid, 
and leave it for justification later. Moreover, MH2 requires that for the winning agent to
wl The following discussion concentrates on agent I and the same reasoning applies to agent 2.
> (A2,A2)[a(7](A2,A2) — A,) + /?,(A2,A2)]
> (A2,A2)[a(7](A2,A2) -  A2) + /J,(A2,A2)].
87
complete the project, type A ,'s utility must he bigger than a7j(A2,A2) for A2 = A,,A,. 
This will he violated if only IMH2 is binding, provided 7j( A,, A3) < 7j( A,, A’). Assume 
provisionally that /¡(A,, A’) < 7j(A2. A2) and hence we can have cither only MH2 
binding or both MH2 and IMII2 binding. In the following, we proceed with the analysis 
by assuming only MH2 is binding, and leave the checking of 1MH2 for the end of our 
discussion. Let (/'(.,.) denote agent f s  utility, and the principal’s objective function can 
be written as:
E&i &! {(x' (A1, A2)(V — [(1 — a)7J(A1, A2) + aA1 + U'(A1, A2)])
+ jc2(A',A2)(V-[(1 — a)7'2(A',A2) + otA2 + i /2(A‘, A2)])) .
For MH2 to be binding, we have type A2’s expected utility of agent 1 as:
£ A: jc' (A2,A2 )t/'(A ,,A 2) = E&!x ' (A2,A2 )a7](A2, A2), (3.18)”
which means that type A2 is rewarded the shirking benefit from taking the contract of his 
own type. For IC1 to be binding, we have
(A,, A2 )U' (A,, A2) = E&! x ' (A2, A2 )[aT, (A2, A2) — A,) + /?, (A2, A2)].
Likewise, we can derive the cheapest rents for agent 2. Substituting (/'(.,.) with the 
cheapest rents and collecting terms, we can rewrite the principal’s expected utility 
function as:
i '(A |,A 1)U2[V -( l  -tx)7j(A |,A |) —txA,]
+x2(A,, A, )\>2[ V — (1 -c O T ^ A ^ A ^ -aA ,]
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-*--v1 (A ,,A 2 )tj( 1 — \>)|V/ — (1 -a)7' l(A , ,A2) - « A l |
+-*2(A, , A 2 ){u(l — u)[V — (1 —cOT^A,, A 2 )-ocA2 )
-(1 -u)ua7'2( A l, A , ) - ' U 2|ajr:, (Al,A 2) - a A 1 + aA,]|
+jrl(A2,A) )|( l—u ) u t V - ( l  -a ) 7 ] ( A 2, A , ) - a A 2]
-(1 -\))ua7'|(A2,A, ) - \ ) 2[a7'2(A 2,A, ) - a A ,  +cxA2 ])
+x2(A2,A, )(1 -  \)>u[V- (1  -  a)72(A 2,A, ) - a A ,  ]
+*' (A2,A 2)((1 —b)2[V — (1 - a ) 7 ] ( A 2, A, ) - a A ,  ]
-(1 -  \))2a7',(A2,A 2) - u ( l  -u ) [a7’l( A 2, A 2) - a A ,  + a A 2]) 
+A:2(A2,A 2) { ( l - - u ) 2[ V - ( l - a ) 7 - 2(A2,A 2) - a A 2]
- ( l - - u ) 2a r 2(A 2,A 2) - u ( l - \ ) ) [ a r 2( A 2,A2) - a A 1 + a A 2] } .  (3.23)
It can be checked that all the coefficients of 7](.) in equation (3.23) are negative, 
meaning that funding is costly to the principal. Hence, the capacity constraints should be 
binding:
7](A,,A2) = 72(A 2, A, ) = A , ,
and
7](A2,A, )  = r2( A l,A2) = A 2.
In the solution, production efficiency will hold as each type finishes the project without 
delay (A,). As we will see later, production efficiency does not hold in a second-price 
auction. Next, we need to find out the allocation rule in this auction. First of all, since the 
terms after x'fA^A,) and jc2(A,,A,) arc identical, to maximise expected utility, the 
principal should set
jci(Ai,A i) + jc2(Ai,A ,)=  1.
Likewise,
X9
jc' (A2,A,)  + .*2(A2,A2) = 1 .
Assuming symmetry, we have jc1 (A,, A ,) = ,r2(A., A .) = at'(A ,,A , ) = x 2(A,,A, ) = — .
2
Secondly, since the value after x'(A,,A2) is greater than the value after jc2(A,,A2), 
jc'(A ,,A 2) should be set as large as possible, i.e., jr'(A,,A2) = 1 . In the same manner, 
we set ar2(A2, A,) = 1 . Comparing this result with the complete information case, we can 
conclude that the optimal auction keeps both allocation and production efficiency as in 
the complete information case.
Finally, we need to check whether the solution satisfies all the constraints. IC2 will 
be pinned down to only 1MH2, as the funding period for the efficient type is A,.
Substituted with the settings of 7] and x ' , MH2 ((3.18)”) says that the optimal rent for 
type A2 is aA2. However, IMH2 requires the expected utility for type A2 to be at least 
as much as taking the contract for type A, and shirking throughout, i.e.,
VtO + ( l - u )  —(aAj) > u — (aA ,) + (l —u)(txA.), which will hold if A2 >A.(1 + —-—).
2 2 1 — U
From IC1, type A, ’s rent for this case is 1 -  -U
2 -  v
a(2A2 — A,), which is smaller than that in
the single agent case: a(2A2 -  A ,). The utility difference is because for this case type A, 
will be less likely to mimic A2 under competition, as mimicking type A2 will give him 
less chance to win the contract.
For A, < A,(1 + —!—), 1MH2 will be violated by the above solution. To have IMH2 
2 ' 1 -u
satisfied, we can either adjust the reward /?2(A) or the probability of winning jc'(A) .
>)()
Since the agent will be indifferent adjusting K,( A) and .v'(A), and since adjusting 
.r'(A) will cause longer expected funding periods, it is optimal to adjust /f ,(A ).
Having IMH2 bind, the inefficient type's incentive rent will be: oA,(l H--- !—), which is
I - u
greater than (xA, by the assumption of parameters. From ICI, type A, ’s rent for this case
is: -——a(2A, — A.H---!—aA ., which is higher than the rent for A, >A,(1h---- !—).
2 - u  2 1 2 - u  ' 2 iv , _ u '
However, it is still smaller than the single agent case (as------ aA. < —!— a(2A, -  A ,)).
2 - o  1 2 - o  2 1
Intuitively, when there is a big difference between the two types, the inefficient type has a 
higher shirking benefit by taking his own contract although doing so will give him less 
chance to win the auction. As mimicking the inefficient type will give the efficient type 
less chance to win the auction, the incentive rent paid for his truth-telling can hence 
decrease. When there is a smaller difference between the two types, the inefficient type 
will mimic the efficient type in order to have a higher chance of winning. Hence, the 
principal has to give the inefficient type higher rent to choose its own type. Accordingly, 
to induce truth-telling from the efficient type, the principal has to increase the incentive 
rent for the efficient type. But still, this rent is less than the single agent case. Overall, the 
principal benefits from the competition between two firms, because the incentive rents 
can be decreased under competition and there is more chance to have the project 
completed by an efficient type.
3.5.2 Second-Price Auction
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An interesting question is “Can the optimal outcome be achieved by a traditional 
auction?” There are four auction forms1' ' in the traditional literature: ascending (English, 
oral), descending (Dutch, oral or outcry), first-price and second-price auctions (sealed- 
bid). Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that descending and first-price auctions arc 
strategically equivalent, and ascending and second-price auctions are equivalent in the 
context of private value models. The revenue equivalence theorem says that these four 
auctions give the auctioneer the same expected revenue, and the separation property says 
that the winner’s effort will be the same as no bidding competition. Apart from these two 
results, it is also well known in auction theory that a bidder’s weakly dominant strategy is 
to bid its true value in a second-price auction (e.g., Vickrey (1961)). In the following, we 
discuss a second-price auction which incorporates the opportunism problem in our 
model, and conclude that “bidding the principal’s reservation price” will be each agent’s 
dominant strategy and neither the revenue equivalence theorem nor the separation 
property holds in this auction.
In a second-price auction, two agents simultaneously submit their bids b' for the 
project’s total cost. Recall that agent i has private information about the total cost A . The 
bidding set is not restricted to |A ,,A ,|, however we assume the principal adopts a 
reservation policy in the auction. There are many papers discussing the settings of 
optimal reservation price (e.g., Milgrom (1987), Levin and Smith (1996)). To avoid 
complication70 and to make it comparable to the outcome from the optimal auction, it is 
assumed that the principal’s reservation price is A ,. Moreover, since there is a moral 
hazard problem, to avoid the agents bidding a low cost, winning the contract and then
The auction forms are not necessarily the optimal forms.
711 One of the issues on the reservation price policy concerns whether to announce the true value or a false 
value. However, this is not the issue addressed in this paper.
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shirking throughout afterwards, we need to put a constraint on each agent’s bid. 
Specifically, for each value b‘ , an end of contract reward ah' 71 is required as part of the 
total cost. The lowest cost bidder wins the project and will be assigned the contract 
associated with the second lowest bid. The loser is given nothing. If both agents bid the 
same total cost, the project is allocated randomly between them.
Firstly, it can be checked that bidding the principal’s reservation price is the 
dominant strategy. To see, suppose b‘ > A ,. If b‘ < b' and b 1 > A , then the project will 
be finished by agent i and its utility for this case is: a(b' -  A ') + a b ' . If b‘ < b‘ and 
b‘ < A , then the project is still given to i but will not be finished. Agent i has the 
shirking revenue ah1. If b‘ = b ' , then both agents share the project with funding 
associated with b‘ . However, if > b ‘ , then the project will be assigned to agent j  and 
agent /’s utility will be zero. Since bidding a lower value can guarantee at least a positive 
utility, to have the highest probability of winning the auction, it is dominant for each 
agent i to always bid A ,.
Secondly, given that each agent’s dominant strategy is to bid the principal’s 
reservation price, both agents will be assigned randomly (with probability in the
symmetric case) the contract associated with A ,. There will be only a probability 
u 2 + u(l -U ) = u  that the project can be finished at time A ,. For other cases, the agents 
will shirk right through A ,. Hence the principal’s expected utility will be:
u{V -A , -cxA, | + (1 — X>) {—A,) ,
71 This constraint is equivalent to the moral hazard constraint. (Equivalently, the hid could be interpreted as 
including the reward «/),).
which will be smaller than that from the optimal auction: \) (V  — A I | +
(1 — \j ) {V — ( I +  o O A ,- ( I  — tx)\)(A, -  A , )) for a sufficiently big project value and a 
sufficiently big difference between two types7’. Since for each winner there is only a 
probability u that full effort will be put in. the separation property does not hold either. 
We write this result as a proposition.
Proposition 3.5
In a second-price auction where the bidding object is the total cost for a long term 
project and there is a moral hazard problem, each agent will bid the principal’s 
reservation price and neither the revenue equivalence theorem nor the separation 
property will hold in this auction.
Next, we use this second-price auction to address an issue that is often confronted in 
long term contracts: the cost overruns problem. Cost overruns have already been noticed 
since early research, for example, Scherer (1964) concludes that “just as in weapons 
acquisition, cost overruns are quite common in advanced commercial product 
development efforts”. However, there is little theoretical discussion concerning this issue. 
In a single agent repeated contract game, Lewis ( 1986) concludes a Bayesian equilibrium 
where the reputation effect keeps the agent performing well in early stages of production, 
but as the principal learns more about the agent’s private information over time, the 
reputation effect decreases and hence production cost will be higher in later stages. Arran 
and Leite (1990) also show that the compensation scheme arises as the project nears its 
completion.
In addition to these compensation changes within the contracts, there is a different 
interpretation of cost overruns by Scherer (p. 155): “overrun refers only to increases in 12
12 The condition will be similar for u smaller difference between two types.
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cost above the negotiated target when there has been no change in the contract’s 
qualitative and quantitative requirements”. In his study of the weapon acquisition 
process, Scherer mentions a very interesting piece of evidence about cost overruns: 
“Secretary of Defence... claimed that cost estimates submitted by both Boeing and 
General Dynamics... were unrealistically optimistic (p. 176)”. In other words, there is a 
built-in cost overrun induced by the competition among potential contractors. To proceed 
with our analysis, I would like to quote another piece of evidence in the same report: 
“Usually a ceiling price (historically, from 115% to 135% of the target cost) is negotiated, 
setting a firm limit on the amount of cost plus profit the government will pay in the event 
of a large overrun”.
It is argued that this kind of built-in cost overrun does exist and is caused by the 
mixed effects of competition among agents and expectation of the price ceiling in case of 
overrun” . The intuition is as follows. The setting of a price ceiling actually extends the 
effective deadline to the extent of the ceiling. Imagine a contracted agent who knows in 
advance that there will be contingent extension of the funding period (and the reward). 
Since a longer funding period implies a higher utility, the agent will find it optimal to 
delay his effort (which is unobservable by the principal) and make the contingent 
extension realised. Hence in a single agent case, there will be an extra rent from 
extension. However, when there is more than one potential agent, each of them knows 
that its effective deadline is the target deadline plus the extended period. Given the other 
agents bid the lowest possible value and obtain this extra rent, agent t will find it optimal 
to forgo some of his extra rent and bid a lower value to have a higher chance of winning 
the contract. Therefore, in equilibrium, each agent will underbid their values to the extent
”  Quirk and Teresawa (1984), and Gaspar and Leite (1989/1990) address independently the relation 
between selection bias and cost overrun. The intuition they use is the “winner's curse phenomenon". As 
they use common value and single stage models, the present model is therefore different from theirs.
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the contract. Therefore, in equilibrium, each agent will underbid their values to the extent 
that the extra rent from extension is driven down to zero and hence there is a built-in cost 
overrun. The detail of this idea is left for further research.
3.6. Symmetric Beliefs
In this section, it is assumed that neither of the involved parties has private information 
about A , which corresponds to the stochastic setting in the R&D literature. Under 
symmetric74 *beliefs, we discuss how the opportunism problem affects the agent’s effort 
decisions and then look for the optimal funding contract. It is shown that the funding 
length is not longer than the contract without the opportunism problem. Later, we 
investigate the impact of contract renewal, the issues of lock-in effect and the choice 
between long-term and short-term contracts. To simplify the analysis, it is first assumed 
that both parties do not anticipate the renewal of the contract. We can justify this case by 
picturing that there is a sequence of principals and agents, and each match of them is 
allowed only one attempt at finishing the project (i.e., one contract). The result shows that 
the lock-in effect persists and a series of short-term contracts is preferable to a single 
long-term contract. A short-term contract refers to a contract that lasts for one unit of 
time (such as one execution period), and a long-term contract refers to the optimal 
contract. Finally, we discuss the case when both parties can anticipate the contract 
renewal, for which case our result shows that no transaction will ever happen.
3.6.1 Symmetric Beliefs W ithout Renewal
74 More specifically, the literature assumes the distribution to be an exponential function. See I.ucas (1971)
for an example of a monopoly firm, and Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinjtanum (1982), Harris and Vickers 
(1987) for examples with rival firms.
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Keeping the assumption of a single self-interested prineipal and single agent, we assume 
that neither of the involved parties has private information about A . Both parties have 
the same belief that A is drawn from (0,°°) by a distribution function F(A), with 
density function /(A )75 and /(A ) > 0 for VA . This setting corresponds to the stochastic 
nature in the R&D literature. One can think of “eureka” kind of projects, where the agent 
puts in effort without knowing how long more it will take before completion. It is 
assumed that once the innovation comes out76, it becomes publicly known. Concealing 
the innovation is excluded in this model. Further assumptions on the distribution form 
will be imposed as we proceed with the analysis.
The principal starts by offering the agent a contract77 {7\G), where she commits the 
funding for T period, and if the innovation comes out any time before or at T, the funding 
stops immediately and the agent is given G as reward; however, if the innovation never 
happens before or at T, the funding stops after T and the agent is not given any reward. 
The constant reward can be interpreted as the prize (a patent or monopoly profit) of R&D 
activities (e.g., Reinganum (1989)). The agent responds by accepting or rejecting this 
offer. If the agent takes the offer, he has to make a sequence of working and shirking 
decisions as described in Section 3.2. Keeping the no discounting assumption. Lemma
3.3 says that if the agent decides to put in effort, he will delay the effort till the last part of 
the funding periods (i.e., he will not put in effort and then shirk at any point). The proof 
of Lemma 3.3 is presented in a discrete version, as it provides a better picture of the
7' The setting of distribution is the same as section 3.4, but now even the agent does not know F(.). The 
assumption of continuity is for technical convenience, as the derivation of optimal contract will be very 
difficult in a discrete setting.
7,1 Only when the innovation comes out, the involved parties know the true value of A .
77 We restrict to this contract form as it is most used in the K&l) literature, (i can be seen as a patent.
agent's choice at eacli point. To do so, we need to re-deline the variables. Firstly, assume 
the index in discrete setting takes the form of natural numbers, that is, l= 1, 2, 3.... Hence, 
a number t refers to the value from t -1  till t in the continuous version. Next, denote
p(A = /):=]" | / ( A)r/A as the probability that the completion time needed is t. As it is
assumed that / ( A )> 0 , we know p (A )> 0 . Further, define p(A = t\A > k)
:= f /"(AlA > k)dA , where /'(AlA > k) is the conditional density function given A > k .Jt-\'
As / (A) > 0, it is also true that / ( A|A > k)>  0. Lemma 3.3 is proved using this adjusted 
setting.
Lemma 3.3
It is not optimal for the agent to put in effort first and shirk later.
P roof: At an arbitrary time t. t < T , assume that the agent has put in effort for k periods. 
Conditional on the project not being finished before t, denote p(A = k + l|A > k) as the 
conditional probability that the project will be completed if the agent puts in effort once 
again. Consider the following two strategies from t on, with the only difference in the 
order of actions at time / and t+1: strategy A specifies the agent to work at t and then 
shirk at t+I\ strategy B specifies the agent to shirk first at t and then work at t+l. The 
expected values for these two strategics arc denoted by W* and W" , where
W,A = p(A = A: + l|A > A:) • G +(1 -  p(A = <: + l|A > k))(a +W,+2 ) .
and
W," = a  + p( A = & + l|A>fc)'G  + (l — p( A = k + l|A >k))W ,+2 .
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where W‘+2, i = A, B is the agent’s value function at t + 2 given k+l ( A > k + \ ) periods 
of effort from Strategy A and Strategy B respectively. The explanation for W/ is: by 
putting in effort for the k + l'1' time, the agent has a probability p(A = k + 11A > k) to 
finish the project, and obtain the reward G from completion. If the project is not finished. 
Strategy A specifies the agent to shirk from t + 1 till t + 2 and get the shirking benefit a . 
W,+2 *s *he value at time t + 2 provided the project is not finished after k + I periods of 
effort. W," is explained in a similar manner. Note that, since the two strategies coincide 
from t + 2 on, we have W,+2 = W,+2 • Further, since /?(•)> 0 by assumption, W,H — W/ 
= a/)(A = k + l |A > k )> 0 . Hence, the agent can be better off using strategy B, and cannot 
be worse off. Since we can take t+J to be the last effort period before a period of 
shirking, we can conclude the lemma. Q.E.D.
Given Lemma 3.3, denote n as the agent’s committed shirking period before he puts 
in effort henceforth until T. In the following, we look for the optimal n for a given 
contract {7\G}, and note that we are back to the continuous setting. The agent’s utility 
for a given contract is:
an + ¡'g BF(A) .
Jo
The agent’s expected utility is the sum of shirking benefit an and the expected reward 
from completion G F (T -n ) .  To ensure the existence of the maximum and simplify 
analysis, we assume F "(A )< 0 , which can be supported by an exponential density
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function <■ " , as most assumed in the R&D literature. The agent maximises his expected 
utility with respect to n, that is.
max{cut + G ■ F(T — «)} (3.24)
St. n > 0 .
Denote n* as the optimal value of n, and the FOC is:
a  — G • f ( T  — n*) = 0 ,
or equivalently,
= (3.25)
The existence of n* is defined, since > 0 and /  is continuous. Two implications can
be drawn: firstly, n* is positively related to T with derivative 1, which means that when 
the agent is also uncertain about the time needed to complete the project, a longer funding 
period will only induce more shirking. Secondly, as we assume F"(A) < 0 , it is clear that 
n* is negatively related to G, implying that a higher reward can motivate the agent to put
in more effort. For notational simplification, denote / “'(—) as t(ot,G). Together with
G
the concavity assumption, we know that t(a ,G ) is increasing in a  and decreasing in G. 
Next, the principal’s expected utility for a given {T,G ) is:
-G)c/F(A) —[n Ai/F(A) + ( 1 - J j " n*r/F(A))(7' -«*)].
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As there is no diseounting, the prineipal will have to waste n* before the agent actually 
puts in effort (the second term). For the third term, note that since the agent will put in
r T - n *
effort from n* until T, the expected cost for this part will be J A <//•'( A), where the
funding stops once the project is completed. Simultaneously, the principal can obtain the 
project value V deducted by the reward G (the first term). Finally, if the project is never
fin ished w ith in  T, the probability o f which is (1 -  J < fF (A ) ) , then the principal has to
waste the funding T — n* in the end. To make the following analysis reasonable, we 
restrict to the case when V is sufficiently big so that the principal’s expected utility will 
be positive for any optimal values of T and G.
The principal’s problem is to maximise her expected utility with respect to the 
contract (7\G):
max fr ~n*(V — G)dF(A) — [n * + f? "* Ar/F( A) + (1 -  fr ""* dF( A))(T -  n*)] (3.26)
j  q  Jo  JO JO
St n*> 0.
The constraint comes from the requirement that any funding period inducing a negative 
n* will be infeasible. To solve the problem, firstly, since funding is costly to the 
principal, without violating the feasibility constraint, T should be set at the lowest 
possible value 7 '*=T(a,G ), implying that in equilibrium the principal will fund the 
project just long enough to avoid any shirking. Secondly, since when G —* 0 the 
expected utility approaches 0, the optimal G must be bigger than zero7*. G*7V is given by:
,H Recall that V is sufficiently big for a positive expected utility in the solution. 
n  1'he existence of G* is justified by the differentiability assumption of F(.).
101
G* = argmax{(V- G)F(x(a,G ) ) - ( |  A</F(A) + (1 -  F(i(a,G)) x(a ,G )l|. (3.26)’
To sum up. when the agent’s effort is unobservable, the optimal contraet [T*,G* | 
describes a funding period which induces no shirking, and a positive reward for 
completion. A useful exercise is to compare this contract to the contract with observable 
(contractible) effort. If the effort is observable, the agent will not shirk. Hence G has no 
incentive effect for the agent. As G is costly to the principal, the optimal G for this case is 
therefore zero. To decide the contract length, the principal has to maximise her expected 
utility which is:
The expected utility consists of the expected project value and the expected funding cost.
funding stops once the project is completed, and hence the expected cost will be
Proposition 3.6 shows that the funding period with unobservable effort is no longer 
than the contract with observable effort.
Proposition 3.6
When neither the principal nor the agent has private information about the finishing 
time, the principal funds the project for a period no longer than the contract without a 
moral hazard problem.
Since the agent will put in full effort, the expected project value will be jV</F(A). The
. However, if the project is not finished within the funding period, the principal
will waste the funding T, the probability of which is (1 -  Jr/F(A)).
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Proof: Let 7, T < °o denote the optimal funding periods for the principal’s maximisation 
problems with observable and unobservable effort respectively, that is,
T = argmax{W(7’) - ( f  Ai/F(A) + (1 - /•'(7'))7'1},
T
and
f  = x(a,G*) = arg max{(K -  G*)F(T)~ | [ Ar/F(A) + (1 -  F(T))T] ),
r Jo
where G* is the optimal reward defined in (3.26)’ and T is the optimal funding period 
such that n*=0. Recall from equation (3.26) that shirking is costly, hence it is optimal to 
set F = X(a,G) which induces n*=0. As G* is the optimal reward, ceteris paribus,
F = X(a,G*) will be the optimal setting of T that maximises the principal’s expected 
utility. The proposition says that T > T , which is to be proved by contradiction. Suppose 
T < T . Then by definition of maximisation:
VF(T)-[j 'AdF(b) + ( l -F(T) )T]Z VF(T)-[\ '&lF(A) + ( \ - F ( f ) ) T ] ,  (3.27)
and
(V -  G*)F(T) -  [J W ( A )  + (1 -  F(f ) ) f ]  > ( V -  G*)F(T) -  [ J W (A )  + (1 -  F(T))T] ,
(3.28)
Equations (3.27) and (3.28) mean that,
V(F(T) -  F(T)) -  { - |W ( A )  + [(1 -  F(T))T -  (1 -  F(f))T] ( 2 0 ,  (3.27)’
(V -  G*)(F(T) -  F(T)) -  {J Ac/F(A) + [(I -  F(T))T -  (1 -  F(T))T] ) > 0 . (3.28)’
Let X:= (F(T) -  F(T)) > 0,
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Y:= - | W ( A )  + |(I -  R T ) } T - ( \  -  F(T))T].
Hence equations (3.27)' and (3.28)’ mean dial
- V X - Y >() =* - V X >Y ,
( V - G * ) X + Y >  0 => —(V — G*)X < Y ,
which is a contradiction. Thus it must be T >T . Q.E.D.
Intuitively, due to the unobservability of effort, the agent can possibly shirk without being 
detected. As putting in effort will not necessarily result in the success of R&D, for a 
given reward, the agent has to trade off the expected reward from innovation and the 
shirking benefit. Accordingly, for any given funding period, the agent will only work up 
to a certain period which is positively related to the size of reward. Anticipating the 
agent’s shirking, the principal would like to set a funding length such that the agent’s 
shirking period will be driven down to zero. Therefore, the presence of opportunism leads 
to a decrease in funding.
3.6.2  Th e  Renewal of the Contract
3.6.2.1 W hen the Aaent Can Not Anticipate the Renewal
Wc address this problem by assuming that the contract is not in a form of “redetermiahle 
fixed price contract"*0, hence wc need not worry about the renewing problem within the
*' Scherer (1964, pi 37) defines the redetermiable fixed price contract as "At the outset,... the buyer and 
the seller negotiate a tentative base price and a firm ceiling price ... Then, after the contractor has 
accumulated some experience in performing the contract (typically after 30% to 40% of expected costs has 
been increased, but sometimes also at the 1(X)% point), the parties negotiate a final firm fixed price, 
adjusting the original base price to reflect any changes in their cost expectation”.
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funding period. The principal faces the contract renewal problem at the end of the 
funding period if the project has not been completed any time before. Provisionally, it is 
assumed that both parties do not anticipate this renewal from the outset, which is indeed a 
strong assumption and will be relaxed later. However with this assumption, we can 
imagine that there is a sequence of principals and agents, and each match of them is 
allowed only one attempt at finishing the project. Whenever the agent cannot finish the 
project within the funding period, the project will be delegated to another match of 
principal and agent111. The issues to be addressed are: How will both parties react in each 
renewed contract? and Will the principal necessarily renew the contract? In other words, 
will there be a lock-in effect?
First of all, to understand both parties’ behaviour, we need to check the posterior 
belief after the k ,h , k = 0,1,2..., round of renewal (if it exists). Denote Tk as the optimal 
funding period in each renewed contract. In equilibrium, both players know that the 
principal will set a funding period which induces no shirking. In other words, in each 
renewed contract, the funding period can induce the full effort of Tk . Define 
k
T(k) = X 7! ’ wtlich 's the accumulated effort that has been put into the project within
1=0
the past k contracts. At the end of time T(k) and provided the project is not finished, the 
posterior belief of A will be:
n * n k ) )  = T = F c m ) '  7<e(7’(*)’oo)’ (329)
*' It is assumed that the transferability of information to the next match of principal and agent is possible 
and free of charge (i.e., there is no intellectual property right problem).
105
Given the distribution function, clearly f ( j \ T ( k ) ) > f ( j )  for j  e (T(k),°°). For the
k + I'* renewal, the new match of principal and agent face a similar maximisation 
problem as in the previous section, except that the belief function is now replaced by a 
posterior defined in equation (3.29). Instead of replicating the maximising process, we 
look at the FOC of the agent’s maximisation problem directly. Given T(k) , let it be the 
optimal shirking period such that
f ( T - n  + T(k)\T(k)) = ~ .  (3.30)
G
The accumulated effort T(k) has two effects112 on the agent’s shirking decision. 
Equation (3.29) says that the posterior assigns higher probabilities to time after T(k) 
than the original function. However, since F"( A) < 0 , the optimal it should be lower as it 
is T -  n + T(k)  rather than T — n in the argument of /(•|7'(A)) • These two effects make it 
difficult to measure the total impact of contract renewal on the agent’s willingness to 
work. However, rewrite equation (3.29):
/(A  + T(k)\T(k)) = /(A  + 7W )
1 -  F(T(k)) ’
and take the partial differentiation of this function with respect to T(k ) :
r)/(A + T(kjT(k))  f \A + T(A))(I -  F(T(k))) + /(A + T(k))f(T(k))  
dT(k)  (I -  F(T(k))2
whose sign depends on whether
Willi an exponential function, due to ihc “memoryless” properly, both effects will be cancelled out and 
hence the updated belief is the same as the original one.
f ' ( A  + n m i  -  F (T (k ))) + /(A + T(k))f(T(k))  > 0,
or equivalently,
- f \ A + n k ) ) c n n k n
f ( A  + T(k)) (1 — F(T(k)))
In words, the agent may or may not increase his willingness to work depending on the 
relative sizes of marginal probability rate and the hazard rate. Moreover, the sign of the 
second order differentiation of /(A  + T(k)\T(k)) with respect to T(k) is also ambiguous. 
However, it can be checked that when T(,k) —» °° , by twice using L’Hospital’s rule, the 
sign of equation (3.31) is positive81. The extreme case says that the agent will increase 
the willingness to work as the project approaches its later stages.
An interesting question is “ Will fc —» ?”, that is, Will the principal keep on
renewing the project if it is not finished any time before? or Will there be a lock-in effect
in funding the project? The answer is yes provided
df(A + nk) \T(k))  
dT(k)
> 0 84. To see why,
let us look at the principal’s expected utility when it comes to the k + l"* 1 renewal. Recall 
that in each renewal, it is assumed that the project will be delegated to a new match of 
principal and agent. The problem is similar to equation (3.26), with the difference being 
that the probability function is replaced by a posterior belief:
max) f ' (K — G)dF(A + T(k)\T(k))
/; .a Jo
-[/i + f ' ‘ " A i / F ( A  +  T ( k ) \ T ( k ) )  + (1 - (j^ '" J F ( A  + T ( k ) \ T ( k ) ) ) ( T ,  - m)]},
This is true under the additional assumptions that F'" < 0 and F""  close to zero.
I,'‘ litis condition will be violated by the exponential distribution.
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St it > 0  ,
or
m a x j '  11 V7 -  6" +  (7; -  ii) -  A] [<//•'(A +  T ( k ) \ T ( k ) ) ~  i]  (3 .3 2 )
St / / > ( ) .
By applying the envelope theorem, equation (3.32) shows that the principal will have a
higher expected utility if
df(A + T(k)\T(k)) 
dT(k)
> 0. Therefore, we can conclude that the
lock-in effect exists in this model when it comes to later stages of production. The 
intuition for this lock-in behaviour is because previous funding has become sunk cost, 
which has no influence to the contract renewal. Therefore as the probability of 
completing the project becomes higher, the principal will find it more valuable to fund 
the project.
Now, let us look at the choice between long-term and short-term contracts. Refer to 
the contract decided by equation (3.26) as the long-term contract, and the contract that 
lasts for only one unit of time as the short-term contract. As there is no clear definition 
about the short-term contract length, to simplify, I assume this “one unit of time” to be 
one in natural numbers, but other splits of time will not change the analysis. Recall that for 
the moment renewal is possible and both parties cannot anticipate this renewal. We need 
to compare the principals’ total expected utilities from a long-term contract and from a 
sequence of short-term contracts which are renewed up to the end of funding period in 
the long-term contract. Proposition 3.7 shows that from the principal’s point of view, a 
sequence of short-term contracts is better than a single long-term contract.
Proposition .1.7
108
Willi symmetric beliefs and the possibility of contract renewal, if both parties do not 
anticipate the renewal, a sequence of short-term contracts is better than a long-term 
contract from the principal's point o f view.
First of all, recall T = x(a,G*) as the optimal funding period determined by equation 
(3.26). x(a,G*) can be either <1 or > 1. If x(a,G *) < 1, then our argument is not 
relevant. If x(a,G*) = l, the long-term and short-term contracts coincide. For 
x(a,G*) > 1 , note that the optimal funding period is dependent on the optimal G* which 
maximises the principal’s expected utility, and is defined in equation (3.26)’:
G* = arg max|(V -  G ) F ( x ( a , G ) ) ’Aí/F(A) + (1 -F ( t (a,G )) x (a ,G )] |.
Moreover, let G„ be the reward such that x(a,G0) = l. For x(a,G*) > x( a ,G0) = 1, it 
must be that G < G * . From equation (3.32) we know that after i rounds of renewal, the
principal will set a funding period 7] which induces no shirking, that is, T: = /  '(—:| 0 .
G
where /(•]() is defined in (3.29). As we are concentrating on short-term contracts with 
duration 1, we need to define the reward such that 1 will be the optimal duration, that is,
G, = | g
As / (  |/)>  /( • ) ,  G, > G ,„. Further define |F| as the greatest integer for T, and let 
Ax - T - \ T \ .  At the very beginning of the project, each value of A is conceived to 
happen with density /(A ) , and therefore the principal’s total expected utility from a 
sequence of short-term contracts renewed up to time x(a,G*) is:
a
= /d |0 » = 1,2,...
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) — A]r/F( A)f'[(V  -  G „ ) -  A ]<//•’( A) + f  [(V -  G, ) -  A]</F(A)+...+ f <" ’i |( V -  G. „
Jo J l j|t(a.(7*)|-l 1
f|T(a.c;*)|+AT ~ |t(aX^)| I +| r |T(a.G*)| + At
+L . . „  K V' - G ir,.,«1() - A ] t/ / '( A ) - | | -  X  1 </F(A)- f t(„,;.y d F { A m a , G * ) ,
which is equivalent to
|t ( «  .<» * >| I ,
X J  ( V - C , W A ) + (V' - G |t(a.c„)^ (A) - { X  J ArfF(A)
i=() 1=0
i| t ( a  | U a / ^ ) j  I J H  t  ( a  ,(»•  H * A tAdF(A) + [ 1 -  Y  f dF(A)-  f r/F(A)|r(a,G*)}.“  Ji J|t(a.<;-)l
(3.33)
Since G0 is smaller than G* as shown above and G, > G(+| , by comparing equations 
(3.26)’ and (3.33), we can conclude that the principals’ total utility will be higher from a 
sequence of short-term contracts. The intuition for this result is: short-term contracts 
provide both involved parties opportunities to update their beliefs about the time needed 
to complete the project. Hence the principals in the later contracts can pay less 
compensation to induce the same level of effort from the agents. On the other hand, we 
can infer that the traditional R&D contract {T, G} may not be an optimal contract form 
for this case.
3 .6 .2 .2  When the Agent Can Anticipate the Renewal
When the agent can anticipate the renewal, no transaction will ever happens\  The 
intuition can be seen from the combination of the lock-in effect and the agent’s optimal 
behaviour described in Lemma 3.3. The lock-in effect says that the principal will keep on 
renewing the contract if the project has not been finished. Anticipating this, the agent will
In other words, the commitment to the contract tail to fulfil the intuition criterion.
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expect a total funding period that lasts for °» period provided that project is not finished. 
The maximising behaviour in Lemma 3.3 then suggests that the agent will only put in 
effort at the very end of period ~ . In the first round of contract (equation (3.26)), the 
principal will expect a working period T -«* = (). Hence, the principal will not fund the 
project in the first place and no transaction will ever happen. In this case, there is no 
difference between long-term and short-term contracts.
3.7. Conclusion and Further Research
Despite the fact that R&D expenditures have been increasing year by year, there is little 
theoretical literature specifically addressing the issues on R&D funding. Our model 
establishes a guideline for funding long-term contracts when confronted with moral 
hazard problems. As a benchmark of comparison, we first derive the optimal contract for 
a long-term project with only a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract form 
happens to be a multi-stage version of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, where the optimal 
fixed fee refers to the agent’s shirking benefit from the contract. After considering the 
agent’s private information, we derive the screening contracts for both discrete and 
continuous type settings. The screening contracts assign no efficiency loss to either type, 
which is in contrast to the usual conclusion in the literature. Moreover, within the 
continuous setting, we show that the principal will adopt a cut-off strategy in funding, 
and the cut-off point is affected by the fact that inefficient types (types greater than the 
cut-off point) will take the contract and shirk all through the funding period. Hence, the 
principal will fund the project for a shorter period in the presence of an opportunism
problem. Furthermore, the discussion of the optimal auctioning contract shows that the 
principal will benefit from the competition among agents in two ways: First, the project is 
more likely to be completed by an efficient type under an auction. Second, competition 
reduces the incentive rent for the efficient type as he is less likely to mimic the inefficient 
type who might have less chance to win the auction, however, this rent reduction will 
vary with the difference between the two types. Comparing the optimal auction with a 
second-price auction, we show that bidding the principal’s reservation price (rather than 
truth-bidding) will be the bidders’ dominant strategies, and neither the revenue 
equivalence theorem nor the separation property will hold. Finally, when neither of the 
players has private information about the time needed for completion, we show that a 
longer funding period will actually induce more shirking, and the optimal funding length 
is determined as the point where the agent’s shirking period is driven down to zero. With 
an additional assumption that neither of the involved parties can anticipate the contract 
renewal, we show that the lock-in effect persists under some constraints and a sequence 
of short-term contracts is preferable to a long-term contract.
The basic model can be extended in several ways. Firstly, in the stochastic setting, 
we can also discuss when the agent has private information about the distribution of 
completion time. The analysis will be similar to the deterministic setting but all in terms 
of expected values. Secondly, further research can consider the case of private 
information for both involved parties and discuss the optimal contract for this case. 
Thirdly, following the existing auction literature, we can further analyse the effects of 
risk aversion, correlated types and (when there is an auction) collusion among bidders. 
Finally, we can explore the cost-overruns issue in more detail.
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4.1 Introduction
Despite the recent liberalisation waves in international trade and service industries, we 
cannot deny that protection still has its popularity all around the world. In international 
trade, “since the launching of the Uruguay Round in 1986, over 60 developing nations 
have unilaterally lowered their barriers to imports” (Safadi and Laird (1996)), however 
the infant industry argument is still heavily applied in the hope that “with appropriate 
trade policies, the domestic government can alter the nature of market competition by 
raising the marginal cost of the foreign firm (via a tariff) or lowering the marginal cost of 
the domestic firm (via an export subsidy), shifting more of the rents towards the domestic 
producers” (Krugman and Smith (1994)). Likewise, in developed countries, protection is 
often requested by the injured industries to let them “buy time” to catch up (Miyagiwa 
and Ohno (1995)). The form of protection has changed from tariffs to non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), which include quotas, voluntary export restraint agreements, various domestic 
price support schemes and other administrative measures. For example, as reported by 
Harrigan (1993), Japan has an overall weighted average NTB coverage of almost 40%
against ten major trailing partners, with France a distant second with an index of almost
2 7 % .
Protection is also an important issue in industrial economics, for example, patent 
protection plays a significant role in solving the un-appropriability problem in R&D 
activities, especially in highly imitating industries. Recently, intellectual property right 
protection has become a new issue in GATT negotiations, which “develop rules designed 
to extend the protection of intellectual property rights to all participating countries” 
(Safadi and Laird (1996)). Another example is in the area of environmental protection: 
before the authority launches a severe anti-pollution law, a preparation allowance period 
is usually granted for the affected firms to install anti-pollution equipment.
A common feature of the various examples is that protection is granted on the 
grounds that the protected firms can undertake a welfare-improving investment in order 
to adopt new equipment for international competition, to update machinery, to install 
anti-pollution equipment, or to invest in creating a new product or production process. 
The difference is that the preparation allowance period and infant or injured industry 
protection put emphasis on protection during the investment, but patents are usually 
granted after the success of the investment.
The literature of trade protection has focused on two issues: (1) the justification for 
protection (reasons for market failure), for example, the existence of externalities (e.g., 
Corden (1974)), informational barriers to entry (e.g., Grossman and Horn (1988)), and 
imperfect capital market (see Baldwin (1969) for critics); (2) the policy instruments to 
carry out the protection. The instruments include both price interventions (tariff, import 
tax or export subsidy) and quantity interventions (quota or voluntary export restraint) 
(Vousecn (1990)). Our model addresses another important but often ignored dimension,
that is, “How long should the protection last?” For this timing problem, most protection 
literature concentrates on comparing the welfare effects from temporary protection and 
permanent protection. For example, Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) discuss whether 
temporary or permanent protection can speed up the protected Firm in adopting a new 
technology. There is little discussion in the literature on how to determine exactly the 
optimal protection length8'’. As concluded by Head (1994) in his study of the steel rail 
industry protection, “it seems that from an aggregate welfare perspective, the form of 
intervention matters less than duration”. The protection length is a critical factor for the 
success of protection and hence deserves more attention.
The patent length, on the contrary, has always been a main subject in its association 
with innovation efficiency. References can be found in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), 
Klemperer (1990), Gallini (1992) and Cornelli and Schankerman (1995). Our model is 
related to Cornelli and Schankerman in making conclusions concerning patent policy in 
the context of incomplete information. In a different framework, they conclude: “to 
ensure that the optimal patent schedule is incentive compatible, the government must 
increase the patent life span” with firms’ innovation efficiency. Our results show that this 
is not always true when we take into account firms’ profits after the investment.
This paper uses a principal and agent model to discuss how, under various cost and 
revenue circumstances, a benevolent government should design the protection scheme so 
that the target firm with a moral hazard problem will undertake a time-consuming and 
welfare improving investment. Of course, the optimal scheme may involve not protecting 
at all. “Protection” is a general term for government interventions and can take the form
“  Matsuyama (1990) uses an infinite horizon and perfect information timing game to mixlel the threat of 
liberalisation as the incentive for the protected firm to invest, and concludes that only immediate 
liberalisation and successful fixed period protection are pure strategy Nash outcomes.
of, for example, an export or import tax and subsidy, a voluntary export restraint, or a 
patent. In other words, this is a general protection model87, which covers a rich class of 
both durinR-investment protection and post-investment protection. The assumption of a 
“time-consuming” rather than "one-shot” investment is to cope with the fact that most 
investments take time, and to avoid making counter-intuitive policy implication from the 
one-shot investment setting. For example, as written in a note of Miyagiwa and Ohno 
(1995): “the government can do better by imposing the permanent protection just before 
the date at which the protected firm would adopt new technology”. They apply Fudenberg 
and Tirole’s (1985) model to analyse the policy effect on the timing of technology 
adoption. As production cost is assumed to decrease over time, the firm has to trade off 
between early and late adoption. The optimal adoption date is determined as the moment 
when the marginal value of adoption is equal to the marginal cost of adoption. 
Government policy will affect a firm’s marginal value of adoption. Hence in the case of a 
quota, a permanent quota will increase the value of adoption and thus speed up the 
adoption, but at the same time it will create a negative welfare effect. Since their model 
has imposed the quota from the beginning of time, it is suggested that the government 
will be better off delaying the quota till the date just before the firm would adopt the 
technology (to reduce the welfare loss).
The basic model of this chapter firstly analyses the case with only a moral hazard 
problem. Since the investment outcome will also affect the target firm’s future profits, the 
incentive scheme has to consider different cost and revenue environments in order to give 
the target firm the right motivation. Various cases arc classified according to the target 
firm’s investment ability and investment willingness. The investment ability refers to
1,7 On the other hand, since we concentrate on the welfare effect of a single market, our model is a partial 
equilibrium model.
whether ihe target firm can afford the investment cost under its current profit, and the 
investment willingness refers to the target firm’s future expected profits after the 
completion of the investment. Hence depending on parameters, the optimal protection 
could involve no protection, one-part protection or two-part protection. One-part 
protection refers to using only during- or post-investment protection, and two-part 
protection involves both during- and post-investment protection. This result gives a 
significant policy implication, that is, as empirical evidence shows different conclusions 
about protection effects, some of which are positive (e.g., Baldwin and Krugman (1988)) 
and some are negative (e.g., Krueger and Tuncer (1982), Luzio and Greenstein (1995)), 
our result suggests that using a correct protection form will be critical for the success of 
investment and not all cases fit in the same protection form.
Furthermore, we conclude that whether the during-investment protection rate is 
increasing, decreasing or constant will not affect the investment efficiency, which is in 
contrast to the prevalent argument that decreasing protection rates can mitigate protected 
firms’ pain when adjusting towards liberalisation. Finally, after considering the target 
firm’s private information about the time needed to complete the investment, our results 
show that: (1) The screening protection scheme could possibly coincide with the efficient 
scheme when only the inefficient type is lacking in investment willingness, or when there 
are only liquidity problems; (2) The screening scheme is strictly better than the pooled 
scheme of the efficient type; however, whether it is better than the pooled scheme of the 
inefficient type is dependent on parameter values; (3) Whenever there is a liquidity 
problem, the efficient type’s post-investment protection will be no shorter than that of the 
inefficient type; otherwise, the reverse result applies. In terms of patents, this means that 
a more efficient firm does not necessarily need a longer patent life span to keep incentive
compatibility. The intuition is: when the target firm’s future profits are also connected to 
the success of the investment, the incentive rent (patent life) will vary with the cost and 
revenue environments.
The rest of Chapter 4 is organised as follows. Section 4.2 first derives the optimal 
protection form from a general protection scheme, including a deadline and a sequence of 
protection rates. Next by assuming only a moral hazard problem, we discuss the optimal 
protection schemes under various cost and revenue conditions. Section 4.3 derives the 
screening protection schemes in the context of incomplete information, and we make the 
comparison between the screening scheme and pooled schemes to find a better protection 
contract. Section 4.4 contains conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
Appendices 4.1 and 4.2 contain the proof for Lemma 4.2 and the welfare comparison 
among various protection schemes.
4.2 The Model8"
Consider the case where a monopoly (domestic) firm8'' is facing a time-consuming 
investment, for example, this investment could be to equip the basic technology 
(experience) in the case of an infant industry, or to update machinery to catch up rival 
firms in the case of an injured industry, or to help retraining employees to change their 
jobs in the case of a sunset industry, or to install anti-pollution equipment before the 
launch of an environmental law, or to research and develop a new product for the firm
“  The major difference between this model and Chapter 3 is that the investment outcome will affect the 
target firm’s future profits, but the success of the project in Ch 3 belongs to only the principal. The 
discounting is also new in this model.
This is a single principal and single agent framework. The cases with multiple agents or principals will 
not he discussed.
itself90. Indeed, these kinds of investments usually eannot he completed at once. Suppose 
further that this investment is welfare improving to the whole society. The main purpose 
of this paper is to answer the following questions in both complete and incomplete 
information contexts: “Linder what circumstances should a benevolent government 
provide protection to the target firm? How should the government design the protection 
scheme to achieve efficient investment?” The important issue is not how to implement 
the protection but how long and how much the protection should be. Finally, this is not a 
general equilibrium framework, as the protection effect is restricted to a single market.
The following cost and revenue structures are common knowledge. Firstly, let 8 be 
the discount factor, where 0 < 5  < I (i.e., we are using a discrete time setting). To use 
notation consistent with the previous chapter, let A be the investment time needed for 
completion41 under the target firm’s fu ll capacity (i.e., no shirking). The value of A is 
related to the target firm’s investment efficiency. For the basic model, A is now assumed 
to be common knowledge both parties, so that we can concentrate on the moral hazard 
problem first. The incomplete information case will be discussed in the next section.
To undertake the investment, it is assumed that whenever the target firm puts in 
effort, it will incur an opportunity cost of £k per period. The opportunity cost includes the 
direct investment cost and the indirect capital loss. For each I, the target firm’s profit and 
consumer surplus before and after the success of investment are denoted as:
7c(L) :firm's current profit92.
Emphasising “for itself is to distinguish from Chapter 3 where the benefit of project only goes to the 
principal.
" The deterministic setting is assumed throughout this chapter, as except for the R&D investment, the 
protected firms usually have better information about the investment time. For the R&D case, the literature 
for the deterministic setting can be traced to, for example. Katz and Shapiro (1985).
',2 Hie target firm's reservation profits are not normalised to zero, as it is easier to stress the problem with
the agent's investment ability.
S(L): current consumer surplus,
7t(H) Minn's profit after the completion of the investment,
S(H) x'onsumer surplus after the completion of the investment.
Finally, it is assumed that the target firm has limited credit, which is bounded above by 
its current profit 7t(L). This limit can be interpreted as a consequence of an imperfect 
capital market or the requirement of down payment or collateral on loans. This 
assumption is crucial, as when the credit is limitless, it will not be necessary to impose 
any government intervention, which would cause welfare distortion due to public 
funding.
For a welfare-improving investment, we need as a necessary condition Assumption 
4.1:
Assumption 4.1. [jc(L) + S(L)] < (7t(H) + S(H)]9’.
Assumption 4.1 gives the government an environment to consider protection. The 
derivation of the optimal protection scheme starts with the government offering a 
protection scheme to the target firm, and the target firm reacts by rejecting or accepting 
the offer. In other words, the government is acting as a first mover and the target firm is a 
follower. It is assumed that the government can commit to not change the scheme in the 
future94. If the target firm accepts the offer of scheme, it needs to make a sequence of 
effort decisions; if it rejects the offer, then it will stay in autarky which, depending on the 
environment, could be investing or not investing. We further assume that the target firm’s
There is no specification to the source of welfare improvement (which could come from producer or 
consumer).
The time inconsistency problem will he discussed briefly in the conclusion.
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effort is unobservable or cannot be monitored by the government, or equivalently, 
monitoring could be too costly to execute. The unobservability in the R&l) area scents 
justifiable. In the “employees retraining" case, for example, it is difficult to know how 
much the employees actually learn from a training course. However, we assume the 
outcome of the effort to be perfectly'1' observed, for example, the innovation of R&D 
activities will be publicly known.
Now, consider a general protection scheme which consists of a deadline and a 
sequence of incremental compensation. Since the target firm’s effort is not observable, 
the government can only relate the compensation scheme to the observable variable: the 
completion date. In the following, we first discuss a general compensation scheme 
without imposing a specific deadline, and turn back to the deadline issue later. Assume 
an arbitrary completion date T, where the target firm commits to finish the investment at 
the contracting date, and a sequence of contingent compensations of the following 
form96:
{r,(T),r2(-C)..... rt (x),rtt,(x),...}7=1, (4.1)
where 1,2,...°° is the time index starting from the moment the target firm accepts the 
offer, r (x) is the incremental profit added to the target firm’s profit at time t>7. Note that 
this setting docs not exclude the possibility of a non-contingent scheme, that is, 
r,(x) = r,(x') for x * x '.
In other words, we exclude the case with "imperfect" observation of the outcome.
%lt will be shown later that the government will not give the target firm a lump sum transfer at /= /  and 
nothing afterwards. The reason is because an excess protection during the investment has no effect in 
encouraging effort, and the maximal protection rate is bounded above by, say, a budget limit.
17 lliat is. the protection will give the target firm an extra benefit in addition to its current profits.
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Like most protection cases, we assume the government cannot punish the target firm 
if it does not finish the investment within the protection period, lienee, we have the first 
constraint on the general scheme:
Constraint 4.1. n(L) < k(L) + r:(T) < n .
Constraint 4.1 says that negative protection (punishment) is not allowed, and the maximal 
protection is bounded above by n . n can be interpreted as the government’s budget limit 
or the target firm’s monopoly profit (without competition from foreign rivals or new 
entrants).
Given the agent accepts the scheme, the effort decision at each time t is defined as 
follows. Let e, = 1 denote the case where the target firm puts in effort and e, = 0 for 
shirking. Define n, as the accumulated investment (effort) at the beginning of time t, that
i-1
is, n, = . Denote Vt(n,) as the target firm’s value at time t as a function of the
accumulated investment, i.e.,
V(n,) = max{7t(L) + /;(x) + ), tz(L) + r (x) — k + 8V^,(m + 1)). (4.2)
Equation (4.2) says that in each period, the protected firm trades off the values from 
shirking and putting in effort. Shirking gives the target firm a profit 7i(L) + r,(x) and a 
future value with accumulated investment remaining at n, . However, putting in effort 
gives it the same current profit n(L) + r,(x), an opportunity cost k and a next period 
value with accumulated effort n, + 1 . The completion date is defined as the earliest date 
that the accumulated effort level exceeds A , i.e..
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X(<') where e = (e. ...) and x(<') could he <*>.
For simplification, denote x = x(e).
It is interesting to ask whether r,(x) should vary or he kept constant in the protection 
scheme (4.1). Since rt (x) appears on both sides of the effort decision, we know that 
whether the protection rate is increasing, decreasing or constant does not make any 
difference to the target firm’s choice between shirking and putting in effort in each 
period. Hence there is no loss to restrict them to be constant before the finishing date, i.e., 
r, (x) = r2(x) =...= rt (x) = r(x). The compensation pattern after X is not yet known, as no 
effort will be needed after the completion. Therefore we can rewrite the protection 
scheme in equation (4.1) as:
|r(T), r(X), r(x).....r(x), rttl (x), rt+2 (x)... )7=1. (4.3)
Now consider an arbitrary deadline T, where 1 < T < °° . The deadline does not 
necessarily mean the moment to terminate the protection, as the post-investment 
compensation is not restricted to zero. T is interpreted as a committed inspection date, 
after which the compensation will depend on whether the investment has been finished 
on that date91*.
As a leader (government) needs to take into account followers’ (firm) reaction to 
make her decision, we have to discuss the target firm’s effort decisions first and then 
determine the optimal protection form. First of all, we can classify several cases
ll means “¡it the end of lime 7” .
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according to the target firm’s investment ability and willingness. When k >n(L) ,  the 
target firm is constrained by eredit limit, and hence will not put in effort without 
protection. When k < 7t(L) but k > k* , where k * is defined as satisfying
£ 8 M7 i( L ) - £ 8 M** + j£ 8 " l7r(//) =
i =I 1=1 t'=A+l i=l
or equivalently,
¿ 8 M[7t(//)-7t(L)]
** = — -----*---------------. (4.4)
£ 8 -
1=1
then although the target firm’s current profit can cover the investment cost in each period, 
the cost is so high that the future benefit from the investment cannot cover the overall 
opportunity cost. As k* is the critical value where the target firm is indifferent between 
investing and not investing, when k < min{Jt(L),ifc* J , the target firm will invest in its 
own interest and hence there is no need to provide protection under complete 
information94. We can ignore this case in what follows (as the solution is trivial). When 
k > min{7t(Z.),it*), the targeted firm will not put in effort"10 without protection, and it is 
required that the first x elements of the protection scheme satisfy:
Constraint 4.2: r(T) + n(L) > k .
w for the incomplete information case ( A unknown), il is possible that a protection scheme is needed to 
screen the types.
The size of it will also affect the reservation utility of the individual rationality constraint: however, this 
issue will only matter when it comes to the incomplete information case in the next section.
124
One can imagine (hat ihe large! firm is able to borrow n(L) at the beginning of each 
period, as its credit is constrained by the current profit. Constraint 4.2 requires that this 
loan together with the incremental compensation must be big enough to cover the 
investment cost. The following lemma will simplify our discussion about the target firm’s 
effort decisions. The government would prefer the investment to be finished before the 
deadline, hence
l^emma 4.1
For t  > T  . the cheapest compensation is to give {rTtl (x), rTt2 (x)...) = {0,0,...).
Lemma 4.1 says that if the target firm cannot finish the investment at any time before the 
deadline (i.e., x > T ), then since any effort afterwards will not change the outcome on 
the inspection date, the cheapest compensation is to provide no protection after T. 
However, for the case of x < T , we cannot say anything about it yet, so we leave this part 
as general.
The next lemma describes the target firm’s effort decision in each period within T. 
The following discussion can simplify the proof for Lemma 4.2. First, by Lemma 4.1 we 
know that the government is better off providing no protection after T if the target firm 
can not finish before T. Hence, the firm’s present value at time T+l for not finishing the
investment is the discounted sum of future profits: VTt,(nTtl <A) = X 8 Mrt(L).
1=1
However, if the target firm finishes the investment, the government will still provide 
protection {rrtl(X),rr+2(x)...), whose form is still unknown, and the firm’s present value
at time T+l for this case will be Vr+l(nT+l > A) = ¿ 8 " ' [ r 7>((x) + 7C(//)]. To simplify
i = I
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the notation, denote ^ 5 '  1 k 7>j('t) + Jt(//)| = // ami 'it(/.)=£.. To motivate the
1=1 , i
target firm to put in effort, the protection scheme must satisfy1111:
/i . C , C4-l\
Constraint 4.3: ^ 5 '  1 rrtl(X) must be such that --------- ---------k < (H -  L ) l02.
i=i 8
The intuition for this constraint is to require the protection scheme to provide a 
sufficiently high post-investment profit. The exact structure of post-investment 
compensation (rr+, ('t),r7.+2(x)...) will be discussed after Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.2""
For a general protection scheme that satisfies Constraints 4.1-3, there is a unique 
decision path where: (i) I f T< A, the protected firm does not put in effort for each 
t < T ; (ii) If T > A , it will shirk from the beginning till period T — A and undertake the 
investment for the last A periods.
Proof in Appendix 4.1.
Two implications can be drawn from Lemma 4.2. First, as r f  x) appears on both 
alternatives of the target firm’s decision function, we can conclude that whether the 
during-investment protection rate is increasing, decreasing or constant will not affect the 
investment efficiency, which is in contrast to the prevalent argument that decreasing the 
protection rates can mitigate the protected firms’ pain when adjusting towards
"" 'Hie analysis of the protection scheme is available for either n(ll) > n(l.) or n(H) S it(L ). Instead of 
directly imposing an assumption on 7 t(//)  and 7t( L ) , which will greatly restrict this model, we put it as a 
requirement for the protection scheme.
1112 This constraint comes from the proof of Lemma 4.2 in the Appendix 4.1.
"" Recall that after the target firm accepts the scheme, the effort decision happens in every period within T. 
That is, it is not a static decision that happens only at the contracting date.
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liberalisation and that the government should provide excess protection to induce 
efficient investment (Slaigcr and Tabellini (1987)). Hence, we have the following 
proposition.
Proposition 4.1
Excessive protection before the completion date cannot induce higher investment 
efficiency.
Second, the proof of Lemma 4.2 says that when n(H) = n(L) or n(H) < n(L), no 
investment will be undertaken without government intervention, since unless H — L is 
sufficiently high, the target firm will lack incentive to put in effort. This is a problem 
often confronted in most R&D activities as the un-appropriability problem, which is 
prevailing in industries with high spillover or imitation. A cure to this market failure of 
R&D activities is to provide patent protection (see Nordhaus (1969), Klemperer (1991), 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1991) for discussion of patent length and patent width). In the 
present model, this is equivalent to the truncated part of the protection scheme: 
K +,(T),rt+j(X)...}.
So far we know that, after imposing the deadline T, Lemma 4.1 says that for x > T , 
the cheapest compensation is to give {r7.+l(x),r7.,.2(x)...| = {0,0,0,...). Lemma 4.2 says 
that for reasonably high post-investment protection rates (restricted by Constraint 4.3), 
the government can only implement a completion date at x > T , as each agent will find it 
as best response to delay its effort till the last A periods of protection and hence x < T is 
not implemcntablc. While x < T  is not implementable, x > T is not desirable (by the 
definition of the deadline) to the principal. Therefore, we can concentrate on 
implementing a completion date such that X = T . The structure of this “reasonably high”
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post-investment protection sequence to implement x — T is defined as follows. As 
Constraint 4.3 requires only the sum of this truncated part to be sufficiently high so that
(I + 5 + . . . 8 A 1 ) <
8 A
^ 5 '  '|r,*,(T) + k(H) -  7t( L ) \ , there is no further restriction on the
components of the sequence [rTtl(T),rT^ 2(T). . .}. However, Constraint 4.1 says that each 
component cannot exceed an upper bound n . Therefore, let ft =n-n(H)  and there is no 
loss in assuming that the sequence after T takes the form {r7>l(T),rr+2(7')...)
= n (7 \ Af):= {tc,7X,...71,0,0,...}I04. The interpretation of this form is similar to the setting 
of a patent, which guarantees the target firm a particular level of profit (through for 
instance, licences) within the patent length. Together with equation (4.3) and the 
definition of W(T,M),  we can rewrite the protection scheme as:
\r(T),r(T)..... r(T), Yl(T,M)).  For simplification, define FI(r, T):= [r(T),.. .,r(Tj].
Hence the protection scheme becomes {n(r,7'),FI(7',M)}.  Furthermore, we can 
abbreviate the protection scheme as:
Thus, we have pinned down the derivation of the optimal protection scheme into the 
determination of three variables: r, T and M,  subject to Constraints 4.1-3 and other
constraints to be discussed below.
"u Any smaller r,(T) < ft will require a longer post investment protection As there is no other restriction, 
we follow the idea of most patent literature and set the unit protection rate to the highest possible profit 
(usually monopoly). Also remind that M iv not restricted to be an integer.
T T
{r,T,M}:= {n(r,T),n(r,Af)} (4.5)
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To sum up, when the investment opportunity cost is not too high (or equivalently, 
the future profits from a successful investment are sufficiently high), the optimal scheme 
is to provide no protection. When the opportunity cost is high (or the future profits are 
low), as described by k > min{7i(L),(fc*), the target firm will not invest in its own 
interest, and therefore it will be necessary to provide a protection scheme {r, T, M) whose 
optimal form is defined as in equation (4.5).
A benevolent government maximises social welfare, the discounted sum of the 
producer’s profit and consumers’ surplus, with respect to [r,T,M\.  First of all, it is 
assumed that protection will impose a shadow cost"15 to the society, that is, for each 
incremental profit r(T), there will be a shadow cost X r(x) .  Hence for t < T , define 
7t(r) as the sum of current profit and the incremental profit from protection, that is, 
71 ( r ) :  = 7t ( L) + r ( T ) , and let S(r) be the corresponding consumer surplus, i.e., 
S(r):= S(L) -  (l + X)r(T). For an easier expression of the solution, we rewrite the 
protection scheme in equation (4.5) as {7t(r),T, M) . For t > T , n is the post-investment 
compensation granted for a period of M and the consumer surplus is S(H) — (1 + X.)ft. It 
can be checked that,
d[7t(r) + .S'(_r)j  < o and n + s (//) _ (i + X)n < 7t(H) + S(H), (4.6)
dr
implying that a higher r and a higher M will cause more welfare loss.
For a given scheme \n(r) ,T,M\ , the principal’s discounted utility for a successful 
investment is:
The shadow cost may come from public internal funding which is assumed by l.affont and Tirole (1993).
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¿ 8 '  11k(/)  + ,V(r)| + ¿ 8 '  , [7t(//) + S ( / / ) l - ( l  + A.)8'p(A/),
1 = 1 1-7+1
where S 7 p (Ai) is (lie discounted sum of the components in II(7\/V/) (where p(Ai) is 
increasing in M) and XS'p(M) denotes the total shadow costs for the post-investment 
protection"17’. Since the target firm’s effort is not observable, there is a moral hazard 
problem with the design of the optimal scheme. Moreover, the following discussion 
concentrates on implementing a successful investment, and to make the following 
discussion reasonable, we assume the welfare gain from a successful investment to be 
sufficiently high to cover the cost of the protection scheme.
Given the target firm’s best response, the equilibrium requires that the protection 
scheme must be consistent with the agent itself acting rationally. In other words, in the 
principal’s programming problem, except for Constraints 4.1-3, we need the following 
constraints to ensure that the target firm will accept the offer of the protection scheme 
and finish the investment.
Given a scheme \ n( r ) ,T,M) , the target firm’s utility for a successful investment is: 
¿ 8 '  't t ( r ) -  ¿ 8 M* + 8 r P(M).
i = l i = 7 -A  + l
Recall the definition of p (M) from the principal’s utility function and
P(M):= ^ 8 '  'n(H) + p(M), which is also increasing in M.  The interpretation of this
( = 1
function is: for each time before the deadline T, a unit profit Ji(r) is granted, and after T, 
n is granted for a period of M. From T+M+l on, no protection will be granted and hence
"* (I + X)fi 1 pi Af ) is put as a separate term since M is not necessarily an integer.
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Ihe target firm lias 7t(//) each period. Lemma 4.2 says that for a given T, it is optimal for 
the target firm to delay putting in effort till the last A periods. Hence, the opportunity
7
cost only happens in the last A periods of T: ^ 5 '  {k .
Im T -A *  i
The first constraint is the Individual Rationality (1R) constraint, which says that the 
whole protection scheme will give the target firm at least the same utility as rejecting the 
scheme, that is,
¿ 5 ' ' M r ) -  ¿ 5 m* + 8 '> (M )>  ,07.
i=l i= T- A+1 i=l
(IR)
The reservation utility is the autarky profit level 8,_l7t(Z,), as the investment will not
1=1
be undertaken. Recall that we are discussing only the cases with k > min(7t(L),k*}.
Secondly, the Protection Rationality (PR) constraint says that taking the whole 
scheme will give the target firm at least the same utility as taking the first part of the 
scheme and staying in autarky henceforth, that is,
-  ¿ 8 i*'A:+8rP(M)> ¿ 8 '- 'j t (L ) .  (PR)
t=r-A+i /=r+1
When A is known and k > min{7t(L),k* | , PR means that the target firm will not benefit 
by taking the protection program but shirking throughout T, which gives the profit
1117 It is noted in Kreps( 1492) that the assumption of weak inequality is “to assume that ties are broken in a 
fashion that favours the first mover" (the government), in order to ensure the existence of equilibrium (p. 
604).
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^ 8 '  'n</-) + ^ 8 '  'it(L). Clearly if it docs not pay to shirk from T -  A + 1 , it will not
,-i i i*i
pay to start shirking hitcr.
Furthermore, Lemma 4.2 shows that the capacity constraint must be satisfied for a 
successful investment:
T> A.  (capacity constraint)
Rewriting Constraint 4.2 in terms of 7C(r), we have the Cost Limit (CL) constraint, i.e., 
it ( r ) > k . (CL)
Together with the non-negativity constraints: r,T, M > 0 , we have the programming 
problem (PI):
max
|lt( r ).T  .A# |
¿ 8 M[Jl (r) + S(r)] + ¿ 8 i-| [7t(//) + S (//)]-( l- t-^ )8 rp(Af)
i=I i=7+1
(PI)
St T> A,
i t ( r )  > k ,
¿ 8 Mi t ( r ) -  ' £ b ‘- ' k + 8 TP ( M ) z ' £ 8 ‘-'n(L),
1 = 1 < = 7 -A + l  t = l
-  ¿ 8 '  '<:+87>(M )>  ¿ 5 ' ' 'i i ( L ) .
i= 7 -A + 1  1=7+1
(capacity constraint) 
(CL)
(IR)
(PR)
In addition, we have to check that the solution of (PI) satisfies Constraints 4.1 and 4.3.
According to the relative sizes of k , i t ( L)  and k*. we can classify three cases: 
k* < k <n(L) , n(L) < k < k *, and k > max[n(L) ,k*) . Since different cases involve 
different constraints binding, we need to discuss each case separately to avoid confusion.
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4.2.1 k*  < k <71 ( L )
This is the case where the target firm can afford the investment cost each period (that is, 
there is no liquidity problem), hut the future profits of the investment are not high enough 
to cover the overall cost. To solve the problem, firstly, by the assumption of it < n(L) , 
the CL constraint is satisfied for any r > 0 .  Secondly, let us guess that the capacity 
constraint is biding, i.e., T = A (the lowest possible deadline that might induce efficient 
investment). Later we will check if this setting is optimal. Substituting T = A into the PR 
constraint, we have:
- £ 8 '  '* + 5 a/>(M)> ¿ S ' 1:!(L). (4.7)
i = l i=A +l
Equation (4.7) will be violated if we set M = 0 , since for k > k *,
- ^ 5 '~'k+ ¿ 8 Mn (//)<  ¿ 8 mjt(L), (4.8)
¿=1 i=A +l i=A+l
or equivalently,
5 A[-5  A ^ ^ - k  + —!— (n(H )~ n(L ))]< 0.
1—0 1—0
Keeping M = 0, we can check that the valuel<m of the PR constraint:
"* "Value" here refers in the value of I.US minus RHS of the equation.
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-  £ 8 '  ' k +  ¿ S ,_ l| 7 t ( / / ) - 7 t ( L ) ]
i * r - A  +1 I 7 > l
or equivalently,
5 7 [ -5  A Ac + —I- (7C ( / / )  -  7t(L))],
l —o I — o
is increasing in T (since 8 1 is decreasing in T). As equation (4.8) says that PR is not 
satisfied with the shortest possible deadline T = A, we could possibly solve the problem 
in two ways: one is to increase T, so that the value of PR will be increased up to zero to 
satisfy the constraint. However, this setting will still violate Constraint 4.3, and therefore 
we cannot solve the problem by increasing Tlm. The other solution is to increase M, 
which then implies that a single during-investment scheme cannot implement a 
successful investment for this case.
Let T = A and define M as the smallest M to satisfy PR2:
- £ S i‘lit + 8 4/>(A7) = ¿ 8 Mrt (L). (4.9)
i= l i=A +l
The existence of M  is defined, since n >n ( H) .  Moreover, since the post-investment 
protection is granted conditional on the observation of a successful investment at the end 
of time T, no more effort will be needed and therefore there is no moral hazard problem 
in the setting of M. Given this setting, we have to compare CL and IR to find out the 
optimal n( r ) . Given T, the only way to increase the target firm’s utility is to increase
This is shown in the proof for Lemma 4.2. The same argument will be applied to all the following cases, 
and hence will not he replicated.
K(r) or M , hut a higher Kir) or M will decrease the principal’s utility. To maximise 
utility, the government has to minimise the target firm’s utility. Therefore, given T = A 
and M = M , let us firstly guess that only IR is binding and define r as:
£ 8 ,~ln ( r ) - ]T ,8 , '* + 8aP(A7) = ¿ 8 '  'k(L). (4.10)
M /= I
Equation (4.10) implies K(r) = n(L) . As noted, the CL constraint will be satisfied for 
any r > 0 .
Furthermore, we need to check if Constraints 4.1 and 4.3 are Su’.’sfied with 
(7t(r), T, M) = (7i(L), A,M ) . Constraint 4.1 is obviously satisfied and by manipulating 
equation (4.9), we have
8 A P (M )-X 8 '- '7 i(L )
1 = 1
By using the notation from the proof for Lemma 4.2, we have H -  L > [1 + 8+...+8A~'], 
8A
and hence Constraint 4.3 is satisfied.
Finally, we need to check whether T = A is the optimal setting. Note that both T and 
M are costly to the government, since if we set T and M to be zero, the welfare would be 
maximal. Since T is set at the lowest possible value A and a higher T will still violate 
Constraint 4.3, we can conclude that T = A is the optimal setting. Therefore, the optimal 
protection scheme for this case is |Jt(L),A,M). This scheme says that the government 
will not provide any extra protection before the deadline A , since the target firm does not 
have a liquidity problem. However, if the target can complete the investment before or on
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the deadline, it will be granted the post-investment protection up to tt for a period of M . 
The setting of M is to provide enough incentive for the target firm to undertake the 
investment, and it corresponds to most patent designs, whose purposes are to create 
enough future profits for R&D activities. In other areas, for example, M could be 
interpreted as the tax-exempt period granted to an infant industry firm.
4.2.2 n{L)< k < k*
In this case, the target firm’s current profit cannot cover each period’s opportunity cost, 
but the investment can bring higher future profits than the current status. To solve the 
problem, first note that since n(L) < k , CL will be violated for some values of r. Second, 
let us guess that the capacity constraint is binding, that is, T = A, and hence the PR 
constraint has the form of equation (4.7). The difference from the previous case is that if 
we set M -  0, equation (4.7) will be satisfied, since k < k * .  Substitute T = A and 
M = 0 into the IR constraint, and let us first guess that IR is binding. Define K(r*) as 
the smallest value such that:
-  ¿ 8 M* + 8 AP(0) = ¿ S ' ' 1« (L).  (4.11)
¡=i i-i (=i
Since k < k * ,  equation (4.11) says that n(r*)<n(L),  which will violate the CL 
constraint. Alternatively, we can let CL bind, which gives n(r) -  k> n(L),  where 1R is 
satisfied with inequality. Finally, it can be checked in a similar way that Constraints 4.1 
and 4.3 are satisfied and the setting of T = A is optimal.
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To conclude, for this ease we have (jt(r), T, M ) = [k, A,0), which gives the target 
firm extra protection for the during-investment periods and stops the protection 
afterwards. This form corresponds to most infant or injured industry protection. In infant 
industries, the target firms suffer most from the shortage of funding, even though their 
prospects are promising.
4.2.3 k > max|7t(L),k*)
In this case, the target firm has no ability or willingness to invest. One can think of most 
basic industries such as steel and cement industries. Investment in these industries is 
capital consuming and future profits are not very high under foreign competition. To find 
the solution, firstly, as in the previous case, CL will be violated for some values of r, 
since ML) < k by assumption. In addition, if we set T = A and M = 0 , the PR constraint 
will be violated as shown in equation (4.8). Proceed as with case 4.2.1 in setting 
M — M , as defined in equation (4.9).
Given T = A and M = M , let us start by guessing IR to be binding which gives 
Mr*’):
X S ' - ' n i r * ' ) -  X s " '*  + S a /’ (A7) = ¿ 5 '  ' n ( L ) .
i= l i= A -A + 1 1 = 1
By equation (4.9), this means that n(r*') = n(L),  which again violates the CL constraint 
since ML)  < k . On the other hand, allowing CL to be binding gives 7t(r) = k > ML)  and 
1R will be satisfied with inequality. Finally, we can check that Constraints 4.1 and 4.3 are 
satisfied and the setting of T = A is optimal.
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To conclude, for this case we have [n(r),T, M) = {k,A, M \ . The optimal protection 
scheme solves the target firm’s liquidity problem during the investment period, and 
further rewards it with the profit ft for a period of M after the completion.
Notice that the during-investment protection basically has no beneficial incentive 
effect but is for the credit constraint problem. The main result of this section is 
summarised as Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2
Depending on the cost and revenue environments, the optimal protection could involve 
no protection, one-part protection or two-part protection.
This proposition can provide an answer to the controversy in empirical results, some of 
which agree that protection has a positive effect, for example Baldwin and Krugman 
(1988) conclude that “Japanese import protection aided the growth of their 
semiconductor industry”; but some disagree, for example Krueger and Tuncer (1982) use 
data from Turkish manufacturing industries to show that “there is no systematic tendency 
for more protected firms or industries to have had higher growth of output per unit of 
input than less protected firms or industries”. Luzio and Greenstein (1995) report the 
result of the Brazilian government’s strong protection on the electronic goods: “most 
observers argue that Brazilian firms did not come close to reaching parity with their 
potential international competitors in most markets”. Our result suggests that not all cases 
fit into one protection form, and efficient protection should take into account the target 
firm's investment ability as well as investment willingness. If the wrong form is applied, 
the protection will probably fail to achieve its purpose in inducing the investment.
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4.3 A  is unknown to the government
In ihis section, we discuss the ease where the target firm has private information about 
the time needed to complete the investment. The private information comes from, for 
example, business secrecy or expertise. The main issues of this section are: How will the 
protection scheme change after taking into account the agent’s private information? More 
specifically, will the principal give excess protection (in both during- and post­
investment periods) to ensure incentive compatibility? Will the principal be better off 
offering a non-screening protection scheme? Can the protection scheme maintain 
investment efficiency? To answer these questions, we need to find the optimal screening 
protection scheme in the presence of incomplete information.
Keeping the assumptions of profits and opportunity cost as in the previous section, 
this section further assumes that the target firm knows the value of A , and the 
principal110 anticipates that this value can take two possible levels A( and A2 with 
respective probabilities u and (1 -  u ) . The information structure is common knowledge.
Firstly, denote ki * as the critical investment cost where the target firm i is 
indifferent between investing and not investing under the current profit* 1", that is,
(L)]
b * _ , = A>+1_____________
K , ~  A,
1 5 -
i=l
1,0 The discrete (instead of continuous) setting is better for understanding the different subcases in this
section.
A ,  A , «  -
111 In other words, ki * is such that £ 8 '  ' t i i / , ) - 8'  '*, * + £ 8 '  ' ti( //)  = £ 8 '  'n (L ) .
i = 1 » = 1 / = a , + 1 i = i
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Since A, < A ,, we know that k2* < k, *. Together with the relative sizes of k, * and 
re(L ) , concerning the target firm’s ability and willingness to invest, we can classify six 
cases: k < min(7t(L),*2* | , k2 < k < min {it (/.),£ ,'), k [ < k < n ( L ) ,  T i (L)<k<k ’2,
ma\{n{L),k2 ) <k < k't and max{7t(L),fc‘ ) < k . As in the previous section, the case with 
k < min{n(L),k2) will be ignored because the solution is trivially not to provide 
protection. Recall that the following design is intended to look for a screening protection 
scheme and we will discuss later whether it is better than a non-screening scheme. 
Moreover, since the target firm has private information, the derivation of the optimal 
protection scheme mainly relies on applying the revelation principle, proposed by 
Gibbard (1973), Green and Laffont (1977), Dasgupta et al. (1979) and Myerson (1979), 
which says that any efficient outcome of any Bayesian game can be represented by a 
truth-telling incentive compatible direct mechanism. A mechanism is a method to 
allocate resources among players. For example, the optimal protection could be 
determined through a bargaining process. The revelation principle says that we can 
restrict our attention to a direct mechanism, which requests the privately informed player 
to report its type to the uninformed player. The allocation of resources is then dependent 
on what is reported. Of course, the informed player could mis-report in its own interest. 
An incentive compatible direct mechanism requires that the allocation among resources is 
designed in such a way that it will be a best response for the privately informed player to 
report truthfully. To make the following discussion reasonable, we restrict our attention 
to the case where the welfare improvement is sufficiently high to have both types finish 
the investment.
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Let A, and A, he the reported values from types A, and A, respectively. By the 
revelation principle, we can concentrate on looking for a truth-telling equilibrium, i.c., 
A,  = A,, / = 1,2 . Denote the respective protection schemes for A, and A 2 as 
)7t(/i ),7'I,A/,| and |7l(r,),r2,M2} .
Given (7t(q ),Tt , M,} and [n(r2),T2,M 2 \ , the government’s expected utility for a 
successful investment is:
T,
(n(r,) + S(r,)) + X  + S(H)] -  (1 + X)8"'p(M,)]
t=i i=r,+1
t2 oo
+(1 -  u ) [ £  5 " ' (n(r2) + S(r2)) + X 8 " ' W H )  + S ( H ) ] - (  1 + 705r’p( Ai2)]},
¡=1 i=7i+i
where each term has the same meaning as in the complete information case, and the total 
utility is the weighted sum over two types. For each type, the agent’s utility for 
completing the investment is:
¿ S ’-'tc(r,) -
i= l ¿»TJ-A.+I
The interpretation for every term is similar to the complete information case. For each 
type to finish the investment, the protection scheme must first satisfy:
7", ^ A ,.
T2 > A 2.
For those whose investment abilities arc limited (i.c., n(L)<k) ,  these are “capacity 
constraints", since if the during-investment protection length cannot cover A , , the best
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response oi type / is not to invest (Lemma 4.2). However, for those whose investment 
abilities are not limited (i.e., n(L)> k ), these constraints need to be satisfied as well. The 
reason is: T, is an inspection date and the compensation henceforth depends on the 
performance at 7^ . If Tt < A ,, the investment will not be completed on the inspection 
date, hence by Lemma 4.1 the target firm will get zero protection after the deadline. If 
k < ki *, the firm will still invest, as it would in the first place. For this case, there is no 
loss to require T( > A : , because no protection rt = 0 is always feasible. If k > k: * , the 
target firm will be better off shirking throughout the funding period, and hence the 
investment will not be finished. Overall, the constraint of T- > A; is necessary even if 
n(L) > k .
Secondly, the cost limit constraints must be satisfied:
7t(r, )> k , (CL1)
n(r2 )> k . (CL2)
Thirdly, remember that each protection scheme actually consists of two parts. The 
Individual Rationality (IR) constraints say that by taking the whole scheme, each type 
will have at least the same utility as staying in autarky"1. Since the autarky profits vary 
with cases"2, to generalise the notation, an index is defined as:
X = 1 if 7t( L) < k
= 0 otherwise.
and
"'"Autarky" means the situation when there is no protection.
" 2ln some cases, the target firm will invest without protection, but mimicking the other type will give it at 
least the same utility.
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R' r ( X . A , )  = X £ 8 '  'k ( L)
A,
+(1 — X) max X 8' '* + S 5' X S '- 'jKL) .
1=1
Rir(X ,A ) denotes the target firm’s autarky payoff. The meaning of R ir(X,A,) is as 
follows: if n(L) < k , the target firm certainly will not put in effort without protection and 
hence it keeps the current profits; if k(L)> k , depending on whether k < k: * or k > ki *, 
the target firm will or will not undertake the investment, and therefore the reservation 
utility is the maximum over these two profits. The IR constraints are written as:
r, t,
£ 8 MJC(r,)- 5L5 '_,A: + S /»(A /,) > Rir(X,A, ) ,  (IR1)
1=1 i= r , - A ,+ i
T, T2
]£ 8 " 'ji(r2) -  ^ 8 , lit + 8 r!/>(M j)> R"i(X,A2). (IR2)
/= i i = r ; - A 2+i
Next, the Protection Rationality (PR) constraints require that by taking the whole 
scheme, each type will have at least the same utility as taking just the first part of the 
scheme and staying in autarky henceforth. For example, when n(L)< k , this means that 
the target firm will not take the scheme but shirk throughout T. Following the same 
procedure in defining IR, define R l’R(X,n(ri ),Ti,A i ) as:
/?w (X,Jt(rj),7;,A,) = X £ 8 '  'k(L)
(4.12)
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where PK(n(r ) .T ,A , )
A,
~ 2 5 ' 'k,+ ^ 8 ,-|Jt(L)+ ^ 8 '  ’7t(//), i fT,<A, ,
1 = 1
max 5' 'ti (H), i f T, > Ar
RIR(X,n(rl ),TI,AI) is the utility from taking just the first part of scheme and then 
staying in autarky. Note that the discounted utility from the first part of the scheme 
appears on both sides of the constraint and will be cancelled out. When n(L) < k , the 
autarky decision is not to invest and hence we have the first term in equation (4.12). The
second term is the maximum between PR(Kfr:),Ti,Al ) and 2 $ '  'n(L).  The latter
means the utility for k > k, * , where the autarky decision is not to invest. The former 
means the utility for k <<:, *, where the target firm will invest in autarky. But depending 
on the relative sizes of the during investment protection and n(H),  PRinir^.T^A,) has 
three possible values: when 7] < A ,, the target firm has higher profits (since n(r() > n(L) 
by Constraint 4.1) for the first T{ periods. However, since the time needed for completion 
is longer than T:, the investment will not be completed on the deadline but the firm will 
still continue its investment and finish at A ,. When 7] > A,, it is possible that the target 
firm will finish earlier than the deadline. For delaying till 7], the target firm’s utility is:
r 7,
2 § '  '^(7;)- 2 ,8 ' 'kt + 2 S' 17t(//), and the utility for finishing earlier at A( is
,= i ¡=a , o
1 ”  The case with 1, ■ A will he excluded by the capacity constraints, however, to exhaust each possibility 
of the target firm’s autarky decision, we need to write it down here.
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/, A, 7.
X.8' 'n(r>)~ X,8' 'k, + X 8 — n(rl))+ X 8’ 'nUI).  The reservation utility is
/ = ! / = |
hence the maximum of these two utilities. The PR constraints are:
/1
X 8‘ + 5 ,|/,(Ail) > R,’K(X,K(rl ),7], A,),
;
(PR I)
i2
X 8 " *  + 5 ri P(Af2) > /f™(X,7t(r2), r2, A2).
7;
(PR2)
Similar to the 1R constraints, the right hand side of the PR constraints also vary with 
types.
Finally, we need further constraints to screen the types. First of all, the Incentive 
Compatibility (IC) constraints say that taking the whole scheme that is meant for each 
type gives him at least the same utility as taking the whole scheme that is meant for the 
other type, that is.
X 8 " 7 t ( r , ) -  X 8," *  + 8r,7,(A'I) * i 8M*(r2) -  X 8 ' + S T' P(M2), (IC1)
When 7^  < A 2, type A2 will not finish the investment at T, and this case will be 
considered in the IPR constraints defined as follows. The IPR constraints say that the 
whole scheme for each type should give him at least the same utility as taking only the 
first part of the scheme for the other type and staying in autarky henceforth, i.e..
i=r,-4,+i
and
if 7] > A2. (IC2)
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(1 PR 1)
and
t2
£ S mJI(r2) -  £ 8 '  ' k+6 ' ' P(M2) > R l’R(X,n(r,),T„A2) + ^ 8 '  'K(rl). (IPR2)
1 = 1
Together with the non-negativity constraints: r(,Ti, Mi > 0 , we have the 
programming problem (P2):
+(1 -  u ) [ £  5' 1 (Jt(r2) + S(r2)) + X  8 " '[« (» ) + S(H)J -  (1 + \ ) S hp(M2)]}
¿=1 ¡=r2+i
subject to capacity constraints, CL1, CL2 IR1, IR2, PR1, PR2, IC1, IC2, IPR1 and IPR2.
Since the constraints are case contingent, we need to check each case separately to 
avoid confusion.
4.3.1 k2 < k < min{jt(Z.),A:l*}
Since ri,Ti,M i are costly"4 to the government, these variables should be set at the lowest 
possible values without violating any constraint. In this case, there is no liquidity problem 
for both types, but the investment cost is too high for the inefficient type to cover the 
overall cost. Hence the efficient type will invest and the inefficient type will not invest 
without protection, and both CL constraints will be satisfied for any feasible r > 0 . To
ll4The reason follows the complete information case.
f | oo
(o [£  8M (it(r,) + S(r,)) + X  5,_l [*(//) + S(//)] -  (1 + X)5r'p(M ,)]
T,
max
|i t ( r ,  )T | ,A1},|»l(r2 ).7'2 .A2 }
i=1
T2
Constraints 4.1 and 4.3 also need to be satisfied by the solution. (P2)
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find (he solution, suppose first that both capacity constraints arc binding: '/] = A, and 
T2 = A 2 (i.e., the lowest possible deadlines that induce produce efficient investment). 
Later we will check if it is the optimal setting. Substituting the settings of Tt , we can 
simplify the PR constraints as:
- ¿ S ' - ' / t  + 8 a'/>(A/,) > - ^ 5 " k  + ¿ 8 m ji( « ) ,
i'=l i=I t=A ,+ l
- j £ d ‘-'k+ 8*’P(M2)Z  ¿ 8 mjc(L). (4.13)
i= l i'=A j+ l
If only taking the first part of the scheme, the efficient type has a higher profit each 
period till Tt (= A ,). Afterwards, his autarky utility is the value from completing the
investment. As k ’2 < k , PR1 will be satisfied for any A/, > 0 , but PR2 will be violated if 
we set M2 = 0 . Define M2 as the smallest M2 to satisfy the PR2 constraint"5:
As 00
- £ S " '*  + 8A!/>(A72) = £ 8 MJt(L). (4.14)
i=1 i=A2 + 1
Since we only know that M , = 0 can satisfy PR1, we will leave the setting of M , as 
general. Temporarily, we have {ZJ, Af,} = {A,, A/,} and {7,,M2 ) = (A2,A/2}. Substituting 
this setting into the other constraints, we can further simplify first the IR constraints:
£ 5 " 7 t ( r l ) - £ 8 ' l<:+8A'P(M l) > £ 5 '  ' n ( L )  -  ¿ 8 ' “'* + ¿ 8 m tc ( H ) ,
i= l 1=1 i=I 1=1 /= A | + 1
£ 8 " 7 C (r2) - £ 8 ' - ' ^ + 8 A¡P(M2) s £ 8 , ' n ( L ) .  (4.15)
1=1 1=1 i=l
Recall from the complete information case where we argue that the increase of 7 'will not solve the 
problem.
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From the IR constraints, it is difficult to tell which type will mimic the other because 
the reservation utilities vary with types. However, we have the 1PR constraints:
£ 8 '  ,7t(rl ) - £ 8 '  'k + 8*-P(Mt)
i=1 i=l
> £ 8 ‘ 17t(r2) + m axi- £ 8 ‘~'k,
1=1 [ /=A2-A, + I
“ ¿ 8 ‘~'k+ £ 8 '  '(7 t(//)-Jt(r2))|
(=1 i=A| + l j i=A2 + l
(4.16)
£ S '"7 t(r2) - £ 8 " f c  + 8 AiP(A72) > £ 8 ' 17t(r,)+ £ 8 ' '7 1 ( 0 . (4.17)
' = 1 1=1 1=1 i= A |+ l
To satisfy Constraint 4. l " 6, it must be true that IPR2 (4.17) implies IR2 (4.15). 
Manipulating equation (4.17) by using the definition of M, yields:
A, A, A.
£ 8 ,_l7t(/-2)>  £ 8 ' ~ ,7i('',) + 2 ^ 8 “ l7t(L). (4.17)’
j=i i=i ¡=a,+i
Constraint 4.1 says that IR1 will be satisfied if IPR1 is satisfied. Overall, if Constraint 4.1 
is satisfied, then both IR constraints can be replaced by the IPR constraints. Finally since 
T, = A ,, IC2 is not valid and IC1 is simplified to:
¿ 8 i- |7 r ( r , ) - £ 8 ‘-,<:+84'P(A/l ) > ^ 8 ' “l7t(r2) -  £ 8 " *  + S A!P(M2). (4.18)
( = 1 1 = 1 1=1 (= A: -  A | + 1
The relationship between 1PR1 (4.16) and IC1 (4.18) is not yet clear. If n(r2) > n ( H ) , 
together with M7 > 0  we know that equation (4.18) will imply equation (4.16) because
"'That is. n(r, ) i  n(l.).
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it >7t(/V). However, if tr(r2) < 7 t(//), then whether (4.18) implies (4.16) will depend on 
the size of 7t(r,). To determine 7t(r2), we need to check the 1PR2 constraint (equation
(4.17)). By letting equation (4.17)’ bind, we can see that n(r2) and 7t(r,) are linearly 
dependent, i.e..
As rc(r2) and 7t(r,) will be cancelled from both sides of IC1, there is no further 
constraint on n(r, ) except for Constraint 4.1. Hence, let us firstly suppose that Constraint 
4.1 binds for 7t(r,), that is, 7t(r,) = n(L) , which further implies n{r2) = n(L) by equation
(4.17)”. By this setting, we can see that IC1 (4.18) implies IPR1 (4.16), since M2 >0 and 
n > n ( H ) . Finally, let M,° be the smallest Mt that satisfies IC1:
To compare the relative sizes of M,° and M2, rewrite the above equation by 
substituting the setting of 7t(z*):
It can be checked that M f  < M2. To prove this, suppose Af” = M2 and let 
/> ((< ). (4.18)’ implies (1- 5 Al' A')X = 2 lS MJt(L)
^ 8 '  '7t(r2) = ^ 5 ' ‘'7t(r,)+ ¿ 8 ,_l7t(L). (4.17)’
1 = 1 ( = 1
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a,
Now, suppose M" < M 2 and let ‘A: + 8 a,P(A/2) = X + e , where e is the utility
A
i=l
difference from setting M" and M2 (since P(.) is increasing and M,° < M2, we have
depending on the size of e , will possibly satisfy the PR1 constraint. Hence, it must be 
that M" < M2. Furthermore, whether M,° > 0  is dependent on the relative sizes of
5 ‘-,K(L) - ' 2J8 i-'k+ X 5 Mn(W) (the RHS of IR1) and 5m* + £ 8 mtc(£) (the
RHS of IC1). If the former is bigger, then IR1 should be binding and hence we set 
M, = 0; If the latter is bigger, then we set Mt = > 0 , which simultaneously satisfies
PR1 and IC1. So far, we have {7t(r, ),7^, M , ) = (Jt(L),A,, M,°) or {jtfLJ.A^O} and 
{7C(r2), T2,M2) = {7t(L),A2,M2) . It can be checked that IR, IPR, IC, capacity and cost 
limit constraints are satisfied. Finally, since PR2 and Constraint 4.1 are binding, 
following the same argument as in Section 4.2, it can be checked that Constraint 4.3 is 
satisfied with the scheme for type 2. Constraint 4.3 is satisfied with type l ’s scheme by 
assumption. By the same argument in Section 4.2, we can argue that the setting of 
7] = A, is optimal to the government. The result says that if type A, mimics A2, it
stands to get a reward M, and the benefit from delaying the investment cost; but to get 
this mimicking benefit, the efficient type will have to delay completion until A2 which is 
costly (since it doesn’t get k (H)  until later). So there may or may not be an incentive to
117 PR I has a reservation utility higher than the current profits.
i=t
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mimic A ,; it there is, M" is needed to ensure incentive compatibility. It is assumed 
feasible1 ls to have M,° > 0 ,  which is interpreted as the information rent paid to the 
efficient type.
4.3.2 k[ < k <n(L)
In this case, the investment cost is too high for both types to cover the overall cost, hence 
neither of them will invest in autarky. However, as there is no liquidity problem, the CL 
constraints will be satisfied for any feasible r by assumption. Suppose first that both 
capacity constraints are binding, which gives T, = A, and T2 = A2. Together with the
assumptions of n( L ) >k  and k'  <k , we can shorten the PR1 constraint as:
and the PR2 constraint as in equation (4.13) from the previous case. If we set M, = 0 and 
M2 = 0 ,  both PR1 and PR2 will be violated. Hence, except for M2 defined in equation 
(4.14), we can define A/, to be the smallest A/, to satisfy PR 1:
Any M , > M , and M2 > M2 will satisfy the PR constraints. As in the previous case, we 
leave the setting of M, as general and hence we temporarily have {Tj, A/,) = {A,, Af,} and
1IR There is no other consideration, such as political pressure, on the setting of protection scheme.
A, CO
- £ 8 ' ^ +  5 *'/>(;)/,)> ^ S '- ' i c a ) , (4.19)
A.
(4.20)
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\T2,M 2} = (A ,,M , ). Substituting this setting into the other constraints, we can further 
simplify first the IRI constraint as:
¿ 5 '  '7 t ( r , ) - ^ 5 ' 'k
1 = 1 1 = 1
+ 5 A,P(M,)> £ 8 '  'n(L),
i = l
(4.21)
and the IR2 constraint as equation (4.15). Moreover, we have IPR1:
¿ 8 '  l7t(rl ) - ^ 8 , l/ :+ 8 'l/>(Ai1) > ^ 8 '  ‘n(r2)+  ¿ 8 ’ 'k (L), (4.22)
and IPR2 as equation (4.17). By applying Constraint 4.1, we know that IPR constraints 
imply 1R constraints and hence we only need to consider IPR constraints. Since 7J = A ,, 
IC2 is not valid and we need only consider IC1, which is described in equation (4.18). 
Comparing IPR1 (4.22) and IC1 (4.18), we know that IC1 implies IPR1, which can be
checked by substituting the definition of M2 and the fact that — > — > ,8‘~'k .
i = A 2 - A , + l  i = l
Hence, the various constraints can be summarised by IC1 (which implies IPR1 and hence 
IRI), and IPR2 (which implies IR2).
To derive K(rt) and , we need to check IC1, IPR2 and Constraints 4.1 and 4.3. 
First of all, by the definition of M2, equation (4.17)’ (from IPR2) is valid with equality. 
By letting equation (4.17)’ bind, we can see that Jt(r2) and K(r,) are linearly dependent. 
As n(r2) and n(rt) will be cancelled out from both sides of IC1, there are no further 
constraints on ji(r,) except for Constraint 4.1. Hence let us suppose that Constraint 4.1
binds for n(r,), that is, 7t(r, ) = n(L) , which therefore implies n(r2) = n(L) by equation
(4.17)". Substituting these values into 1C1 gives:
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( 4 .1 8 ) ”- ¿ 5 '  '* + 5 A'P(Af,)> ¿ 8 " n ( L ) -  ^ 8 " A + 5 A;V(M2)
1 = 1 i= A |+ l  i = A 2- A |  + l
To find the optimal Af,, let A/, be the value of Af, such that equation (4.18)” is binding. 
We need to compare the relative sizes of Af, and Ms . Note that, if Af, = Af, , the left
hand side of equation (4,18)” will be ^ d '  'n(L) by the definition of M, . This value is
i=A,+1
A2- A ,  oo
smaller than the right hand side of (4.18)”, which is ^ 5 ‘“'/t + ^ 8 ‘~'k (L) by using the
/=! i=A |+l
definition of Af2 and the assumption of n(L)>k.  Hence it must be Af, > Af, . To 
simultaneously satisfy PR1 and IC1, we need to choose the bigger value, that is, 
Af, = Af, . The intuition is: Af, only gives the efficient type the reservation utility which 
is the same as that of the inefficient type, but mimicking can give him at least the benefit 
from delaying to put in the investment cost. To ensure incentive compatibility. A/, must 
be bigger than Af, to compensate this mimicking benefit. Furthermore, following the
argument in the pervious case, we can show that if Af, — Af2 , the value of
a, i
- V 8 '“'k + 8 A|P(Af,) will be 8 A|------ n(L)  (hence the expected utility will be
TV 1 - 8
^ 8 l_l7t(L)), but this will not satisfy the IC1 constraint, whose RHS is
i>i
~^ l 00 ~ _
^ 6 MA: + ^ 5 ' “'7t(L). Hence it must be Af, < Af2 . Therefore, the optimal scheme is
i*l («1
{7C(r,),7], Af,) = (rt(L), A,, Af, ), and |7t(r2), T,, Af2) = {ji(Z,),A2, Af2}. Following the same
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checking process as in the previous case, this solution satisfies Constraints 4.1 and 4.3 
and the setting T] = A, is optimal to the government. This solution shows that even when
both types are liquidity constrained, it is still optimal to give the efficient type a shorter 
period of post-investment protection, as the efficient type has less incentive to mimic the 
inefficient type whose higher profits from a successful investment will not be realised 
until later.
4.3.3 n ( L ) < k < k ’2
In this case, both types have liquidity problems and hence neither of them will invest 
without protection, although both types’ future profits from a successful investment are 
sufficiently high. The cost limit constraints will be violated under the current profit for 
both types. By setting T, = A, and T2 = A2, we can simplify the respective PR 
constraints as equation (4.19) and equation (4.13). Unlike the previous cases, the PR 
constraints will be satisfied if Mi = 0 , and therefore any Ml > 0  will satisfy the PR 
constraints. Furthermore, we have IR1 and IR2 as equations (4.21) and (4.23):
f j 8 - ,K(rl ) - J j 8 l- ' k+8&' P(Ml) > Y 5 ' - ' n ( L ) ,  (4.21)
1=1 1=1 1=1
(4.23)
Similarly, we have IPRI and IPR2 constraints as:
(4.22)
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(4.24)
A , A , A, oo
^ 8 '  'u(r2) — ' 'k + 8 A; P(M2) > ^ S 1 'jt(r,) + ^ 8 '  'jt(Z.).
1 = 1 « = 1 1 = 1 i = A, + l
By applying Constraint 4.1, we know that IPR1 implies IR1 and IPR2 implies IR2. 
Therefore, we only need to consider equations (4.22) and (4.24). However, it is difficult 
to tell from equations (4.22) and (4.24) which type will mimic the other. We go on to 
check the IC constraints. Since 7^  = A ,, IC2 is not valid and only IC1 is valid:
£ 8 ' ' * + 5 A!P(Ai2). (4-25>
¡=i i= i i= i ¡ = * ¡ - * ,+ 1
It can be checked that IC1 implies IPR1: as any M2 > 0 will satisfy PR2 and 
— > - ^ d '  ' k , the RHS of IC1 is bigger than the RHS of IPR1. We now have
i =A j - A i +1 ¡=1
constraints IPR2 (4.24) and IC1 (4.25) to decide four variables: 7t(/;) and M ,, i= 1,2. 
We certainly need more information to find the solution. Recall that any M, > 0 will 
satisfy the PR constraints and the cost limit constraints will be violated for the current 
profit n(L).  Given 7] = A,, we know from the agent’s utility function that the only way 
to increase utility is to increase 7t(/-) or M, . However, a higher 7t(r,) or M( will 
decrease the principal’s utility, hence (4.24) and (4.25) should be set at the lowest 
possible values. Let us firstly guess (4.24) to be binding and let M2 = 0 . By manipulating 
equation (4.24) after assuming binding, we have:
X ,S, l7t(r2) = X 5 " 7 t ( r 1)+ ¿ 5 '  't t iZ A -l-X S ' '* + 8 A’P(0)]. (4.24)’
, = | 1 = 1 h  A, ♦ I i = l
155
As there are no further restrictions on K(r:) except for the cost limit constraints, we can 
guess that type I's cost limit constraint is binding, that is, n(r,) = k . Denote 7t(r,*) as 
the value that satisfies equation (4.24)’, it must he 7t(r,*) < k (since
&2
- £ 8 '  'k +5 A; P(0) > ^8'~'7t(Z.) by assumption). Since the cost limit constraint will
1 = 1 / = A2 +1
be violated by 7t(r,*), we set instead n(r2) = k (CL2 binding). By this setting, IPR2 is 
satisfied with inequality. After substituting M2,K(rt) and 7T(r,) with 0, k and k, we can 
rewrite IC1:
A ,  A 2
S A‘ /»(A/,)) S: ^ 5 '- '* : -  £ S '- 'A :  + 8 4‘ P (0 ). (4.25)’
( =  1 i = A 2 - A ,  +1
Let be the value such that (4.25)’ is binding. Whether > 0 is dependent on the 
relative size of k " 9: if 8A'7t(//) > k , then the LHS of (4.25)’ is greater than the RHS. To 
have it binding, it must be that M '  < 0 ; if 8A| n(H) < k , it must be that M'  > 0 . For the 
case when > 0 , setting M, = M[  can satisfy both IC1 and PR1; if M[ < 0 ,  then set 
M, = 0 as required by the non-negative constraint. Following the same checking process 
as in the previous case, this solution satisfies Constraints 4.1 and 4.3, and the setting of 
7] = A, is optimal to the government.
To conclude, in this case both types have liquidity problems and will not invest 
without protection. The optimal scheme [K(r, ), 7j , M t} = [k. A,, M') or {(k, A, ,0} and 
{n(r2), T2, M21 ={A',A2,0) provides both types extra protection during the investment
-  -  A , - A  I
" 'L e t  = 0  and rearrange (4.25)’, we have 'it ( / / ) -  ^ 8 '  ' t i ( / / )2  ^¡Ts1 1 k , or in short,
i=A|+l  /= A 2 + I i -I
8 A' r t ( / / )  > k
156
period so that they ean afford the opportunity eost. There is no protection to the 
inefficient type alter the completion, however, depending on the relative profits from 
finishing the investment earlier ( A ,) (which it has to forgo the extra protection k - n ( L )  
from taking the inefficient type's scheme) and finishing later (A ,), there will be no 
protection or protection up for a period of M{ to the efficient type after the completion.
4.3.4 max{7t(Z,),ifc2} < k <
Similar to the previous case, both types are liquidity constrained and will not invest in 
autarky. In addition, the inefficient type’s future profits from the investment in this case 
are not sufficiently high either. By assumption of parameters, the cost limit constraints 
will be violated under the current profit. After setting T, = A, and T, = A ,, we have PR I 
and PR2 constraints as equations (4.19) and (4.13). Different from the previous case is 
that if we set M2 = 0 , PR2 will be violated. Hence let us set M2 - M2 as defined in 
equation (4.14) and we know that M2 > 0 .
The other constraints are the same as in the previous case, that is, we have equations 
(4.21) and (4.23) for IR1 and 1R2, and equations (4.22) and (4.24) for 1PR1 and IPR2. By 
applying Constraint 4.1, we can replace both IR constraints by 1PR constraints. Since 
T, = A ,, we know that IC2 is not valid and IC1 is as equation (4.25). The only difference 
in this case is the first guess about M2. As argued, we can firstly set M 2 = M2 since M2 
must be at least M2 to satisfy PR2. Manipulating IPR2 (4.24) gives equation (4.17)’, 
which will be valid with equality. To satisfy the cost limit constraint, let 7t(r,) = k which 
by equation (4.17)” implies that 7i(r2) < k , but this will violate the cost limit constraint.
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Instead, ¡1 we set n(rt ) — n{r2) = k , (4.17)’ will be satisfied with inequality. Substitute 
K(r,) = k and M, = M,  into IC1 (4.25), and let * be the smallest value to satisfy IC1. 
Rearranging ICI. we have:
a 2  ~~ a  |
5 a'P (M ,*)- > 8 a'- i , [54|P(A72)]. (4.26)
i=I
From equation (4.26), we have M,*>M2. To prove, suppose M*=M., and let
is the utility difference for changing from Mt * to M2 (since F(.) is increasing and 
q > 0). Depending on q , the efficient type’s rent could possibly decrease and 
still satisfy ICI. Therefore, it must be that Since M2 > 0 , it must be that
M*>0.
To sum up, in this case we have {7t(r,),Zj, A/,} = and {7t(r2) ,r2,Af2)
= . We can check that this solution satisfies all the constraints and T, -  A, is
optimal to the government. Since, in this case both types are liquidity constrained, the 
optimal scheme provides the during-investment protection to both types to pay the 
investment cost. Moreover, since the inefficient type is lacking in willingness to invest, 
there will be post-investment protection for a period of M 2. For the efficient type to 
mimic, it can benefit from the extra during-investment protection k - tc(L) for A2 -  A,
Y:=d*'P(M,*). From (4.26), we have (1 - 8 A!' i| )T = 2_,d k ( = ------------k ), which
t f  1 - 8
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period and the post-investment protection M ,. Hence, the screening scheme has to give 
the efficient type longer post-investment protection to ensure incentive compatibility.
4.3.5 m a x { 7 C } < k
In this case, both types have liquidity problems and lack willingness to invest. By 
assumption, the cost limit constraints will be violated under the current profit. After 
setting Tt = A, and T2 = A ,, we have PR1 and PR2 as equations (4.19) and (4.13). The 
difference from the previous case is: both PR constraints will be violated if we set 
Mt = M2 = 0 . Therefore, in addition to setting M 2 = M2 as defined in equation (4.14), 
we define M, as described in equation (4.20). That is, and Af, are the values that 
cause the PR constraints to be binding. The other constraints are the same as in the 
previous case. Let us temporarily set M2 = M2. Substituting Tt,T2, M2 by A,,A2,Af2, 
we know that 1PR2 (equation (4.24)) and IC1 (equation (4.25)) will imply IR2 and IR1. 
We further guess equation (4.24) to be binding and set n(rt) = k .  As argued in the 
previous case, we know that n(r2) = k (the cost limit constraint is binding) will be higher 
than the value of 7t(r2) which makes equation (4.24) binding. Therefore, we set
7T(r,) = 7t(r2) = k . Substitute n(rt) into IC1 and denote Mi  as the smallest value to 
satisfy IC1, that is,
¿ 8 " k  -  ¿ 8 '  'k + 8 A| P(M, ) = X 8 '"'* -  ¿ 8 " '*  + 8 &1P(M2)
1=1 1 = 1 i=l  i = A 2 - A ,  + 1
or equivalently.
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(4.26)’
A 2 -  A,
8 A ' P ( M i ) -  £ S M Jfc = 8 A= A|[ S a'P(A/2)].
First of all, following the same argument as in the previous ease, we know that M, > M ,. 
Next, it must be that Mi > M, , since by the definition of M2, the right hand side of 1C1
is higher than ^TS' 'k(L) (as ^ S ‘~'k < ^ 8 '  'k ). It can also be checked that
i = l i = &2 - A |  + l 1 = 1
Mi = A/,’ . We can check that this solution satisfies all the constraints and 7] = A, is 
optimal to the government.
To conclude, in this case both types have liquidity problems and lack willingness to 
invest. The optimal scheme {Ji(r, ),7], M, ( = (A:, A ,, M i ) and (7t (r2),T2, M2\ 
= (At,A2, M ,) provides both types the during-investment protection to pay the investment 
cost. As in the previous case, by mimicking, the efficient type can have extra during- 
investment protection and the post-investment protection of period M2. Since M, < M2 
(by the assumption of A, < A 2), although the efficient type also lacks willingness to 
invest, the mimicking benefit is still higher than its autarky utility. Hence we have the 
same solution as in the previous case.
Having derived the screening protection scheme, we now turn to the addressed 
question: “Will the government be better off offering a non-screening protection 
scheme?” Proposition 4.3 provides the answer:
Proposition 4..1
(!) The screening protection scheme could possibly coincide with the efficient scheme 
when only the inefficient type is lacking in investment willingness, or when there are only
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liquidity problems; (2) The screening scheme is strictly better than the pooled scheme o f 
the efficient type; however, whether it is better than the pooled scheme o f the inefficient 
type is dependent on parameter values; (3) Whenever there is a liquidity problem, the 
efficient type’s post-investment protection will be longer than that o f the inefficient type; 
otherwise, the reverse result applies.
The welfare comparison for various schemes is routine and hence is presented in 
Appendix 4.2. The first part of the proposition can be seen from cases 4.3.1 and 4.3.3, 
where the screening schemes could possibly coincide with the efficient scheme. The 
intuition is: for both cases the efficient type has higher profits after completing the 
investment (if possible). Hence, depending on the size of future profits, the efficient type 
will not necessarily have the incentive to mimic the inefficient type, and hence we have 
the first result.
The argument for the second part of Proposition 4.3 is similar for each case, and 
hence we only explain case 4.3.1 here. From Appendix 4.2, we know that the welfare 
from the screening scheme is always higher than the pooled scheme of the efficient type, 
since there is a possibility (1 -u )  that the investment is not completed in the latter. 
Recall that it is assumed optimal that the investment proceeds for both types. Whether the 
screening scheme is better than the pooled scheme of the inefficient type is dependent on 
the mixed effects of belief (U) and the difference between types ( A2 -  A ,). That is, if
u[ ] ¿ 5 M(rc(«) + S(W ))-(l + ^)8a|p(M,,,)] is higher than ( l - u ) [  ¿ 8 m (tc(£,) + S(L))
i = A |+ l  i=A|+1
—(1 + A,)8A;p(Af2)], then the screening scheme is better. For a higher belief or a smaller 
difference between two types, the screening scheme is more likely to be better than the 
pooled scheme of the inefficient type.
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The intuition lor the last part ol the proposition is: whenever there is a liquidity 
problem, the efficient types mimicking incentive becomes higher, that is, type A, will 
have extra during-investment protection k-7t(L) for A , - A ,  more period by mimicking. 
If there is no post-investment protection for the inefficient type, the screening scheme 
could be the same as the efficient scheme; otherwise, the efficient type’s post-investment 
protection is always higher, as it is not optimal to provide excessive protection during the 
investment period. When there is no liquidity problem, the efficient type’s post- 
investment protection is always shorter, which is in contrast to most patent literature, for 
example Cornelli and Schankerman (1995), in asserting that a more efficient firm should 
be given a longer patent length to ensure incentive compatibility. Our model shows that 
this is true only when the target firm has a liquidity problem, otherwise, the efficient 
type’s patent length can be shorter and still keep the incentive to finish earlier.
4.4 Conclusion and Further Research
Since various government interventions are still heavily applied by many developed and 
developing countries, a positive attitude is to provide a comprehensive guide to the 
design of protection scheme. More specifically, our model addresses two important but 
usually ignored dimensions: the protection form and the protection length. In the context 
of complete information, our model concludes that depending on parameters, the optimal 
protection could involve no protection, one-part protection or two-part protection. This 
result provides an explanation for the controversial empirical conclusions on protection 
effects. When there is incomplete information, we show that for some cases the screening
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always better than the ponied scheme of the efficient type. However, whether it is better 
than the pooled scheme of the inefficient type is dependent on parameters. More 
interestingly, our result suggests that when there is no liquidity problem, the efficient 
type’s post-investment protection is shorter than the inefficient type. This is in contrast to 
the usual proposition in patent literature that a longer patent life should be given to the 
more efficient firm to ensure incentive compatibility.
As the model is simplified by considering only a monopoly firm, there is no 
discussion about the market structure effect. Further research can be extended to cover 
the interaction among firms. For example, granting the post-investment protection to a 
single firm, like a patent, could possibly save the incentive rent for the efficient type. 
Another important issue is the lime-inconsistency problem in most government policies. 
As noted by Tornell (1994), “temporary protection has had to be renewed repeatedly or 
been transferred to permanent protection, if the government grants the protection in the 
present, it is unlikely that they will not grant it in the future.” The present model can be 
extended by assuming an exogenous renewing rate, which may be determined by voting 
among parliament members from different interest groups110. As the producer’s lobby 
power is limited by the single market profit, there will be some neutral voters whose 
attitude will depend on past protection experience. Therefore when protection is first 
introduced, we can expect an exogenous renewal rate in the future, and hence we can 
design a time-consistent protection scheme. However, the result is possibly similar to 
Tornell, i.e. the time consistent protection scheme could be too expensive to put in 
practice.
Appendix 4.1
""This belongs to another stream of protection analysis: political economy analysis.
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Proof o f Lemma 4.2. Firstly, lor T < A . at any time I < T , the protected firm's decision
is to shirk, because any effort will not change the value at T+l. VTtl = y  S' 'n(L) = L.
i= I
Secondly, for T> A, the following is to decide at any t < T  how the target firm 
makes its decision between shirking and putting in effort, depending on history and the 
deadline. The proof is separated into two parts: for 1= T -A  + 1 to T and for t=l  to 
T - A.
1. For t= T -  A + l to T,  it is proved by strong induction that for an arbitrary number 
^ < A - 1 ,  at time t = T-%  , the protected firm will put in effort only when 
n  = A -  ^ - 1 .  In the following, n(L) and r(x) are abbreviated as n  and r for 
simplification . For \  = 0 , that is, t = T ,
if n = A —1, Vj (n) = max(jr + r + SV^iA -  l),7t + r - k  + 6V,T+1(A)} 
= max{7t + r + 8L,7t + r-A: + 8//)
= n + r - k  + &H if - < [ H - L ) .
8
■ < [H -  L] is satisfied by Constraint 4.
if n > A , V,.(n) = max{7t + r + 8V’7.+l(n),7i + r-A: + 8V7.tl(n+ 1))
= max{7t + r + 8//,7t + r  — k + bH)
= it + r  + 8 // .
if n < A -  2 , VT(n) = max{7t + r + 8V7>,(n),TC + r-lfc + 8Vr<.l(n+ 1)} 
= max(7t + r + 8L,7t + r — k + &L)
= 7t + r + 8L.
Therefore, for ^ = ()(i.e., t=T), the protected firm only puts in effort when n — A -  I .
Next, let 7. be an arbitrary integer smaller than A -  1. Suppose for every j  < z , the 
protected firm’s decision follows the rule
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This supposition says that for any time t = T - j ,  if the protected firm has already put in 
investment for A -  j  -  1 times, it will find it optimal to put in effort in investment time /; 
otherwise, it will be better off with shirking.
For t, = z , i.e. at time t = T - z ,  if w = A -  z -  1, the firm’s decision is :
Vr_j(A —z — 1) = max{7t + r  + 5VJ._J+1( A - z - l) ,7 t  + r- fc  + 5V7._J+l(A -z))
By supposition, this means:
V ^fA  -  z -  1) = max {7t + r + 8(tr + r+...b(n + r + bL)...),
n + r — k+  b(n + r -  k+  b(.. .+8(7t + r -  k + bH ...)) (
= max{(7t + /•)(! + S+...8' 2) + b!~'L,.(n + r)(l +8+ ...8z~2) - ( l  + 5+...S' 2)k + b z~'H)
Therefore, the protected firm will invest if (1 + 8+...8z' 2)g,-' k < [H — L ] , which is satisfied
under Constraint 4.3.
If n > A -  z -  1, ( note that n + l > A - z - l  as well), by the supposition the
protected firm will shirk till time T - j  (when n = A - y ' - l ) ,  then start to put in effort 
and obtain the result of bH at T+l.  The difference between investing and shirking at the
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moment is to choose to put in effort earlier or later. Since the former causes a higher 
discounted opportunity cost, shirking will be a better choice.
If n < A -  z -  I , if the protected firm chooses to work, causing opportunity cost of £k 
at the current stage, by supposition its next choices from T-z+l to T will be to shirk, and 
hence the effort status will remain A — z ■ This will result in a final value of bL at T+l.  
However, if the protected firm chooses to shirk, without spending the investment cost, its 
next choices described by the supposition is to shirk from T-z+l to T. This will result in a 
final value of 8Z, at time T+l as well. Thus, we can conclude that the best choice at 
t = T -  z is to shirk at this stage.
2. For t=l to T — A, since the above discussion shows that at time T -A  + l ,  the 
protected firm will put in effort only when n=0. It is argued that the protected firm will 
find it optimal to shirk from t=l till T — A . Suppose it deviates once at time s <T -  A , 
resulting in accumulated effort n = I at time T -  A + 1. The firm’s value at time s is:
JC + r -  k + 8( 31 + r+... 8( VV_4+1 (1))...)
= X 8" ' ^  + r ) - k  + 57 a[Vr_A+1(l)] (A4.1)
i—S
The expected value to stick on shirking till time T — A is then 
7t + r + 8(7t + r+...8(V'r_/UI(0))...)
= X 8 M(n + r) + 8r*-A[Vr Atl(0)l (A4.2)
i - s
The first part of the proof says that Vr _A+, (0) = 7t -  A: + SV'7-_A+2(1) and 
^r-A+t(1) = n + 8F7-A+2(1). Together with equation (A4.1) and (A4.2), we know that
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equation (A4.2) is greater than equation (A4.I), and therefore the protected firm will not 
deviate. QED
Appendix 4.2 Welfare effect comparison from different protection schem es
This appendix firstly summarises two different protection schemes: the efficient scheme 
(A) and the screening scheme (B). Next, the welfare effect (that is, the government’s 
expected utility) is presented for: (1) the efficient protection scheme; (2) the screening 
protection scheme; (3) the pooled scheme of the efficient type; (4) the pooled scheme of 
the inefficient type.
4.3.1 k [ < k <  min{jt(D,*i*}
A. The efficient protection scheme
(Jt(r,) ,T,, M , } = (7t(L),A,,0}, {7t(r2),T2, M2) = |n(L). A ,, M2}.
B. The screening protection scheme
{Jt(r,),7;,M , } = {rt(D. A ,,M,°) or {ti(L),A, ,0}, {7t(r2).T2, M2}= A2, M2}.
(1) . Welfare for the efficient protection scheme
M X  5 "  (tc(L )  + 5(L)) +  £  6 " '  O K « )  +  S(«))J
t=| /=A|+1
+(1 -  ^ [ ¿ S M (iKi.)  +  S ( L ) )  + ¿ 5 " '  («(//) + S ( H ) )  -  (1 + X)5a;p(A72) ] }
1=1 i = A j + I
(2) . Welfare for the screening protection scheme
( « [ ¿ 8 m («(L) + S(L))+ ¿ 8 , , (7t(//) + 5 ( / / ) ) - ( l  + X)84'p(yv710)]
i = l i=A| +1
+(1 -  u ) [ £  8'-' (Jt(D + S(L)) + £  8' 1 (n( H )  + S(H) ) - (  I + D 8Aip( M2)])
1 =  1 /= A 2 +1
,or the same as the efficient scheme.
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(3) . Welfare for the pooled scheme of the efficient type: |7t(L), A ,,0).
A , no M
M ^ 8 ' - ' ( n { L )  + S(L))+ X 5 'H(7t(tf) + S ( //) ) ]+ ( l-u ) |]T 5 ' '(7t(D + 5(D)]}
*~l i = A ,  + 1 ¡=1
(4) . Welfare for the pooled scheme of the inefficient type: {rt(L), A2,/W,).
| £ S ‘- \ n ( L )  + 5 (D )  + £  8 - ' ( n ( H )  + S ( H )) -  (1 + D S A’p(M2 ) i
[  >=1 l = A j + l  j
4.3.2 *,* <k <n(L)
A. The efficient protection scheme
(Tl(rl ),7;,Afl} = {7t(i,),Al,A7l }, i7t(r2) ,r2,A/2} ={7t(L),A2>Ai2}.
B. The screening protection scheme
{Tt(r,),7;,Ml } = {7t(L),Al , # l } ,  [n(r2) ,T 2, M 2) =  {ji( L ) ,A 2, a72) .
( 1) . Welfare for the efficient protection scheme
{ulXS-'fTC(D + S(D) + ^ 5 - ‘(7c(//) + S ( / / ) ) - ( l  + A.)5A'p(M, )]
t = l t= A | +1
A 2 OO
+(1 -  X))[]T 5M(7r(D + 5(L)) + H )  +  S ( H ) )  -  (1 + D 5 A’p(Af2)])
1=1 i = A 2 + l
(2) . Welfare for the screening protection scheme
{ « [¿ 8 m (ji(D  + 5(D )+  ¿ 5 ,-'(Jt(//) + 5 ( f /) ) - ( l  + D 5 A|p (# l )]
i = l  (= A |  +  I
+ ( l -u ) l£ 8 " (7 t (D  + 5(L))+ ¿ 8 ,-'(Jt(//) + 5(//))-(H -A .)8A!p(A72)])
i = l  i '= A j + l
(3) . Welfare for the pooled scheme of the efficient type: [k (L) ,A, ,M{ }
{v[ Y  8' ' (rc( D  + 5( D) + Y  8' '(7t(//) + S ( / / ) ) - ( l  t-D 6A'p(M, ))
1 = 1 i*Aj ♦!
+(1 - u ) i y 8 '  '(n(L ) + 5(L))l)
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(4). Welfare for the pooled scheme of the inefficient type: (ti( T), A,, M , j
'(7i(L) + S(L))+ £ 8 '  ' W H )  + S ( H ) ) - ( \ + \ ) 5 &‘p{M2)
4.3.3 k(L)< k < k\
A. The efficient protection scheme
{Tt(rl ),7;,A/1} = {A:,Al,0}, {rc(r2), T2, M2) = {*,A2,0}.
B. The screening protection scheme
= or |t ,A „ 0), {n(r2),T2,M2) ={ k , A2,0}.
(1) . Welfare for the efficient protection scheme
A, oo
( u [ £  S '"1 (* + £(*)) + £ S M (Jt(//) + $(«))]
i=l  i=A|  + l
+(1 -  4 ))ti 8M (* + sot)) + X  8 "  (k(H) + S(H)) ] )
i=l  i=A2+l
(2) . Welfare for the screening protection scheme
M X S " 1 (k + S m  + X 8 M(n(H) + S(H)) -  (1 + X.)8a'p(M,')]
1=1 i=A | + 1
+ (1--U )[^5 i-'(A: + .S(A:))+ ¿ 8 '  '(7t(//) + S(//))])
1 = 1 i =A2 + I
(3) . Welfare for the pooled scheme of the efficient type: {&,A,,0}
A,
(o [£ 8 '- 'O t+ « * ))+  X 8 ' ' (x(H) + S(H))]
i = I i A, ♦ I
A |
+ 0 - ' » [ ¿ S ' 1 (* + $(*)) + X 8 ' '0t(i<)+ $(£))!}
i=l  i = A , t l
(4) . Welfare for the pooled scheme of the inefficient type: (A:, A2,0|
U>«>
A ; oo
£ s *  \ k  + S ( k ) ) +  £ 8 ' '(n (H )  + S(H)) l
i= l  i= A 2 +  1
4.3.4 max{7t(D.D’ ) < k < k,'
A. The efficient protection scheme
(rc(r,),7;,M1| = {* ,A l ,0},  {Ti(r3),7;,A/2} = { * ,A 2,M 2).
B. The screening protection scheme
|it(r,),7;,A/,| =  {/t,A,, A/’ } , {7i(r2 ) ,T 2, M 2) = {* ,A 2, M 2).
(1) . Welfare for the efficient protection scheme
M X S - ' ( k  + S ( k ) ) +  ¿ 5 w (n ( H )  + S ( H ) ) ]
i=\ i'=A |+ l
Al oo
+(1 -  u ) [ £  8'-' (k + S ( k ) )  + £  8M (it( H )  + 5( H ) ) - (  1 + D S A; p( M 2)]}
i =  l i= A 2 +  l
(2) . Welfare for the screening protection scheme
{ u [£ 5 ‘-'(7t(D + 5(D ) + ¿ 8 i-'(7t(//) + 5(//)) -(1 + D S A'p(M,')]
1=1 i=A ,+ l
A2 oo
+(1 -  D ) l £  8m  ( n ( D  +  5 (D )  +  £  8M (n( //) +  S( / / ) ) - ( I + X)8Alp(A72)]}
i =  l i= A ,-H
(3) . Welfare for the pooled scheme of the efficient type: {Jt.A^OI
A
{ u [ £ 8 ' - ' ( *  + 5(*)) +  £ 8 w ( n ( « )  + 5(//))]
i= l  i= A ,+ l
A | oo
+ ( 1 - u ) | £ 8 ‘- '(*  + 5 (* ))+  £ 8 m (jc( D  +  5 ( D ) ] |
1 = 1 t=A | +1
(4) . Welfare for the pooled scheme of the inefficient type: {¿,A,,M2|
A , oo
£ S '  ' ( k  + S ( k ) ) +  £ 8 " ( n ( A / )  + 5(/V))-( l  +X.)8a' p (A7,)
i = A 2 + I
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4.3.5 max{7t(L),Jfc’ ) < k
A. The cllicicnt protection scheme
{n(r,),T„M,) = {<:,AI,/V7I| , {7t(r2) ,r2,A/_,( = {*, A2, M2) .
B. The screening protection scheme
{n(rl ),Tl,Ml} = {k,A, ,Ml) , [K(r2),T2, M2) = {A,A2, M2}.
(1) . Welfare for the efficient protection scheme
00
{ i ) [ £ 8 ,H(* + S(r,))+ £ 8 , l (7c(W) + S ( t f ) ) - ( l  + A.)84'p(A7, )]
l=l i=A,+1
+(1 -  *>)[]£8'-'(jt(jL) + S(L)) + £  + S(H)) -  (1 + \)8 4’p(A/2)]}
t = I t=A2 +1
(2) ~(4) are the same as in the previous case.
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5. Conclusion
In closing, (his chapter summarises the contributions of the thesis, including the findings 
for the addressed issues and some notes on mechanism design. Then we look at some 
applications of the three models.
This thesis consists of three individual models of research and development, 
addressing issues on technology adoption, funding contracts and protection schemes. The 
first model is motivated by the inconsistency of empirical results and theoretical models 
regarding the “firm size effects” upon the timing of adoption. To be specific, the 
empirical results show that large firms could adopt a certain technology earlier or later 
than small firms; however, previous theoretical models always assert that large firms will 
adopt earlier. Chapter 2 proposes a two-stage, endogenous learning, Stackelberg model to 
analyse firms’ adoption decisions towards an innovation with uncertain profitability. It is 
shown that in a pure strategy equilibrium, the large firm may or may not tacitly delay its 
adoption to capture the information advantage, depending on production cost and belief 
parameters. In the comparative statics, we have an interesting conclusion concerning the 
after-adoption market concentration, that is, even for a successful innovation, if the large 
firm adopts earlier, the market concentration will decrease in the first stage and then 
return to the pre-adoption level in the second stage. The welfare analysis provides a 
justification for government intervention in firms’ adoption decisions.
The second model is motivated by the fact that although more and more resources 
(personnel and money) have been devoted to R&D activities, there is little theoretical 
discussion regarding R&D funding issues. Chapter 3 provides a guideline to a rich class 
of funding contracts, especially for time-consuming projects confronted with moral
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hazard problems. As a benchmark of comparison, we first derive the optimal contract for 
a long-term project with only a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract form 
happens to be a multi-stage version of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, where the optimal 
fixed fee refers to the agent’s shirking benefit from the contract. After considering the 
agent’s private information, we derive the screening contracts for both discrete and 
continuous type settings. The screening contracts assign no efficiency loss to either type, 
which is in contrast to the usual conclusion in the literature. Moreover, within the 
continuous setting, we show that the principal will adopt a cut-off strategy in funding, 
and the cut-off point is affected by the fact that inefficient types (types greater than the 
cut-off point) will take the contract and shirk all through the funding period. Hence, the 
principal will fund the project for a shorter period in the presence of an opportunism 
problem. Furthermore, the discussion of the optimal auctioning contract shows that the 
principal will benefit from the competition among agents in two ways: First, the project is 
more likely to be completed by an efficient type under an auction. Second, competition 
reduces the incentive rent for the efficient type as he is less likely to mimic the inefficient 
type who might have less chance to win the auction, however, this rent reduction will 
vary with the difference between the two types. Comparing the optimal auction with a 
second-price auction, we show that bidding the principal’s reservation price (rather than 
truth-bidding) will be the bidders’ dominant strategies, and neither the revenue 
equivalence theorem nor the separation property will hold. Finally, when neither of the 
players has private information about the time needed for completion, we show that a 
longer funding period will actually induce more shirking, and the optimal funding length 
is determined as the point where the agent’s shirking period is driven down to zero. With 
an additional assumption that neither of the involved parties can anticipate the contract
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renewal, we show that the lock-in effect persists under some constraints and a sequence 
of short-term contracts is preferable to a long-term contract.
The third model is motivated by the observation that various government 
interventions (protection) are still used by many developed and developing countries, but 
the empirical results do not always support the positive effect of protection. Considering 
a time-consuming investment, Chapter 4 first derives the optimal protection form, which 
consists of two often seen types of protection: during-investment and post-investment 
protection. When there is only a moral hazard problem, we show that the optimal 
protection scheme varies with the target firm’s investment ability and willingness, and it 
hence could involve no protection, one-part protection or two-part protection according 
to the cost and revenue environments. This result suggests that not all cases fit into the 
same protection form, and the efficient protection should take into account the target 
firm’s investment ability as well as investment willingness. In the context of incomplete 
information, we show that (1) The screening protection scheme could possibly coincide 
with the efficient scheme when only the inefficient type is lacking in investment 
willingness, or when there are only liquidity problems; (2) The screening scheme is 
strictly better than the pooled scheme of the efficient type; however, whether it is better 
than the pooled scheme of the inefficient type is dependent on parameter values; (3) 
Whenever there is a liquidity problem, the efficient type’s post-investment protection will 
be longer than that of the inefficient type; otherwise, the reverse result applies.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide the following insights into mechanism design: Firstly, as a 
consequence of assuming unobservable effort and binary outcomes (success or failure), 
there will be no trade off between efficiency and rent extraction in the solution. In other 
words, the principal’s fear that the whole project value will disappear in case of any
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shortage in (uncling has led the principal not to distort the production efficiency in the 
optimal mechanism. Furthermore, since there is no efficiency loss to any type, the 
solution will also be renegotiation proof after the revelation of the true value. However, 
there is a limitation in this setting, that is, throughout the thesis we are contented with the 
assumption that the principal can commit to not extend the scheme in the future. The 
time inconsistency problem has been a major concern in policy design, and although we 
have seen some discussion of the time inconsistency problem at the end of Section 3.6 
and Chapter 4, this issue ought to be discussed in more detail. Secondly, the time- 
consuming (or equivalently limited liability) assumption draws our attention to long-term 
mechanism design, and to complete the object, the mechanism needs to make sure that 
the agent’s effort decisions are best responses at each point within the mechanism. In 
terms of timing, although the principal’s decision is to precommit to a mechanism (hence 
it does not belong to the dynamic context), the agent’s effort decision will be dynamic. 
Thirdly, in Chapter 4 we consider the target firm’s future profits after the completion of 
the investment, and as a result, the optimal compensation scheme is affected by this 
consideration. As we have seen the difference this makes in an example from the patent 
literature, we should be more cautious in providing incentive schemes when the agent’s 
future value is taken into account.
We now consider possible applications of the three models. Firstly in the adoption 
model, technology adoption is basically an irreversible investment, and hence the model 
can be applied to various investment cases, such as the launch of McDonald into the 
Chinese market. The uncertainty associated with the investment may come from 
consumers’ preferences, and natural or bureaucratic environments. Secondly, a natural 
and important application of the long-term mechanism design is to the area of regulatory
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economics. More specifically, instead of using a constant project value or constant 
welfare change, we can replace the value by a market demand function, and thus discuss 
issues of price or quality regulation. This is directly relevant to Chapter 4, as we can 
interpret different levels of protection rates in the forms of regulated prices. Moreover, 
the discussion of multiple agents will be more important as the regulated markets are 
usually oligopolies. Further research can also analyse the setting of two-sided private 
information, risk aversion, correlated types and (when there is an auction) collusion 
among bidders. Finally, we can extend the protection model to discuss the effects of 
interest groups. That is, since policies are usually decided by voting in the Parliament and 
the producer’s lobby power will be limited by the single market profit, there will be some 
neutral voters whose attitude will depend on past protection experience. Flence when 
protection is first introduced, we can expect an exogenous renewal rate in the future, and 
therefore we can design a time-consistent protection scheme. But as explained, the time 
consistent protection scheme could be too expensive to put in practice.
I7C)
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